Language, truth and power in ancient Greek thought : prolegomena to Nietzsche. by Shepard, Paul M.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1993
Language, truth and power in ancient Greek
thought : prolegomena to Nietzsche.
Paul M. Shepard
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shepard, Paul M., "Language, truth and power in ancient Greek thought : prolegomena to Nietzsche." (1993). Doctoral Dissertations
1896 - February 2014. 1922.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1922






Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1993
Department of Political Science













e ome B. King, Membe
J. Peter Euben, Member
3-
Peter R. Pouncey, Member
George ^ Sulzner, B^partment Chair
Department of Political Science
For Dennis, my Patroclus.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There were some who fought the Trojan war for loot,
others for honor, a few for justice. This project
represents my Trojan War, and has lasted about as long.
During that time I have acquired no loot, collected little
acclaim, and seen precious little justice. I have, however,
been rewarded by a small amount of wisdom, mostly
unconventional, and a stalwart number of friends, equally
unconventional. Although I cannot name them all, there are
a few heroes among them for whom my appreciation is
eternally grateful. They cannot go untold.
Felix Oppenheim first enlisted me in the roles of
political theory. It was, characteristically for him, a
wholly magnanimous, kind and gracious gesture. It was for
me, the intellectual wanderer, a welcome home. Bill
Connolly has been the mentor every graduate student needs
and hopes to have. His early care and encouragement gave me
the energy and confidence to continue. His rare
intellectual vision and acuity launched me on an exciting
new odyssey at a time of life when I might have headed for
firmer ground. Jerry King's warm good nature, reverent
irreverence and unfailing insight presented a welcome refuge
whenever my ship floundered at sea. Nick Xenos paid me the
honor, unusual for a committee chairman, of allowing me to
v
chart my own course through difficult waters without taking
over the helm.
I want to single out Peter Pouncey for special,
heartfelt thanks among my committee members. His own work,
and his generous reception of mine, rekindled for me an
intellectual fire that might otherwise have become
extinguished through neglect.
Jane Bennett has been a true friend and colleague from
the beginning. More than she knows, her buoyant enthusiasm,
unrestrained optimism, refreshing candor and helpful
comments have kept me afloat over the years. Gary Lehring
taught me that it is possible, and often necessary, to
become a warrior without losing one's innocence or sense of
humor. Carol Cheu opened a place in her heart for me, a man
who could not, and would rather never have become a warrior.
I especially want to express my gratitude and
appreciation to Larry Feldman, without whose unselfish
assistance and wholehearted support this voyage could never
have been completed.
Lastly, but above all others, my heartfelt appreciation
for Dennis goes beyond words. He has at all times been all
things to me: father, mother, brother, son, and lover. He




LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND POWER IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT-
PROLEGOMENA TO NIETZSCHE
SEPTEMBER 1993
PAUL M. SHEPARD, B.A., WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
The meaning of democracy was contested theoretical and
political terrain in classical Athens. In this dissertation
I examine three contending theoretical views of democracy
found in the works of three Greek thinkers—Thucydides,
Aeschylus and Plato
—
present at the height of Athenian
democracy. I show that each view draws upon competing
conceptions of nature, language, truth, and power in order
to claim the contested terrain.
I argue that the heroic view of democracy, portrayed in
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, saw politics
as the means by which states achieve immortal glory through
feats of war which simultaneously destroy them. In this
view political power was delivered by the unified voice--the
single identity--of the Athenian assembly produced by the
power of persuasion.
I interpret the tragic view, represented by Aeschylus'
Oresteia, to criticize the heroic tradition of politics as
dangerously unbalanced. The Oresteia offers an alternative
vii
view of democracy in which multiple voices divided against
themselves produce not weakness but balance as a shield
against the loss of limits implied in the heroic view. I
argue that the ambiguity of language, and the ambiguous
identity it produces, is affirmed by tragedy to be a source
of political strength and not a sign of political
disintegration
.
The Platonic view articulated in the Republic opposes
both the heroic view of politics and its tragic revision. I
contend that the Republic, while appearing to oppose
democracy, actually seeks to place it on a more secure
foundation grounded in the logical concept of identity and
rational thought applied to the soul. I argue that the
Platonic attempt to found political order on the twin
concepts of logical and psychological identity maintained by
rational thought and language actually recapitulates on a
grand scale the same dangers it identifies in its heroic
opponents. And I suggest in conclusion that our Platonic
legacy may effectively blind us to the dangerously heroic
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The collective nature of political power is expressed
in various terms such as "assent," "consent," or
"obedience." "Action in concert" 1 is the phrase chosen by
Hannah Arendt to express the same concept and to distinguish
between the nature of political power on one hand, and force
or violence on the other. As Arendt well recognized,
however, action in concert poses a problem of limits. If
politics is by its very nature a marshalling or pooling of
individual power, on what basis or by what means is the
requisite assent, consent, or obedience obtained and what
are its limits? How, in other words, are we to distinguish
between cooperation and complicity?
The experience which shaped Arendt' s political
theorizing was of course the degree of cooperation, active
or passive, which contributed to the power of Nazi Germany.
Arendt ' s entire work is devoted to the need to distinguish
between this kind of political power and more "legitimate"
instances. In this respect Arendt 1 s work is representative
of much of Western political thought, and it follows a
venerable tradition which seeks to found that distinction
upon a notion of truth.
In her essay, "Truth and Politics," Arendt poses the
rhetorical question of whether political power "could or
2should be checked not only by a constitution, a bill of
rights, and by a multiplicity of powers, as in the system of
checks and balances,
. . . [but also] by something that
.
. .
has its source outside the political realm, and is as
independent of the wishes and desires of the citizens as is
the will of the worst tyrant." 2 To Arendt, the answer is
clearly "yes," and in her essay she goes on to argue for a
version of "factual truth" to fill that authoritative
position. It is beside the present point if Arendt's effort
ultimately fails to establish factual truth as the
unimpeachable authority needed to ground or legitimize
political action. For in that essay and in her larger work
Arendt conveys the conceptual architecture behind a
significant tradition of Western political thought.
Arendt's lifelong search for a truth to occupy the position
defined by the intersection of power, authority, and freedom
represents a tradition which seeks to admit the necessity of
power in political action while simultaneously seeking a
basis to limit that power once admitted.
The figure which haunts the shadows of all such efforts
is Friedrich Nietzsche. If Nietzsche's work can be said to
culminate in an affirmation of will to power, the persistent
target of this affirmation is the concept of truth in its
various historical articulations beginning with Plato.
Traditional approaches to Nietzsche tend to read his
work as endorsing, even celebrating, the priority of power
over and against truth. 3 The implicit assumption within the
3traditional critique is that truth and power stand in
primary opposition to each other and, more specifically,
that truth operates as a limit to power. On this
traditional view, then, Nietzsche's attack on truth is an
attack upon limits to power. But contrary to the
traditional view, Nietzsche's work can also be read as a
critique of a loss of limits to power which is definitive of
modernity. Far from endorsing the abolition of limits,
then, Nietzsche instead may actually sound a warning that
the limits have already been abolished, and that the
executioner was Plato.
From Nietzsche's perspective the highest ideals of
modernity have always been some version of the Platonic
ideal of subjecting power to a higher standard or even
banishing it from the world altogether. In Nietzsche's
lexicon, philosophic truth, religious truth, or scientific
truth are all, despite the deep oppositions which divide
them, merely different forms of the Platonist ideal of
erecting a final authority over power, an authority in the
form of an ideal standard which could both authorize and
limit power but which would itself require neither
authorization nor limit. From Nietzsche's perspective,
however, the "highest ideals" in the Platonic sense actually
operate as insidious forms of power, insidious in that they
deny or conceal themselves as power, and so operate as to
evade resistance, opposition, or limitation.
4It is fundamental to Nietzsche's position, as I
understand it, that unless power is openly acknowledged and
accepted as a primary component of human life, human
relations will be governed by a rancorous resentment which
destroys the possibility of human friendship and mutual
respect. Ironically then, from Nietzsche's perspective, the
attempt to banish the element of power from human relations
in favor of "higher" and finer sentiments can lead only to
an unhealthy, subterranean pursuit of power whose
insatiability consumes all other human possibilities
including those "higher values" in whose name power is
condemned. It is this self-denial of power which, in
Nietzsche's view, renders the figure "man" such a sick and
dangerous animal, sick because he does not recognize his
servitude to invisible power, and dangerous because he seeks
to extend it over all of life.
The Nietzschean position can be summed up briefly in
the claim that Platonic truth institutes a modern regime of
unlimited power. Adequate assessment of the charge requires
a re-examination of Platonic truth with respect to the
problem of power and its limits. But any such re-
examination must avoid slipping surreptitiously into a mere
Platonic rejoinder to Nietzsche. It is much too easy in
attempting to assess Nietzschean claims to uncritically and
unref lectively re-impose Platonic standards of truth and to
discover, not surprisingly, that Nietzsche does not conform
bto them. This then opens an easy door to dismissing
Nietzsche on various epistemological grounds.
To insist that Nietzsche be held accountable to
Platonic standards of truth is not to refute Nietzsche, it
is to refuse to take him seriously, and to take Nietzsche
seriously is first of all to entertain the possibility of
other configurations of truth opposed to the Platonic one.
Only then can the more difficult task be undertaken, which
is to assess the Nietzschean claim that Platonic truth poses
a special danger with respect to power.
Nietzsche's assault on Platonic truth is launched from
behind, so to speak, from the vantage point of earlier modes
of Greek thought. I follow a similar strategy in examining
the situation of Platonic truth with respect to the possible
limits of power by rejoining Platonic truth to its original
opponents in the form of tragic and heroic literature. The
initial objective is merely to try to make plausible the
claim that other configurations of truth form a part of the
same tradition which produces Plato, and to suggest critical
ways in which those earlier configurations differ from the
Platonic one. The credibility of the Nietzschean accusation
against Plato can then be better assessed.
Three traditional Greek cosmological orientations to
the problem of power and its limits can be identified: the
heroic, the tragic, and the Platonic. These configurations
formed three separate strands of a single tradition which is
largely definitive of ancient Greek political culture. But
6as separate strands of a single tradition, each orientation
nevertheless locates itself in opposition to one or both of
the others.
The heroic tradition, usually associated with the
Homeric poems, yields a relatively coherent conception of a
natural cosmological order and man's place within it. 4 The
two most prominent features of the heroic cosmos are power
and death, that is, human mortality. In the heroic view,
the cosmos is an arena of strife, an agon of forces and
powers in conflict. 5 Within this conception the relation of
truth and power can perhaps best be described as the truth
of power. Cosmic power was not something which Homeric
heroes took up and possessed; it was rather something which
mortals passed through, something which took them up and
touched them in some fashion or another. To an early Greek,
for example, the regularity of the seasons and the
alternation of night and day would not have signified
neutral events obeying mechanical-type laws. They would be
interpreted as signs of victory and defeat in the regular
ebb and flow of struggles for power among gods and other
active forces. Interpretation of the cosmos as a series of
interminable struggles for power need not imply that the
early Greeks did not notice the regularity of natural
cycles. It means only that the regularity was interpreted
and understood in terms of a contest or competition for
dominance
.
7Next to power, the most palpable presence in the
Homeric world is death. Significantly, death is the single
most prominent difference between men and gods in the
Homeric world. 6 Men die and the gods are immortal. The
ancient Greek gods were more powerful than mortals but they
were not omnipotent; they were fallible and could
occasionally be outwitted, seduced, and even wounded by
mortals. The gods were decidedly not more "moral" than
mortals in a modern sense. For a Greek to rely on the
morality of the gods could prove ruinous. What mortals
could rely on from the gods was their competition and desire
for honor, or deference, and in this they differed not at
all from men.
War was a normal occurrence in the Homeric world, and
it was somewhat paradoxically through the medium of war that
heroic man sought to overcome death through the achievement
of honor and glory. Although death served as an absolute
limit to individual power and presence in the immediate
world, immortality of a sort could in principle be achieved
in mortal memory, which is to say in the language of legend
and song. 8 The epic language of the Iliad, for example,
does not merely recount the exploits and the valor of
heroes; it commemorates those heroes in a monumental
language. The language of the Iliad is itself a monument to
greatness which in its timeless retelling confers a
semblance of immortality upon the greatest of heroes. The
choice faced by Achilles in the Iliad, for example, was not
8whether to live or die, but rather how to die: early, in
combat for the greatest glory told forever in song; or
later, unremembered and unsung. 9 Achilles chooses the
heroic death, and his greatness is remembered in part
because of the greatness of his opponent, Hector. In many
respects the contest between Achilles and Hector exemplifies
the heroic conception of power, which contains within itself
the notion of opposition. Where today we might see two
powers in conflict, the Homeric Greek would see conflict as
the very substance and expression of the singularity of
power. Conflict and the presence of opposition is a
characteristic of power in the Greek conception.
Although the heroic cosmos is an agon of forces
competing for dominance, the cosmos is not a chaos of power.
Limits operate through the agency of dike. Dike, usually
translated as "justice," is one of many Greek terms which
revolve around a conception of natural order in the cosmos.
Moira, fate, and physis, nature, are others. The term
kosmos itself is opposed to chaos and implies order. For
present purposes it suffices to think of dike as the
regulatory principle of order in the cosmos, "the order of
things," while remembering that the cosmos itself is an
order of power. Dike is not yet a moral notion in the
10Homeric cosmos.
Like any set of limits, dike both restrains and gives
form to that which it limits. It is often useful, for
example, to distinguish between the river and its banks, but
9we need not lose sight of the fact that without banks there
is no river. Similarly, although it may be analytically
useful, even necessary, to distinguish between power and the
dike which limits it, it would nevertheless be thoroughly
misleading to think of dike as having a separate identity
from the power which it limits. Power and opposition are
one, not two, in the heroic cosmos. This is perhaps the
simplest, yet most difficult "truth" for moderns to
comprehend. Its simplicity lies in its restrained,
geometric balance. Its difficulty lies in its challenge to
our deepest convictions about the nature of identity. To a
modern mind, identity means non-contradiction, but the
marriage of opposites which seems to characterize early
Greek thought seems to deny what for us is an intuitively
logical and necessary truth. As I will argue later,
however, this "intuition" of ours is an inheritance from
Plato. It was neither intuitive nor necessary to much of
pre-Socratic thought.
The distinguishing feature of the heroic cosmos is the
characteristic relationship between power and dike. In the
heroic cosmos, power conforms to a cyclical nature, physis,
resembling an upright wheel. The movement of celestial
objects, rising from the horizon to an akme, or zenith, and
then declining below the horizon again, supplies a model for
the natural rotation, or physis, of power. The natural
cycle of life, from weakness at birth through strength
at
maturity, followed by decline and death, is also seen
to
10
follow this cyclical trajectory. To the mind of an early
Greek, this paradigmatic movement represents a fundamental
truth of the cosmos; and the physis of power--which grows
from weakness to strength, possibly ascending to greatness
before entering its inevitable decline—offers no exception.
Given the agonistic conception of the cosmos which dominates
early Greek thought, any account of this cyclical movement
at the heart of the cosmos must be offered in terms of
power. If day is followed by night and Spring follows
Winter, for example, it is because Day becomes weak and is
defeated by Night, and Spring achieves victory over Winter.
Each achieves dominance in turn, only to face eventual
defeat by its proper opponent. Power is seen to be self-
limiting in this cosmology because it tends to naturally
increase (hubris) until it destroys itself, and it destroys
itself because it naturally generates its own opposition
which then passes through a similar cycle. A natural
tendency toward hubris11 is followed by dike, not as two
separate, oscillating powers, but as the physis of power
itself
.
Homeric man is compelled by the world he lives in to
pursue honor and avoid dishonor. Either course necessitates
an alignment with power. Neutrality, in the sense of a
position outside alignments of power, is not an available
option in the heroic world. Like most early Greek values,
the Greek idea of freedom is intimately related to the
centrality of power in the Greek experience. In the heroic
11
world "power" is almost synonymous with rule over others.
Thus only two real possibilities present themselves to the
early Greeks: rule or be ruled. In its heroic
manifestation "freedom" means freedom from rule by others.
Consequently dominance and freedom come to mean much the
same thing. 12 Equality of power was not yet a principle to
be maintained, but only a precarious condition resulting
from an indecisive competition for power and honor.
The all-consuming pursuit of honor seeks to overcome
the limit of mortality, but because power rises and falls
with the turning of the cosmos, those to whom dike once
grants the greatest honor and glory may also be those to
whom she delivers the greatest suffering and undoing. The
greater the rise, the greater the fall. Although the
inexorable action of dike would seem to mitigate against the
pursuit of greatness, it could also fuel the desire to die
in a heroic blaze of glory. In such a way a mortal might
cheat fate, live forever in memory, and earn a semblance of
honor customarily reserved only for the immortal gods.
Although the heroic view is most often, and
appropriately, associated with the epic poetry of Homer,
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, which bears
many affinities to Homer's Iliad, 12 is particularly well-
situated to illustrate the theoretical utility of the heroic
orientation to power and its limits. By the time Thucydides
writes his History, perhaps four centuries after the Iliad
was written down, the view of nature which silently shaped
12
the earlier text is no longer uncontested. Time, events,
and other texts have intervened to provide space for
competing views to clash. The distance from Homer to
Thucydides, however, far from dimming the heroic view,
sharpens it in some respects and renders it more available
to Thucydides as a theoretical account of the war he
describes between Athens and Sparta.
The Peloponnesian war, which ended in Athenian defeat,
lasted for twenty-seven years from 431 B.C. to 404 B.C. The
end of the war marked the end of a remarkable trajectory of
Athenian power following the combined Greek victory over
Persian naval forces at the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. 14
At Salamis the Persians were defeated by a confederation of
Greek forces including among the strongest both Athens and
Sparta. It was the Persian threat which initially served to
unite, at least loosely and temporarily, what had been
fiercely competitive and relatively autonomous Greek states.
Although the Greek confederation was at least in principle
an alliance between equals, Athenian daring and leadership
was conceded by others and claimed by Athens to have
contributed disproportionately to the victory. During the
war with Persia, Athens had boldly overthrown its traditions
to become a naval power. Following the audacious Greek
victory at Salamis, Athens continued to develop its navy and
15
emerged as the dominant power in greater Greece.
Twenty-eight years before Salamis, Athens had become a
democracy under the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C., and
13
Athenians were fond of crediting their greatness to their
form of government. If we accept this self
-assessment
, and
designate 508 B.C. as the infancy of Athenian greatness,
then the period which encompasses the institution of
Athenian democracy to the death of Socrates just over a
century later, in 399 B.C., represents a period of
extraordinary accomplishment amid intense intellectual
strife. This was the period of "Greek enlightenment" when
traditional understandings of the fundamental bases of law,
justice, and political rule, for example, came under intense
scrutiny and debate. It was also during this period that
the production and performance of Greek tragedy reached its
height before passing into history shortly after the end of
the Peloponnesian War.
The lifespan of Greek tragic drama closely paralleled
the steep trajectory of Athenian power and greatness. It
emerged along with Greek democracy and did not long outlive
it. A signal characteristic of Greek tragedy is the
dramatic presentation of contested meanings within the folds
of action. But the "tensions and ambiguities in Greek
tragedy" 16 do more than to dramatically reproduce and
reflect the social strains of shifting meanings within a
changing world. 17 Greek tragedy occupies a definite
political position and embraces an affirmative political
theory at odds with the heroic orientation shaping
Thucydides' text.
14
Thucydides* History and Greek tragic drama can be
juxtaposed to portray contending theoretical orientations to
the nature of power and its limits. In part the debate
revolves around the nature of language itself and its role
in political life, and this contest may account in part for
the prominent place of the famous speeches in Thucydides'
text. The theoretical confrontation which emerges from a
juxtaposition of Thucydides' History and Greek tragic drama
serves to illuminate both the heroic and tragic orientations
to the limits of power. The confrontation also helps to
situate, both historically and intellectually, the
Socratic/Platonic philosophic reaction to both the poetic
tradition and the political dislocations engendered by the
war. As it happens then, Thucydides' text presents a
convenient aperture through which we might view, directly or
indirectly, all three strands of the tradition I want to
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CHAPTER 2
THUCYDIDES AND THE LANGUAGE OF POWER
Thucydides and Homer
In Thucydides' History the heroic cycle of power is
traced by the dramatic rise and fall of Athenian power in
the context of the Peloponnesian War, where the war is
representative of the cosmic agon, and the combatants are
city-states rather than heroic individuals. The History
begins with an account of the antecedents of Athenian power
in "early times" and culminates in the political dis-
integration of Athens following the disastrous Sicilian
Expedition, in which the Athenians
were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they
suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying
is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army
—
everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned
home . 1
Between its emergence and its demise, Athenian imperial
power surpassed all previous bounds among Greeks, and
appeared to deny any future limits. The magnitude of the
Athenian defeat in Sicily provides a dramatic counterpoint
to the Battle of Salamis in the Persian War in which the
invading Persian fleet was destroyed by smaller Greek forces
and Athenian ingenuity. Although Thucydides does not make
the comparison explicit, the ironic reversal could hardly
fail to be noted by any contemporary Greek reader, and
the
18
contrast follows a basic structural principle of Thucydides'
text
.
In his introduction to the Crawley translation of
Thucydides History, T. E. Wick describes Thucydides' style
as "antithetical," that is, "characterized by sentences in
which words, clauses, and ideas are coordinated to give
balance, parallelism, and comparison and contrast." 2 As
Wick also observes, the antithetical designation can readily
be applied not only to Thucydides' own narrative sentence
structure and that of the reconstructed speeches of various
parties to the war, it can be applied as well to the
organization and arrangement of the whole work. Initially,
the text appears to be a running account of the events of
the war as they occurred, and Thucydides' method of
chronicling the war according to consecutive summers and
winters contributes to the initial impression. The geometry
of the text soon emerges, however. The speeches, often
presented in balanced pairs, are frequently echoed and
rejoined in complex juxtapositions later in the text.
Beyond the speeches, the text abounds with contrasts and
comparisons, oppositions and reversals. Sea-power is
contrasted with land-power, Athenian character is contrasted
with Spartan character, and oligarchy is contrasted to
democracy. Justice is pitted against both force and
expediency. A description of Athens afflicted by plague is
paralleled by a description of Corcyra afflicted by civil
war. These contrasting images are then reversed, turned
19
inside out, and paradoxically rejoined with yet other
oppositions within the text moving in similar orbits. The
structure is not merely antithetical; it is thoroughly
agonistic. Even Thucydides' apparently natural method of
recounting events chronologically by summers and winters can
be seen to conform to the principle of paired oppositions
which governs the structure of the text.
Hunter R. Rawlings III, in The Structure of Thucydides
'
History, further claims that "Thucydides wrote the history
of a great war that was itself composed of two wars of
almost identical length." 3 According to Rawlings,
Thucydides' original insight that the Peloponnesian War was
a single war of twenty-seven years' duration4 is further
complicated by Thucydides' belief, reflected in the
structure of the text, that the war was "not only twenty-
seven years long, but it consisted of two periods of
intense, continuous fighting each lasting ten years. It was
the equivalent of two epic wars." 5 Rawlings then argues
meticulously that the speeches and events of the "two wars"
present mirror opposites to each other.
°
That Thucydides' text is carefully structured, and
structured antithetically, has been extensively noted by
other scholars. 7 Considerably less attention has been given
to the significance of that structure. Rawlings contends
that the structure is intended to demonstrate and verify the
truth of Thucydides' assertion that the past will resemble
the future, 8 not as repetition but as ironic contradiction.
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Francis Cornford, in his Thucydides Mythistoricus
, is among
those drawn to the tempting conclusion that Thucydides' text
is not history at all in the modern sense but rather a form
of tragic drama. 10
Reacting to the "ambivalences" and oppositions within
the text, James Boyd White claims in When Words Lose Their
Meaning, that "irresolution on matters of greatest
importance is a structural characteristic of the text as a
whole." 11 White's intention is not to fault Thucydides'
ability or style, even though he finds that "the events of
the History are
. . . constructed in incompatible ways as
well as subjected to incompatible modes of explanation."
Indeed he emphasizes that "the opposition is deliberate
. . . [and] gives the text its central life and meaning." 12
White's interpretation is both sophisticated and generous.
He argues that Thucydides has created a text which "mirrors
the world" itself, one in which "the modes of presentation
and understanding Thucydides employs are the ways in which
we still try to make sense of our own world. ni He
maintains further that Thucydides goes "beyond the
conditions of his own life as he represents them and raises
a hope that things could somewhere, sometime be different"
from a world which falls apart. 14
White's invocation of a world shared at some level by
both Thucydides and the modern reader fails to consider that
Thucydides' world may be even more alien to us than White
allows. White's insistent characterization of the
21
paradoxical oppositions which structure Thucydides ' text as
a "lack of resolution" prevents him from entertaining the
possibility of a world in which the longing for resolution
is not an operative or predominant standard. White's text
is one of the more prominent attempts to interpret
Thucydides* text as anti-war. But the alternative
possibility, that the text is a glorification of war in the
Homeric tradition, has at least an equal claim to viability.
Rather than rejecting the world of war, the text may seek to
defend and immortalize it just as Homer immortalized the
Trojan War in the Iliad.
White would consider the criticism to be misguided
since he interprets Homer's Iliad to be anti-war as well. 15
Commenting on the oppositions which permeate the heroic
culture, and which are represented in the quarrel between
Achilles and Agamemnon, White finds it "remarkable that the
culture provides the intellectual and rhetorical material by
which an opposition such as this can be defined . . . but
apparently no material by which it can be authoritatively
addressed and resolved. . . . The central issue is always
this: Who shall dominate, and who shall submit." [Emphasis
added]. 16 The agonistic order of the heroic cosmos is
recaptured in part in the antagonism between Achilles and
Agamemnon, and White confronts this world with wonderment.
His governing standard of "resolution"—resolution of
ambiguity and conf lict--prevents him from seeing the culture
he observes as whole and coherent in its own way. From the
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perspective of "resolution," the culture must be viewed as
deficient, incomplete, and inadequate.
White notes that, although Homer necessarily works
within "a language that seems to have been made for the
celebration of the heroic culture he criticizes," 17 the
structure of the poem manages to order materials into a
"pattern of experience that teaches the reader something
different from anything the material itself seems to say." 18
According to White, the critical space opened up by the
structure of the poem "operates as an appeal to normalcy, to
a world without war, where night is safe and beautiful." 19
The status of this "normalcy" is in question, however.
White makes no claim that war itself was anything but normal
in Greek culture from Homer to Thucydides
.
20 It would
appear, then, that the normalcy of a world without war
alludes to the "impossible hope" repeatedly invoked by White
and attributed to both Homer and Thucydides. 21 This longing
for reconciliation and resolution, which finds no actual
expression in the language of either Homer or Thucydides,
and which exists, according to White, only in the unspoken
community of author and reader, 22 apparently finds its
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reality in the universal longings of humanity.
There is, then, something resembling a Hegelian dynamic
shaping White's interpretations of both Homer and
Thucydides. It seems uncharitable to be critical of this
beautiful vision or to deny a moment of "truth" to the hope
which inspires it. Nevertheless, it bears noting that
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White's "impossible hope" may represent an innocence
achieved through the privileged elevation of one set of
longings over still yet others present in the human breast.
Modern thought will puzzle at a suggestion that hope for an
end to strife and conflict should not be privileged over
contrary longings. But another Greek tradition, found in
Greek tragedy, will treat the proposed hierarchy as itself
dangerously unbalanced. And Nietzsche will, much later,
remind us that such innocence may itself become the
unwitting instrument of those "other" longings.
Thucydides
'
text exists in an ambiguous relationship to
Homer. On the one hand Thucydides appears to disparage
Homer and "the poets," associating them with exaggeration
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and romance. On the other hand, Thucydides tends to echo
Homer even as he discounts him. The key to this paradox is
contained in the Greek tradition of the agon, or contest.
Thucydides is engaged in a competition with Homer in which
he seeks to best Homer at his own game. Like Homer,
Thucydides relates the history of a war. More to the point,
Thucydides informs us repeatedly that his war, the
Peloponnesian War, is the greatest war in history. 60 This
would certainly have been a bold claim by contemporary Greek
standards. The Trojan war occupied the central position in
Greek history, and all wars in Greece tended to be measured
against the Trojan War. 26 Thucydides, however, provides
numerous grounds for the claim that his war is greater than
Homer's war. The Trojan War lasted for ten years by Homer's
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account, but the Peloponnes ian War lasted for twenty-seven
years. Furthermore, since the Peloponnesian War was a
single war composed of two ten-year wars separated by a
seven-year interval of nominal peace, 27 it was, he could
argue, the equivalent of two epic wars, and more than twice
as great as Homer's war. 28 Thucydides could also claim that
the scale of the fighting involved in the Peloponnesian War
was far greater than that of the Trojan War. For contrary
to the Peloponnesian War, he tells us, the Trojan War never
employed the whole concentrated force of the victors.
On the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation
. . .
and to piracy from want of supplies. This is what
really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten
years against them. ... If they had . . . persevered
in the war without scattering for piracy and
agriculture, they would easily have defeated the Trojans
in the field . . . [and] the capture of Troy would have
cost them less time and less trouble. y
Thucydides similarly dismisses the Persian War as an
engagement which "found a speedy decision in two actions by
sea and two by land," in contrast to the Peloponnesian War
which was "prolonged to an immense length," and caused an
unprecedented scale of desolation, suffering, and
bloodshed. 30 Lastly, Thucydides can, and does, claim
superiority to both Homer and Herodotus in terms of
accuracy, thereby elevating himself by implication to the
unrivaled status of the greatest historian of all time,
suitably fit to be the chronicler of the greatest war in
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history. As a parting blow to Homer, Thucydides notes as
additional signs of greatness the unparalleled number and
extent of earthquakes, eclipses, droughts, famines, and
plague associated with the Peloponnesian War. 32
Even as Thucydides discounts Homer on one level, he is
simultaneously engaged on another level in demonstrating a
Homeric truth exemplified in the Peloponnesian War on a
greater scale than ever before: power follows its own laws,
and power uses men, not the reverse. On one level,
Thucydides might be read as the first modern historian,
chronicling a war in an almost scientifically detached
manner. On a deeper level, the structural patterns of the
History suggest that Thucydides may be defending an older,
more conservative view of law, nature, and "the order of
things" generally, against more modern contentions of his
day
.
The Truth of Power and Language
There can be little doubt that in his account of the
war, Thucydides seeks to convey a great and timeless
truth. 34 Thucydides himself informs us that
The absence of romance in my history will, I fear,
detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged
useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge
of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the
future, which in the course of human things must
resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content.
In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which
26
is to win the applause of the moment, but as a
possession for all time. 35
We may judge from this passage that Thucydides finds
revealed in :he war a pattern to human events which recurs
over time, and it is this pattern which interests him even
more than the particular events of the war. The course of
the war is treated by Thucydides as metaphorical of a
greater truth. The point is reinforced by Thucydides'
assertion that his work eschews mere passing entertainment
to aim at a possession for all time; that is, it presents,
in Thucydides 1 view, a timeless truth.
Some scholars have focused on the apparent utilitarian
value of knowledge claimed by Thucydides in the passage
above. According to one view, Thucydides advances an early
rationalist view of history incorporating a belief that
rational understanding of the past will be useful in
altering or controlling future events. Thucydides,
however, makes no such claim here or anywhere else in the
text. He suggests that history recurs in cyclical patterns,
and that a knowledge of those patterns will be useful in
interpreting or recognizing the future. There is never any
claim that human intelligence can do more than observe the




The growth of power generally, not merely Athenian
power, is the subject of the first twenty-four chapters of
Thucydides' History, usually referred to as the
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"Archaeology." The theme of "greatness" permeates this
section of the text. In the opening sentences Thucydides
tells us that he undertook to write the history of the
Peloponnesian war because he believed it "would be a great
war;" indeed it would be "the greatest movement yet known in
history;" and further, that there was nothing on such a
"great scale, either in war or in other matters" which
preceded it. 38 Greatness is contrasted generally to
weakness throughout the Archaeology, and it is treated
synonymously with a range of activities including the
building of large cities, collective action, naval power,
and of course, war. The nominal subject of the History,
then, is the course of a particular war, but the larger
subject concerns a recurring pattern of history involving
great and powerful deeds: deeds which command renown and
are therefore worthy of retelling; and a pattern of power so
inscribed in nature as to earn the epithet of "truth."
Addressing the question of the origins, roots, or
causes of the war, Thucydides distinguishes between two
categories of causes— those which were spoken and those
which were unspoken--and he concludes that the true cause,
which was "invisible to speech," was the growing power of
Athens. This distinction between spoken and unspoken causes
parallels Thucydides' division of the text into speeches and
narrative. The passage which introduces the subject of the
causes of the war deserves close examination since it has
long been recognized as one of the most important in the
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text. As translated by w. Robert Connor it reads as
follows
:
The Athenians and Peloponnesians began the war when they
repudiated the Thirty Years Truce which they had made
after the capture of Euboea [in 446 B.C.]. I have set
down first the causes of complaint and the grievances
behind the repudiation so that no one ever has to
investigate from what origin such a great war broke out
among the Greeks. The truest reason, although the least
evident in the discussion, was, in my opinion, that the
Athenians by growing great caused fear in the [Spartans]
and drove them into war.^
Hunter Rawlings III translates the same passage, retaining
the Greek terms in critical places, as follows:
As to why they broke the peace, I wrote first the aitiai
and the diaphorai , so that no one will ever seek the
background out of which so great a war arose among the
Greeks. But as for the truest prophasis, though the
least apparent in talk, I believe that the Athenians,
becoming powerful and causing fear in the [Spartans]
,
forced them into war. 40
And lastly, the Crawley translation:
To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by
placing first an account of their grounds of complaint
and points of difference [aitiai and diaphorai] that no
one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which
plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The
real cause [ alethestate prophasis] I consider to be the
one which was formally most kept out of sight
[aphanestate de logoi] . The growth of the power of
Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in [Sparta],
made war inevitable.
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Both the Connor and the Rawlings translations make clear
that the "true cause" of the war was unspoken, in contrast
to the accusations articulated by the parties to the war.
The Crawley translation, in rendering aphanestate de logoi
as "out of sight" rather than "beyond language" or some such
equivalent, deflects attention from the Thucydidean
distinction between things which appear in language and
things which do not. The Crawley translation does have the
merit, however, of clearly highlighting the issue of
background causes, or why the war broke out.
The controversy which surrounds this passage concerns
the perplexing notion of "cause" employed by Thucydides.
Frances Cornford argues persuasively that Thucydides had no
concept available to him resembling our modern,
deterministic sense of cause. ^ He concludes that the word
is best avoided, advice which is largely respected by Connor
and Rawlings. Sound as it may be, Cornford 's analysis does
not satisfactorily address the importance of Thucydides'
distinction between things which did and did not appear in
speech; and it is well for us to recall that precisely what
did not appear in speech was the truth.
Cornford' s analysis focuses on the fact that the Greek
term prophasis, which Thucydides employs in some sense of
"root cause," can also mean "pretext." Cornford then
translates the critical phrase alethestate prophasis,
aphanestate de logoi, as "the most genuine pretext, though
it appeared least in what was said." He concludes that
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"Thucydides draws no clear distinction between an aitiai and
a prophasis. No respectable writer who had such a
distinction in his thoughts could speak of a 'most genuine
pretext, which appeared least in what was said'
--which in
fact was least of all a pretext." 43 Cornford identifies the
paradoxical, oxymoronic aspect of the construction and
concludes that Thucydides could not mean what he appears to
say. But oxymoronic constructions, we know from Greek
tragedy, were a hallmark of the Greek language. It is
strange that Cornford, who argues forcefully that
Thucydides' History is actually a tragic drama on the model
of Aeschylus, should reject as meaningless a linguistic
construction which is itself a characteristic feature of the
language of Greek tragedy.
The fact that Thucydides' His tory consists in large
part of reconstructed speeches of parties to the war
strongly suggests that we should take Thucydides at his
word, and treat the puzzling distinction between truths
which appeared in speech and those which did not, as
deliberate and significant. What does it mean to say that
the truth did not appear in language? Does it mean that it
was mere happenstance that no one mentioned it? Was there
deception involved? Was the truth deliberately omitted from
language, suggesting that it could have been spoken but was
not? Or was the truth of such a nature that it could not
appear in words, and was therefore invisible to language?
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James Boyd White adopts the first view when he says
that "prophasis" simply refers to "what the Spartans would
have said had they spoken to the question. In this sense it




According to White, Thucydides "spends little time on what
he calls its [the war's] 'truest explanation' or deepest
cause, for that is easily stated: it is Sparta's fear of
Athens* growth. His primary concern is with its 'causes' in
a different sense: the grounds or claims that the two sides
had against each other," that is, the spoken charges and
accusations.^ But White's treatment of the problem begs
the question of why Thucydides would bother to make such a
distinction in the first place, and go so far as to
structure the text around it. White overlooks the
possibility that, far from spending little time on the war's
truest explanation, which was hidden from speech, Thucydides
actually devotes his entire text to exploring the unspoken
cause—power--and its relation to language.
Thucydides' text has been interpreted by others as
attempting to convey a universal truth or law of nature. °
Often, however, these interpretations seize upon Thucydides'
allusions to "human nature," and place that notion at the
center of analysis. The approach is not without foundation
in the text, but, in my opinion, it does not go far enough.
Limiting the interpretive focus to the concept of "human
nature" rather than "nature" writ large, tends to prejudge
the question and overlook the strong possibility that
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Thucydides' text resists to some degree the notion of a
human nature autonomous from the forces of necessity
[ananke] operating in the whole of nature itself. 47
Focusing on the element of compulsion cited by
Thucydides in the Athenian growth of power and the Spartan
response, Werner Jaeger suggests that Thucydides points in
the direction of an overarching law of nature. According to
Jaeger, Thucydides considered that "Athenian progress to
power was necessary and inevitable," and he saw that "Sparta
was compelled by fear of Athens to declare war." 48 Jaeger
concludes that Thucydides' recurrent references to
compulsion, or necessity, indicate that the effort to
delineate the causes of the war does not seek to fix
responsibility or blame, but looks more toward the immanent
laws of power itself. In this context it is significant
that Thucydides emphasizes in the Archaeology that both
Athens and Sparta were at the height of their power when the
war broke out, y suggesting that power is bipolar in nature
and conforms to a pattern of development ascending from
early weakness to a great clash at its peak. The pattern of
the Peloponnesian War, exemplifying the cycle of power, then
suggests that the peak is followed by decline and
disintegration before the pattern repeats itself anew. It
has often been remarked that Thucydides, like Homer in his
treatment of the Trojans, does not detract from the
greatness of the Spartans, even though Thucydides himself is
an Athenian. The explanation is found in the
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Homeric/Thucydidean view of power as agonistic in its very
structure. Power includes the element of opposition which
it generates within itself as it grows.
Thucydides' treatment of the true cause of the war
suggests a relationship between power, truth, and language
such that power and truth belong together in some fashion on
one side of an antithetical relation to speech. Three
related possibilities present themselves. 1) The truth of
power does not appear in language. But then what does
appear in language? 2) The truth of power and the truth of
language are not the same. This alternative suggests that
there is a truth of language which is at odds with the truth
of power. 3) The truth of power appears in language but
does not appear in words or speech. This third formulation
distinguishes between the content of language and its use,
and it is this formulation which is most consistent with
Thucydides' portrayal of language in the text. Thucydides
regularly portrays language used instrumentally , and the
reader must carefully distinguish between what is said in
speech and what is sought by speech. This line of reasoning
raises perplexing questions, to be sure, but it also
provides a useful key to interpreting Thucydides' text. The
speeches are included in the text as much for what is unsaid
as for what is said, and the reader must therefore be alert
to ironic juxtapositions of speeches, actions, and events.
Another clue to the function of the speeches in the text
lies in Thucydides' methodological statement that while he
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has adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of
what was said, it was also his habit to "make the speakers
say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various
occasions."™ Like other ambiguities and obscurities in
Thucydides, this methodological statement has been the
subject of some debate. Certainly, however, it seems to
admit the possibility that Thucydides' History portrays an
active power of Necessity at work in the speeches as well as
the events.
The Speeches and the War
Immediately following his statement of the true but
unspoken cause of the war— the growth of the power of
Athens—Thucydides allows that nevertheless, "it is well to
give the grounds alleged by either side which led to . . .
the breaking out of war." 51 An account of the affair of
Epidamnus follows. By prefacing his account in such a
manner, Thucydides makes clear that the events of the affair
to be described belong to the aitiai and diaphorai , and not
to the truest prophasis of the war. Later, following his
account of the affair of Epidamnus and the numerous debates
and allegations which it inspired, Thucydides provides a
lengthy retrospective account, known as the "penta-
contaetia," of the circumstances under which Athenian power
grew following the Persian War. 52 Although the penta-
contaetia has often been treated as a digression, W. Robert
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Connor recognizes it as an elaboration of the truest cause
of the war: the growth of Athenian power. 53
Epidamnus, a city on what is now the Adriatic coast,
was a colony of Corcyra, one of the wealthiest cities in
Greece and a notable sea-power. Corcyra in turn had been
founded as a colony of the city of Corinth. As a matter of
custom, the original founders of Epidamnus were leading
citizens of Corinth, thus preserving formal affiliation to
the original parent city. Following a period of
debilitating internal strife in which an exiled faction of
nobles allied themselves with non-Greek foreigners to attack
the city, Epidamnus sought the assistance of Corcyra to end
the war. Corcyra, however, refused any aid to its colony.
The Epidamnians then turned for assistance to Corinth after
receiving favorable guidance from the God at Delphi. On
behalf of their appeal to Corinth, the Epidamnians could
cite the customary bonds of affiliation as well as the
divine blessings of Delphi. The Corinthians consented to
protect the Epidamnians, according to Thucydides, because
"they felt it to be a kind of duty. . . . Besides," he adds
succinctly, "they hated the Corcyraeans" for their failure
54
to properly honor Corinth as their own parent city.
Thucydides inserts a brief description of the relative power
and wealth of Corcyra before concluding that "All these




In the space of a few short sentences Thucydides has
managed to quietly introduce the elements of a major
confrontation which will be amplified throughout the text.
On one hand, there are claims of justice; on the other hand
there are subterranean interests of power and advantage. In
this instance calculations of justice (duty and friendship)
and interest could be made to coincide by Corinth. But
Thucydides deftly complicates things by noting a short time
later without further comment that "the Epidamnian exiles
had come to Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of their
ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to restore them." 55
In other words, Thucydides shows us two warring factions of
Epidamnians appealing in similar terms of kinship
obligations to enemies who are themselves related. Clearly,
beneath the surface of this matter-of -f actly chronicled
event of the war, there are inaudible conflicts already
taking place.
Upon learning of Corinthian assistance to Epidamnus
,
Corcyra besieged her colony, and Corinth then declared war
on Corcyra. In the end, both Epidamnus and the Corinthian
fleet fell to Corcyra. Following its defeat, Corinth, a
Spartan ally, concentrated all of its efforts on building up
a powerful naval force against Corcyra. Alarmed by the
prospect of Corinthian power, Corcyra, previously unaligned
with either the Athenians or the Spartans, sought to enter
into alliance with Athens. An assembly was convened at
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Athens to decide the question, with both Corcyraean and
Corinthian advocates present.
The ensuing debate, generally referred to as the
"Corcyraean Debate," contains the first set of formal
speeches presented by Thucydides
. The Corcyraeans spoke
first to the question of why Athens should accept them into
alliance. The Corinthians, in a point-by-point rebuttal,
sought to convince the Athenians to reject the Corcyraean
suit
.
The Corcyraean speech is notable for its heavy reliance
upon considerations of power and expedience to convince the
Athenians to accept them. The Corcyraeans begin by
renouncing their past policy of non-alliance as both weak
and inexpedient. Next, following a perfunctory claim to
being a victim of injustice, Corcyra enumerates the many
advantages which will accrue to Athens upon acquiring the
most powerful navy in Hellas, second only to Athens' own.
Thirdly, Corcyra prompts Athens how to reply to anticipated
Corinthian claims to have law and justice on its side. And
lastly, Corcyra returns again to rehearse at length the
strategic considerations flowing from the size of the
Corcyraean navy, and the folly of an Athenian rejection of
alliance
.
For your first endeavor should be to prevent, if
possible, the existence of any naval power except your
own; failing this, to secure the friendship of the
strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe
that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon
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this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the
treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever
your fears, your strength will be formidable to your
antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you
derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will
have no terrors for a strong enemy. 56
Aside from two rather peremptory and defensive earlier
references to injustice, the entire Corcyraean speech is
couched in terms of calculations of power and advantage.
The brief mention of "justice" merely serves to highlight
the emphasis upon power. In contrast, the Corinthian speech
is devoid of strategic calculations, and is framed entirely
as an appeal to considerations of justice. The Corinthian
speech is sprinkled with references to justice and
injustice, honor and shame, honesty and moderation, law and
morality, doing right and being wronged, the commission of
crimes, and mutual gratitude among friends. Against
calculations of power and advantage, the Corinthians argue
that "Abstinence from all injustice ... is a greater tower
of strength than anything that can be gained by the





At the conclusion of this lengthy debate, Thucydides
reports that two assemblies were held by the Athenians. "In
the first, there was a manifest disposition to listen to the
representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling
had changed, and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on,
with certain reservations." 68 It was to be a defensive, not
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an offensive alliance, and could not therefore be invoked by
Corcyra to involve Athens in an attack upon Corinth, a
Spartan ally, in violation of the Treaty of Euboea between
Athens and Sparta. As for the reasons behind the Athenian
decision, Thucydides says only that war with the
Peloponnesians (Sparta and its allies) was felt to be
inevitable, and no one was willing to see the naval power of
Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth.
Thucydides says nothing more about the process of
Athenian decisionmaking except that "two assemblies were
held." James Boyd White acknowledges that the Athenian
decision, as reported, seems to bear little relation to the
actual arguments presented by either side, even though the
decision favored Corcyra over Corinth. 59 Why then has
Thucydides bothered to provide nearly eight pages of
speeches when they seem to have so little relation to the
way in which the decision to form an alliance was made?
According to White, the speeches introduce the reader to a
"culture of argument, of which it is Thucydides' object to
tell the history." 60 White maintains that it is language
which defines or constitutes the community of speakers, and
consequently it is language which furnishes limits upon the
actions performed by members of the community which it
constitutes. White contends that the culture of argument
depicted in the Corcyraean Debate is successful on its own
terms even though the outcome of the speeches is the
beginning of a war, for it is not the purpose of this
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culture to eliminate war but rather to make it manageable
within limits. 61
White's identification of language as an authoritative
source of limits would not have been an entirely alien
thought to the Greek culture of Thucydides ' time. Indeed
there are both tragic and Socratic/Platonic dimensions to
his argument. But Thucydides' text can also be interpreted
as specifically contesting those views rather than sharing
or endorsing them. The text directly challenges the
presumption that language is a privileged repository of
limits by portraying language as little more than one weapon
among others to be wielded in the pursuit of domination or
advantage. There are early indications of this view in the
Corcyraean offer to Corinth to arbitrate their differences
over Epidamnus . The offer was rejected by Corinth as long
as Corcyra refused to lift its siege of the colony. In this
exchange, which is reported without commentary by
Thucydides, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
neither side is willing to resort to the language of
arbitration unless it is likely to yield a superior
advantage to its own position. Thus Corcyra is willing to
talk so long as it is permitted to simultaneously continue
its military options. The delay of arbitration would then
disadvantage only Corinth. But significantly, Corinth, too,
was unwilling to press for arbitration without securing a
CO
greater advantage for itself in the process. Later, in
the Corcyraean Debate at Athens, Corcyra recalled the
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Corinthian rejection of arbitration as evidence of unjust
Corinthian intentions. The Corinthians countered that,
under the circumstances, the Corcyraean offer amounted to no
more than a resort to arms in words as well as deeds. 63
Lest the Corinthians appear to occupy the moral high ground
in this debate, Thucydides mentions in passing that the only
reason for the Corinthian presence in Athens in the first
place was to prevent her own war aims from being impeded. 64
It has long been tempting to read Thucydides' History
as a compelling drama of Athenian hubris (overreaching)
followed by the moral retribution of Nemesis. 65 From this
perspective, the Athenian alliance with Corcyra would
represent the first in a series of increasingly arrogant
Athenian actions which eventually led to her downfall. Part
of the appeal of this interpretation is undoubtedly its
comfortable fit with modern moral views. The text, however,
permits a contrary interpretation. Soon after the
Corcyraean Debate, Athens will suggest to the Spartan
Assembly that the issue of justice is only raised by those
who seek their own advantage but lack other forms of
strength to secure it. 66 It is a claim which recurs
throughout the text, and it suggests that an adequate
assessment of claims of justice must take into account the
relative position of who is speaking. In the Corcyraean
Debate it is the Corinthians who are at a strategic
disadvantage in confronting an alliance between Athens and
Corcyra. And it is Corinth who raises the "cry of justice."
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Much later, in the hour of defeat, the Athenian commander
Nicias, too, will speak of justice and reverence for the
gods. But it remains to be decided whether, in Thucydides
'
view, this is a portrayal of poetic justice and Nemesis in
action, or whether it is confirmation of the law of nature
soon to be cited by Athens that the strong take what they
can while the weak cry out for justice.
Although the Athenian Alliance with Corcyra was to be
defensive in nature, it soon drew Athens inadvertently into
direct naval conflict with Corinth, a Spartan ally and
member of the Peloponnesian Confederacy. As a result of
this and other grievances against Athens, Corinth and other
allies came to address the Spartan Assembly, and sought to
elicit a declaration of war from that body against the
Athenians. Of all the allies to address the Spartans,
Thucydides records only the speech of the Corinthians, the
last to speak. The Corinthian speech presents two major
thrusts. It holds Spartan lack of resistance responsible
for the expansion of Athenian power, and it contrasts the
bold adventurousness of Athenian character with the timid
procrastination of the Spartans. The Corinthians accuse the
Spartans of being overly concerned with acting justly, and
fi7
too little concerned with resisting injustice. For,
according to the Corinthians, the true subjugator of a
people is not so much the immediate aggressor as it is the
one who could prevent it but does not. 68 There then follows
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a long and striking comparison of Athenian and Spartan
national character.
The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their
designs are characterized by swiftness alike in
conception and execution; you [Spartans] have a genius
for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total
want of invention, and when forced to act you never go
far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their
power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger
they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is
justified by your power, to mistrust even what is
sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from
danger there is no release. Further there is
promptitude on their side against procrastination on
yours; they are never at home, you are never far from
it; for they hope by their absence to extend their
acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what
you have left behind. ... To describe their character
in a word, one might truly say that they were born into
the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to
others .
^
At the metaphorical level, the Corinthian speech
introduces two new elements into the Thucydidean view of
power. The Peloponnesian War is to be seen not merely as a
contingent war over prerogatives between adjacent city-
states, but rather as a violent and necessary clash between
fundamentally opposite principles. 70 Secondly, Thucydides'
characterization of power is not limited to domination, but
includes within it the necessity of resistance to
domination. The remainder of the text elaborates and
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explores the inner dynamic of this bipolar conception of
power
.
The Corinthian speech is set off against a speech by
Athenian envoys who, Thucydides tells us, just happened to
be present in Sparta on other business. The intention of
the Athenian speech, according to Thucydides, was not to
defend Athens against the charges being brought against her,
but to show that war was not a matter to be hastily decided
upon but rather one which called for further consideration.
"There was also a wish to call attention to the great power
of Athens
. . . ,
" Thucydides informs us, "from a notion that
their words might have the effect of inducing them [the
Peloponnesians] to prefer tranquility to war." 71 The
Athenian speech reminds the Spartans of Athens' superior
contributions to the defeat of the invaders during the
Persian War, a victory which benefitted Peloponnesians as
much as Athenians. Then, in an interesting parallel to the
Corinthian speech, Athens charges that it was Spartan
reticence against the Persians that made the Athenian empire
both possible and necessary. 72 And furthermore, they
charge, had Sparta persevered contrary to her character,
then Sparta, too, would have been forced to follow the same
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path to empire as Athens and incur the same hatreds.
Contrary to the Corinthian speech, however, which seeks to
goad Sparta into compensating for its earlier hesitations by
going to war against Athens now, the Athenian speech claims
that as a result of Spartan reticence the Athenians fairly
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earned and now deserve their empire. Inherent in this claim
is a view of a natural order of things in which superior
power properly rises due to the weakness of others.
Moreover, the Athenian position implicitly denies a moral
dimension to the imbalance of power, attributing it to the
natural order. There is no room for equality in this
conception; either Athens must dominate, or Sparta must
dominate according to the order of things. At this point
the Athenians articulate for the first time the natural law
which commands their allegiance: "... for it has always
been the law that the weaker should should be subject to the
stronger." It is only Spartan calculations of their own
interests, continue the Athenians, which now prompt them to
take up the cry of justice, "a consideration which no one
ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had
a chance of gaining anything by might. Nevertheless,
Athens continues, in actual practice Athenian justice is far
more equitable than its superior strength would require, and
more moderate than the practice of others would be in the
same position.
Athens, in the very act of describing its own position
as just, seems to be conceding some legitimate force to the
language and the principle of justice. But the "justice"
which Athens acknowledges is upon closer inspection very
different from the "justice" apparently invoked by its
accusers. Athenian justice, or the principle upon which it
is based, resembles a gift of mercy or restraint which a
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conqueror might at its discretion grant to the conquered.
This principle is not at all at odds with the law of nature,
just cited by Athens in the same speech, that the weaker
should be subject to the stronger.
The Athenian speech closes with a reminder to its
audience of the unpredictabilities of war once it starts,
and proposes that Spartan and Athenian differences should be
settled by arbitration as called for by their treaty. The
apparent reasonableness of this final appeal is somewhat
tempered by two considerations. Firstly, the Athenian
character described by the Corinthian speech is far better
suited than the conservative Spartan character to take
advantage of the imponderables of war. And secondly, the
Athenian offer of arbitration is not only consonant with the
treaty, it also coincides with the Athenian strategy of
delay indicated earlier by Thucydides
.
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Following the Athenian speech, the Spartan assembly
dismissed both the Athenians and their own allies in order
to debate the question of war among themselves. Thucydides
presents the speeches of two Spartan leaders, King
Archidamus and the ephor S tenelaides
.
76 The speech of
Archidamus is a model of prudence and moderation consistent
with the king's reputation and the cautious Spartan
character. As reasonable as the king's speech may sound,
however, it is worth noting that the issue of justice is
never touched upon, but instead the king's counsel of
patience and preparation is based entirely upon strategic
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considerations detailed in the speech. In context, the
king's advice to continue talking to the Athenians while
preparing for war shows that the Spartans, too, resort to
language for strategic and tactical gains. "I do bid you
not to take up arms at once," the king advises the assembly,
but to send and remonstrate with them in a tone not too
suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of
submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our
own preparations. ... If they listen to our embassy,
so much the better; but if not, after the lapse of two
or three years our position will have become materially
strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think
proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our
preparations, backed by language equally significant,
will have disposed them to submission .... [Emphasis
added] . 77
The long (three pages) speech by Archidamus is offset
by a very short (one paragraph) speech of Sthenelaides
.
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Sthenelaides mistrusts words and uses very few of them
himself. He announces tersely that he does not understand
the long speech of the Athenians. "They said a good deal in
praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are
injuring our allies . . . ." Against proposals to let
"lawsuits and words" settle the matter, Sthenelaides calls
for immediate war against the Athenians. It is not by words
we are harmed, he says, but by Athenian actions, and
furthermore "long deliberation is rather fitting for those
who have injustice in comtemplation . " Despite its emphasis
on action, however, the speech of Sthenelaides disdains all
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strategic considerations in favor of the justice of prompt
retaliation against Athens. He urges immediate war based on
considerations of honor, duty to friends, and what Athenian
behavior deserves. "With the gods," he says in conclusion,
"let us advance against the aggressors," regardless of con-
siderations of money, ships, and horses.
Sthenelaides
'
speech is interesting because even though
it identifies words as disnonorable instruments of
injustice, it does not conclude that justice is nowhere to
be found. Sthenelaides clearly believes that there is a
moral order to the cosmos, and that that order is upheld by
the gods. He finds justice in certain actions—acts of
resistance against aggression, and acts of assistance to
injured friends, for example. It is an uncomplicated,
perhaps admirable, moral view which Thucydides does not
initially condemn. Instead he treats it as irrelevant.
Having just presented the reader with twelve additional
pages of carefully staged speeches, Thucydides declares
succinctly that
the [Spartans] voted that the treaty had been broken,
and that war must be declared, not so much because they
were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as
because they feared the growth of the power of the
Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to
them. 79
Once again, the text provokes the question, Why has
Thucydides presented these speeches in such detail, only to
inform us at their conclusion that the succession of events
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has little to do with what was said? To answer the question
we must refer back to the fundamental distinction made by
Thucydides between that which appears in speech and that
which does not. Beginning with the affair of Epidamnus,
Thucydides announced his intention to first "give the
grounds alleged by either side, which led to . . . the
breaking out of war." 80 But this was to be clearly
distinguished from the truer cause, invisible to speech,
which was the growing power of Athens. Twenty pages of
speeches reveal to us what the various parties told each
other, and told themselves, about the necessity of war.
They also serve to introduce several opposing views of
justice, or its absence, as justifications for war. We need
not treat what was said in the speeches as meaningless or
deceptive rhetoric. The speeches do show us a level of
truth. These are the things which people say, or said, when
preparing for war. On one level, the speeches reveal the
reasons for war. But Thucydides informs us that this is not
the deepest level from which to view the causes of war.
For, in his view, these were the sorts of things the
speakers had to say. 81 Thucydides here suggests that there
is an order to power which has the character of
inevitability, or necessity. From this point of view, the
speakers and the parties to the war are caught up in a
larger, inexorable movement of power which they may not
understand, but which nevertheless governs the direction of
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events. At a deeper level, then, Thucydides ' text portrays
not people using power, but power using people.
Having presented, as promised, the spoken reasons for
the war, the text then turns to the unspoken cause: the
growth of Athenian power. The Pentacontaetia , or "Account
of the Fifty Years," follows immediately after Thucydides'
statement of the real reasons behind the Spartan vote for
war. w This section recounts the growth of Athenian power
from the end of the Persian War up to the events already
described by Thucydides. The Pentacontaetia portrays a
restless Athens ceaselessly engaged in battle, building up
its fleet, subjugating formerly independent allies, and
extending its power in all directions. Thucydides almost
seems to apologize for the relentless quality of this
section, saying that "My excuse for relating these events,
and for venturing on this digression, is that this passage
of history has been omitted by all my predecessors." But
"besides," he adds almost coyly, "the history of these
events contains an explanation of the growth of the Athenian
empire . " OJ
In a particularly allegorical description reminiscent
of the growth of the empire itself, Thucydides relates the
manner in which the Athenians hurriedly rebuilt and expanded
the walls of their city at the end of the Persian War. "For
the bounds of the city were extended at every point of the
circumference; and so they laid hands on everything without
i 84
exception in their haste," he states portentously.
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According to Thucydides, the allies begged Athens not to
fortify itself on the pretext that if the Persians should
return, such fortifications would only serve to aid an
occupying enemy force. "The real meaning of their advice,
the suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was
not proclaimed," Thucydides informs us, signalling the
reader that we are in the subterranean realm of true but
unspoken causes. 85 The Athenian stratagem for extending its
defensive fortifications is representative of the Athenian
use of language to achieve its ends. Upon hearing of
Spartan objections to the Athenian project, the Athenians
proposed that negotiations should be held at Sparta to
decide the issue. The Athenians then delayed the talks long
enough to secretly complete their fortifications before
announcing that negotiations were no longer necessary.
Similarly, throughout the Pentacontaetia Athens regards a
truce of any kind as an opportunity to further expand in
another direction.
Following the Spartan vote for war, and after some
delay during which the favor of the god at Delphi was
ascertained, a second Peloponnesian congress was convened at
Sparta. This time the question was put before the Spartan
allies as a whole and, after some debate, the majority voted
for war. Once again it is the Corinthians who are portrayed
as the most aggressive and persuasive speakers, and on this
occasion it is only the Corinthian speech which is
reproduced by Thucydides. 86 The Corinthians portray Sparta
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as the pre-eminent power in Hellas, having a duty to lead a
united resistance against "enslavement" by Athens. The
Corinthian speech assesses the relative strengths of each
side and predicts a Peloponnesian victory based largely on
the superior courage and discipline of the Spartan side.
After a period of preparation and some trading of
charges between both sides, the Spartans issued a terse
ultimatum to Athens: "[Sparta] wishes the peace to
continue, and there is no reason why it should not, if you
would leave the Hellenes independent." 87 As modest as this
proposition may sound, compliance would certainly have
entailed the dismantling of the Athenian empire, increased
exposure to danger, and the loss of Athens' heroic status. 88
It may well have been deliberately formulated as a demand to
which Athens could not possibly submit. 5 Upon receiving
the ultimatum, the Athenians held an assembly to debate the
Athenian response. Thucydides informs us that there were
many speakers to address the assembly, some urging peace and
others urging war. Of all the speeches, however, Thucydides
chooses to reproduce only one: that of Pericles, "the first
man of his time at Athens, ablest alike in counsel and in
action. . . ." 90
Pericles: The Heroic Ideal
The speeches of Pericles are widely considered to be a
major focal point of Thucydides' History. This judgment is
due in part to the high tribute paid to Pericles in
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Thucydides' own remarks. 91 since Thucydides rarely speaks
in his own voice, his favorable opinion of Pericles is taken
to be highly significant. But there is another structural
factor supporting the treatment of Pericles' words as having
key significance. The usual pattern of Thucydides is to
present speeches in antithetical pairs, but this pattern is
abandoned in the case of Pericles. Three speeches of
Pericles are reproduced in the text, all in fairly rapid
succession, and all are unanswered by any opponent. On the
other hand, elements and themes of Pericles' speeches
continue to resonate throughout the text, and are often
reflected ironically in the speeches of other major figures
such as Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias.
The privileged position of Pericles' speeches in the
text suggests that, on one level, Pericles occupies the role
of the traditional, Homeric hero in Thucydides' History. In
the Homeric world, the normal course of events is cyclical
in a more or less vertical plane, following a trajectory
from low to high and back to low again. In the Iliad, the
greatest heroes tend to die at the acme of their glory, as
measured by the greatness of their opponent. Paradoxically,
a heroic death achieves a measure of immortality through the
legendary fame of the hero untarnished by the inevitable
decline which would have otherwise occurred. This kind of
heroism is akin to the brilliance of an exploding star.
There are certain standard ingredients to the heroic
formula. First of, all the requisite heroic height is
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usually achieved in battle or contest. Secondly, the ascent
to heroic heights is itself a factor in bringing about death
at the proper moment. Ideally, death would be neither
accidental nor unrelated to the heroic pursuit. Pericles'
brilliant career closely approximates this heroic
trajectory, but the fit is imperfect due to his apparently
untimely death from plague. Nevertheless, he died near the
peak of his greatness and his reputation was spared its
predictable decline. 92 The career of Themis tocles , which
Thucydides draws upon to represent the normal course of
events, stands in contrast to the career of Pericles.
Themistocles , described by Thucydides as among the greatest
men of his time, was the architect of the brilliant Athenian
naval victory over the Persians during the Persian War, and
he was the founder of Athenian imperialism. Despite his
near-heroic status, he ended his life as an outlaw and
traitor to his country.
On yet another level, however, the true hero of
Thucydides' History is Athens itself, and Pericles merely
stands for, and speaks for, Athens at its height. On this
level as well, Thucydides' history conforms to the
traditional heroic paradigm of the Iliad except that large
movements of collective power and greatness replace feats of
the heroic individual, and personal interventions of the
gods are replaced by the less personal operation of natural
forces. In turning to the speeches of Pericles, then, as
spokesman for the Thucydidean version of the heroic ideal,
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we can expect to gain a clearer view of the geometry of
power which Thucydides finds portrayed in the Peloponnesian
War.
Initially, Pericles' first speech has the structural
function of answering, and thus balancing, the Corinthian
speech assessing the relative Spartan and Athenian strengths
and predicting Spartan victory. But in introducing
important new themes, Pericles' speech goes beyond that
antithetical role to occupy new and uncontested heights. In
one respect the first speech of Pericles can be read as a
rejoinder to the Spartan ultimatum. The speech, however, is
not directed to the Spartans but to the Athenian Assembly
for the purpose of persuading that body to vote for war. In
a brief earlier reference to Pericles, Thucydides had
described him as " . . . the most powerful man of his time,
and the leading Athenian statesman; he opposed the
[Spartans] in everything, and would have no concessions, but
ever urged the Athenians on to war." Pericles confirms
this unyielding characterization in his opening remarks,
saying that his one guiding principle through everything is
"no concessions to the Peloponnesians .
"
94 He portrays
himself as disciplined, resolute, and uncompromising in
contrast to the irresolution of ordinary men in the face of
chance and changing events. Pericles goes on to cast Athens
as the victim of Spartan aggression, and the approaching war
as a necessary stand against Spartan enslavement. He also
faults the Spartans for failing to offer negotiation of
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their differences, as provided in the treaty, before issuing
bellicose demands.
Two points about this speech initially stand out.
First of all, up to this point the text has consistently
portrayed Sparta to be a conservative, hesitant land-power
in contrast to the audacious and acquisitive sea-power of
Athens. Secondly, the Spartans would appear to have sound,
historical reasons for distrusting any Athenian call for
negotiations. In context, then, the specter of enslavement
invoked by Pericles appears to be designed more to arouse
the zeal of the assembly in support of war than to point to
any real, immediate danger.
In the same speech, Pericles provides his own assess-
ment of the military factors affecting each side, and his
inventory is remarkably similar to that presented in the
Corinthian speech to the Spartan allies. The chief
divergence between the two speeches in that respect lies not
in their perception of the "facts," but in their evaluation
of the relative advantage the facts will give to either
side. Unlike Corinth, Pericles argues that the military and
political situation favors Athens over Sparta, and that the
advantage lies chiefly in the concentration of Athenian
resolve (gnome) compared to the characteristically
irresolute tardiness and division among the Spartans. The
fact that the text portrays no significant disagreement over
the "objective" military assets of the two sides supports
the view that Thucydides considers this war to be less a
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confrontation of military factors measurable in terms of
men, money, and ships, than a clash between less tangible
factors such as "character" and "resolve."
We have already heard the Corinthians describe the
character of the Athenians as active, innovative, and daring
compared to the slow, ponderous caution of the Spartan
character, and the text consistently confirms that
description. But Pericles' first speech introduces a major
new chord upon the same theme. He attributes Athenian
swiftness and decisiveness to their superior gnome, and he
finds the roots of this gnome attached to Athenian political
arrangements. 96 In the same vein, Pericles faults the
Spartans for their lack of unity and consequent lack of
strength, and he associates this fault with Spartan
political institutions. Pericles clearly equates superior
power with steadfast unity (gnome), and he associates this
superior cohesion and resolution with political structure.
The claim that superior Athenian power and unified
resolve are due to superior political institutions is made
more explicit in Pericles' second speech, the "Funeral
Oration," where he bestows lengthy praise upon the many
advantages accruing to Athenians from their democratic
institutions. 97 The chief advantage of democracy, in
Pericles' view, is the power it delivers to the state.
Pericles' speech does cite the many freedoms and comforts
derived from democracy in ordinary life, but the final
standard by which to evaluate the greatness of Athens, in
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every case, turns out be measured in terms of Athenian
power. Pericles pronounces Athens to be the "school of
Hellas," by which he means that Athenian arete, competitive
success, is the envy of the Hellenic world. 98 Athens'
superiority is "a plain matter of fact," Pericles proclaims,
which
the power of the state acquired by these habits
proves.
. . .
[T]he admiration of the present and
succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our
power without witness, but have shown it by mighty
proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist,
or others of his craft
. . . , we have forced every sea
and land to be the highway of our daring, and
everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left
imperishable monuments behind us."
There is probably no better statement of the heroic
ideal than Pericles' funeral oration. It is appropriately
the most famous, and the most frequently cited of all the
speeches in Thucydides ' History. Most recitations, however,
emphasize its praise of democracy and the sacrifice of
private ambition to the common interest. Rare attention is
paid to the Periclean standard by which democracy is judged
to be commendable: it confers the power to rule over
others, and the means to achieve eternal glory through
memorable feats of war. 100
The Homeric theme is pursued and extended in the third
and final speech of Pericles. This speech is aimed at an
angry and demoralized Athens two years into the war.
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Periclean war strategy had called for full development and
projection of Athenian naval power, coupled with a refusal
to be drawn into land battles against the Peloponnesians
.
As a result, Athenian territory beyond the walls had been
laid waste at will by invading Peloponnesian forces, while,
at Pericles' insistence, Athenian citizens looked on.
Moreover, the city had been devastated by plague with its
attendant widespread suffering and death, further eroding
Athenian will and resolve. Demoralization reigned and
Pericles addressed them in an attempt to restore their
gnome. In the course of his speech Pericles reminded them
that
your country has the greatest name in all the world
. . . because she never bent before disaster, and
because she has expended more life and effort in war
than any other city, and has won for herself a power
greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which
will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in
obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be
forced to yield, still it will be remembered that we
held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic
state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their
united or separate powers, and inhabited a city
unrivalled by any other. . . . Hatred also is short-
lived; but that which makes the splendor of the present
and the glory of the future remains forever unforgotten.




With the addition of the "general law of decay"
articulated in this speech, the portrait of the heroic ideal
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is complete. All things human have a tendency to decay and
pass away. But this general law can be thwarted through
great and memorable feats of battle. Great deeds need not
be "good" deeds. What counts is scale. Great deeds
"whether for evil or for good," create immortal monuments in
the living memory of posterity. It is worth recalling that
in Thucydides* view, the Peloponnesian War was the greatest
war of all time not because it was a "just" war, or even a
victorious war. It was the greatest war in history because
the scope and the depth of the suffering and dislocation it
caused was unprecedented. 102
But what is the status of this general law of decay
evoked by Pericles? It is, to be sure, the tendency of all
things toward disintegration. But what is its relation to
that other general law cited earlier, and soon to be cited
again by Athens, that the weaker should be subject to the
stronger? These two laws appear to represent counter-
tendencies in nature. Power is expressed as a tendency
toward combination; weakness is expressed as a tendency
toward fragmentation. Thucydides has made it abundantly
clear that in his view, power, at least the greatest power,
transcends individuals and is collective in nature. This
premise is the basis of his interest in war rather than
muthodes , or the quarrels of individuals. The collective
character of power is associated in the speeches of Pericles
with gnome, steadfast resolution, and gnome is associated in
turn with the political practice of democracy. Power, to
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put it simply, is a coming together, a uniting of
something— call it "will" for lack of a better word--which
makes concerted action possible. The historical movement
toward association, expressed in the founding of cities and
the formation of alliances, has a natural force of its own,
judging from the history of power portrayed by Thucydides in
the "Archaeology." But the historical movement toward
amassed power is not unopposed in nature. The tendency
toward integration and resolution is countered (but not
necessarily balanced) by an opposite tendency toward
disintegration and dissolution. This tendency is poignantly
portrayed by Thucydides in the parallel events of the plague
at Athens, and stasis, civil strife, at Corcyraea.
Pericles, in his heroic role, understands these
countertendencies as conflicting natural forces which he
must dominate. But Thucydides, in a more complicated
vision, portrays them as opposite poles of power, each
opposing, yet each generating the other.
Pericles understands the collective, and therefore
political, nature of power. He claims in his speeches that
Athenian superiority over the Peloponnesians is rooted in
the Athenian form of government--democracy--which is said to
yield superior gnome, or common will and determination,
compared to the oligarchic governments of the Spartan
confederacy. We might ask, however, what, in Pericles'
view, is responsible for this coincidence of gnome and
democracy? What is it about democracy which provides for
62
and sustains the singlemindedness from whence it derives its
power? In the Funeral Oration, Pericles praises the
Athenian constitution for the many benefits it confers upon
its members. It favors the many instead of the few. Its
laws provide equal justice for all in private disputes.
Advancement in public life is the reward of ability, not
class or wealth. But beyond these few explicitly political
considerations, Pericles' list extends praise to many
comforts of ordinary Athenian life whose connection to
democracy is less clear. He cites, for example, the absence
of interference from one's neighbors in one's private
affairs. And he further commends the general respect for
law which flourishes despite the freedom of private
relations. And for our recreation, he says,
we celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round,
and the elegance of our private establishments forms a
daily source of pleasure and helps to banish our cares;
and the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the
world into our harbor. . .
Undoubtedly these and other pleasures of Athenian life
which Pericles goes on to mention, can be attributed in some
fashion to political institutions and practices at Athens.
Surely they are intended to compare favorably to the more
regimented, austere lifestyle practiced at Sparta. And,
just as surely, a high level of equality is prerequisite to
the success of Athenian political arrangements. Yet the
answer remains obscure. What, in Pericles' opinion, is the
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source of the singlemindedness which constitutes Athenian
power, and which, he claims, is uniquely associated with
Athenian democracy? It is by no means obvious that
political equality and private comfort necessarily lead to a
common will of uncommon strength.
For the answer we must turn back to Pericles' first
speech responding to the Spartan ultimatum to Athens. In
that speech Pericles analyzed the strategic differences
between Sparta and Athens and concluded that "they are
incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power
different in character from their own, by the want of a
single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous
action." 104 The "single council-chamber" identified by
Pericles refers to the Athenian assembly, and it appears
that in Pericles' view, that body is the source of Athenian
gnome and power. It differs from the Peloponnesian
organization "in which every state possesses an equal vote,
and each presses for its own ends, a condition of things
which generally results in no action at all."^®
Although Pericles has in this speech located the
decisive gnome of Athens in its democratic assembly, while
locating the opposite principle in its Spartan counterpart,
it is increasingly clear from the text that both tendencies
are simultaneously present in the assembly. Its strength is
also its weakness. While the assembly may be superior at
achieving consensus and uniting public opinion behind a
common course of action, it is equally liable to greater
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fickleness, divisiveness
, and lack of focus. Worse, it may
be resolutely carried away in a direction which is
ultimately self-defeating, as in the disastrous Sicilian
expedition.
Thucydides himself is more ambivalent than the words of
Pericles would suggest about the strengths of Athenian
democracy as embodied in the assembly. Looking back to the
Corcyraean Debate, in which the Athenians had to decide
whether or not to accept the Corcyraeans into alliance, we
recall Thucydides mentioning almost in passing that "two
assemblies were held" before reaching a decision to side
with Corcyraea
.
106 This unobtrusive comment signals early on
in the text that the assembly may be somewhat less than
decisive. Later, following Pericles' third speech, in which
he assailed the Athenians for wavering in their resolve in
the wake of the plague and repeated Peloponnesian invasions
of the Athenian countryside, Thucydides again points to the
ambivalence of the assembly. According to Thucydides,
Pericles succeeded in convincing the Athenians "as a
community" to prosecute the war with renewed vigor.
"Still," he reports,
as private individuals they could not help smarting
under their sufferings. ... In fact, the pubic feeling
against him [Pericles] did not subside until he had been
fined. Not long afterwards, however, according to the
way of the multitude, they again elected him general,
107
and committed all their affairs to his hands. . . .
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Thucydides' disdainful reference to the "way of the
multitude" suggests less than whole-hearted confidence in
the ways of democracy. Later in the war, in the debate over
the fate of the rebellious colony of Mytilene, Thucydides
would still more dramatically portray the indecisiveness of
the Athenian assembly. Mytilene was an independent colony
of Athens, in possession of its own naval forces, which
revolted and joined the Peloponnesians
. The revolt
ultimately failed and the Athenians voted to put to death
the whole adult male population of Mytilene, and to make
slaves of the women and children. 108 The next day, after a
lengthy debate reported by Thucydides, The Athenians elected
by a slim majority to rescind the original decree and to
impose a slightly less harsh punishment upon the population.
The language in which Thucydides reports the reversal
emphasizes the "division" and "change of feeling" among the
Athenians. 109 Thucydides' own verdict upon the democratic
assembly is found in his endorsement of the abilities and
policies of Pericles.
Pericles, ... by his rank, ability, and known
integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent
control over the multitude— in short to lead them
instead of being led by them. ... In short, what was
nominally a democracy became in his hands, government by
the first citizen. With his successors it was
different. More on a level with one another, and each
grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the
conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.
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This, as might have been expected
. . produced a host
of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition. 110
Despite Pericles' earlier assertion that Athens was
free of the defect of disunity which he found in the
Peloponnesians
,
111 the text is clear that the Athenian
assembly, and, by implication Athenian democracy, harbored
within itself the two contrary tendencies of nature. In one
direction lay the possibility of superior unity and
therefore great power. In the other lay the possibility of
great fragmentation and weakness. Pericles' greatness, in
Thucydides' view, lay in his unparalleled ability to
consistently tip the balance in favor of preserving and
enhancing the great power of Athens. Unlike his successors,
Pericles is said to have sought no power for himself, but
only for the city. His successors, each grasping at
supremacy for themselves, and each currying favor with the
multitude, managed to prevent Athens from reaching its
greatest potential height in war, and introduced civil
strife at home.
The Fall
On one level, the text might be read as the story of
Periclean leadership and the slow decline of Athens
following his death from the plague in 429 B.C. On this
reading, the greatness of Athens is to be attributed to the
almost superhuman statesmanship and incorruptibility of
Pericles. Only Pericles could retain and act upon the
unifying vision of the common interest. Others, with their
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limited, selfish visions could appear only as hollow
imitations of the Periclean ideal. Their leadership, which
substituted private aggrandizement for the public good,
tainted the greatness of Athens and led it into moral and
civic disintegration. This is the moral skeleton beneath
many conventional readings of Thucydides' History, and it
admits of many excellent variations upon a theme. It
permits political lessons to be drawn emphasizing the
importance of placing the common interest above private
concerns, for example. Furthermore, Thucydides"
characterization of Pericles' policies as moderate and
conservative 1^ can be used to support an interpretation of
the text utilizing the moral axis of hubris and nemesis.
From this perspective, Pericles represents the moderate
center. His successors pursue extreme policies which, in a
moral universe, bring about the nemesis of defeat as a form
of retribution of the divine or natural order.
Thucydides' text is not unamenable to such pedagogical
uses. On the other hand, in order to fit the text, such
moral approaches tend to overlook and leave untouched much
of its rich and profound complexity. 113 A similar, but far
more interesting and sophisticated approach to the text
examines the phenomenon of language as portrayed by
Thucydides. A particularly lucid and influential version of
this approach is advanced by James Boyd White.
114 White
focuses on the speeches of the text and identifies a
progressive loss of limits traceable to the Athenian use of
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language. White's premise is relatively uncontroversial : a
community is largely constituted by the language it speaks.
Conversely, language is subject to misuse of a sort which
can erode and destroy the basis of community. According to
White, Thucydides' text portrays just such misuse by Athens
resulting in the steady disintegration of the Greek
community.
White argues that Athens' use of language to justify
aspirations to unlimited supremacy undermines a traditional
language of justice which imposed limits upon those who
shared the language. White's argument is sophisticated in
part because it seeks to avoid attributing transcendental
status to language even while identifying it as a source of
limits to behavior. The outline of his argument runs as
follows. The language shared by Athens and the other Greek
city-states defined a culture of argument in which a shared
language of justice could be used to justify a wide range,
but not all, of behavior. Thucydides' text portrays members
of the culture pursuing self-interest by using the language
of justice in imaginative ways. Under normal conditions,
the language of justice would tend to become strained to its
limits, but would not break those limits. The portrait,
according to White, serves to highlight the functional
limits residing in accepted linguistic practices. The
language could be used creatively to justify the pursuit of
advantage, but it could not be forced to justify simply
anything at all. There were limits, and those limits lay in
69
respecting, at least to the extent of paying lip service to,
the premise of a rough equality of power between members of
the culture. But Athens was, and sought to be, more
powerful than any other city. The Athenian attempt to
reshape the language of justice to accommodate and justify
unlimited empire could not possibly be accepted by other
speakers of the language, according to White, because it
refuted the premise of equality, and demanded acquiescence
to a state of permanent inferiority. In White's
interpretation, Athens sought to impose a perverted language
of justice which could not be shared by others. The
Athenian use of language violated the unspoken limits which
defined the community, thereby contributing to the demise of
that community. White points out that "as language
deteriorates, so does everything else," 115 and he argues that
Athenian ambitions were self -negating because they
undermined the cultural framework of meanings which might
have sustained those ambitions.
White repeatedly characterizes the Athenian position
portrayed in the text as "incoherent" and "irrational"
because it is self -destructive . This is an important
characterization of "rationality," but it fails to take into
account the heroic premises of Thucydides' text. In the
heroic conception of time and the universe, everything
passes away in due course. In that world, the accusation of
self-destructiveness loses its force: everything is self-
destructive, everything decays. Speaking from within that
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world, Thucydides can claim that Athenian behavior is
perfectly rational and eminently realistic. Athens pursues
the only kind of permanence available in the heroic world:
immortality in memory. White might respond that, even so,
Athenian self-interest lay in preserving the culture which
gave meaning to Athenian ambitions, if only to preserve an
institutional memory which would exalt Athenian deeds.
Thucydides' text constitutes his rejoinder to the
hypothetical argument. It is partly through his text that
the greatness of Athens, "for evil or for good," is still
remembered and debated.
White concedes that there is a certain compelling logic
to the "realistic" position of Athens in the text. "In a
world of unequal power, talk about justice has no place," he
admits. 116 But, White asks rhetorically, "could equality be
seen not as the factual precondition of the discourse of
justice but as its product, as something that it creates and
makes real in the world?" Thus, despite its rational and
pragmatic aspirations, White's argument is forced to fall
117back on a moral plea. Thucydides recognizes and gives
118
voice to similar pleas throughout the text. ° Indeed, the
text may even, as White claims, intentionally incite such
pleas. But part of the "message" of Thucydides' text is
that in the heroic world, such pleas cannot be heard or
understood. They have no ontological footing. Thucydides
depicts and defends a world in which equality has only a
precarious place between great powers. In that world, the
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plea for equality can only be heard as an attempt by the
weak to become strong at the expense of the powerful. In a
world where power is all, talk of justice and equality can
only be heard as a clever strategy of power, no different in
status from any other strategy. The heroic world of
Thucydides' text is coherent and self-contained. It cannot
be adjusted to accommodate and appreciate claims to equality
from unequals. It can only be replaced by a different
conception of reality. White's pragmatic effort to avoid
attributing privileged ontological status or location to
language is laudable, perhaps even dictated, by modern
standards of academic argumentation. But it deprives him of
any foundation for the moral plea which he is forced to
advance. Without that foundation, his plea cannot penetrate
11Q
the world of the text, but must remain external to it. *
White acknowledges that Thucydides' text is deeply
ambiguous. 120 On one hand it might be read as a profoundly
moral drama portraying the destructive effects of the
Athenian abuse of language. On the other hand, if Athens
was forced by historical necessity to talk as it did, then
the text portrays Athens enmeshed in a web of forces beyond
its control. White's own interpretation places the text in
the category of moral drama. In doing so, however, it has
the distinct merit of emphasizing the important position of
language in Thucydides' text while simultaneously pointing
to an alternative interpretation of its significance. The
alternative interpretation would look to the portrait of
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language presented in the text as it follows the trajectory
of necessity.
The conventional moral framework focuses on what
appears to be a progressively distorted use of language
portrayed in the text, a distortion which closely parallels
the decline in Athenian fortunes. Three events tend to
occupy the foreground of the moral "decline-and-f all " genre
of interpretation: 121 the Corcyraean Revolution, the Melian
Dialogue, and the Sicilian Expedition. The Corcyraean
Revolution, in which the cohesive force of language breaks
down, is conventionally interpreted to represent the social
disorder and corruption of language which flows from the
pressures of war and the pursuit of self-interest.
"Political anarchy readily symbolizes a moral anarchy,"
according to the interpretation of W. Robert Connor.
*
22 From
the same perspective, the Melian Dialogue, in which Athens
refuses to honor any talk of "justice," represents the
supreme violation of moral limits. Following the conclusion
of that debate, Athens imposed the same cruel punishment
upon Melos which it had earlier refrained from imposing upon
Mytilene. Lastly, the disastrous Sicilian Expedition
represents, in Christian terms, the sin of pride or, in
Greek terms, excess. The crushing defeat suffered by Athens
in its ill-advised attempt to conquer Sicily then comes to
symbolize Athens' final fall and the retribution of justice
or Nemesis.
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The conventional reading of the text is very useful and
Yields some very sophisticated interpretations, much as a
simple theme can be expanded and embellished to yield a
Beethoven symphony. Moreover, Thucydides text does not
unambiguously demonstrate the conventional approach to be
mistaken. Indeed, the celebrated ambiguity of the text
lends itself to a variety of interpretations. But
allegiance to the theme of moral decline-and-f all tends to
overlook many interesting elements of the text which do not
seem to neatly fit the theme. 123 Furthermore, the decline-
and-fall paradigm assumes a constant view of natural order
which has shifted very little from Thucydides to today.
Consequently, the notion of retributive justice at work in
the conventional interpretation, for example, along with the
structure of natural order which supports it, is left
unexamined along with the various alternative versions of
justice articulated in the text. Those versions which do
not fit the standard are easily consigned to the category of
"distortion," "abuse," or "pathology," 124—all respectable
substitutes for "sin." Left out of this approach is the
possibility that Thucydides does not share the presumptive
paradigm but actively resists it in defense of an earlier
conception of natural order. The remainder of this chapter
looks more closely at the three episodes— the Corcyraean
Revolution, the Melian Dialogue, and the Sicilian
Expedition--from this latter perspective as an alternative
to the decline-and-f all framework.
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The "Corcyraean Revolution" refers to the condition of
stasis, or civil strife, 125 which infected Corcyra early in
the war, but which later spread throughout the Hellenic
world to finally envelop Athens itself. Thucydides
furnishes a brief history of the stasis at Corcyra, but
makes it clear in the process that that event is part of a
larger pattern of truth revealed in the war. The Corcyraean
stasis had its origins in the circumstances of the affair at
Epidamnus, which Thucydides had earlier recounted as part of
the aitiai and diaphorai, allegations and complaints,
leading up to the Peloponnesian War. 126 That account was to
be carefully distinguished from the truest prophasis , or
root cause, of the larger war. Turning later to the
Corcyraean stasis, Thucydides brings us up to date on the
"progress" of that original dispute, and simultaneously
lifts the curtain somewhat on the truth of war and the truth
of history.
Epidamnus, it will be recalled, was itself rent by
factions between the many and the few, the demos and the
oligoi. 121 The oligoi had been exiled by the demos, and the
former retaliated by joining with barbarian, non-Greek
enemies to attack the city. To assault one's mother city
would itself have been a crime of considerable magnitude
against Greek views of what was proper even in war, but to
ally with barbarians to accomplish the deed would have been
a transgression of the greatest proportions. Yet it was
this exiled faction with whom Corcyra sided against the
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demos of Epidamnus. 1^8 Epidamnus, with the endorsement of
the god at Delphi, the religious center of Greece, then
appealed for support to Corinth, the mother city of Corcyra.
Corcyra then attacked and defeated both its own mother and
child, so to speak. Thucydides concludes his account of the
Epidamnian affair with the decision of democratic Athens to
accept oligarchic Corcyra into alliance because of the
potential value of the Corcyraean navy, leaving democratic
Epidamnus to appeal to oligarchic Corinth for assistance. 129
When Thucydides returns his attention to Corcyra in the
fifth year of the Peloponnesian War, the city is rent by
internal strife.
. . .
the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those
of their fellow-citizens whom they regarded as their
enemies. . . . Death thus raged in every shape; and as
usually happens at such times, there was no length to
which violence did not go; sons were killed by their
fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain
upon it, while some were even walled up in the temple of
Dionysus and died there.
Thucydides' account vividly describes the savagery, the
treachery and the terror of stasis, and goes on to link its
contagion to a loss of stable meanings for words.
Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and
the places at which it arrived at last, from having
heard what had been done before, carried to a still
greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as
manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the
atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their
ordinary meanings and to take those which were now given
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them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the
courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious
cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for
unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question,
inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the
attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable
means of self-defense. The advocate of extreme measures
was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be
suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd
head, and to divine a plot, a still shrewder; but to try
to provide against having to do either was to break your
party and to be afraid of your adversaries. 131
The disorder which is stasis is thus attributable to,
or paralleled by, a disintegration of language. The deepest
horror of stasis, in Thucydides' view, lies not only, if at
all, in its violence, but in its loss of coherence, its loss
of unity. Even here, Thucydides can be seen to be concerned
with the nature and the sustenance of power. Power, it will
be recalled, is collective, and is associated in Thucydides'
text with the concentrated resolve of gnome. Gnome in turn
is associated with Periclean leadership of the Athenian
assembly. At the time of its revolution, Corcyra was
democratic, 132 and certainly one facet of Thucydides'
description of the Corcyraean stasis is a reminder of the
fragility of democratic cohesion. More broadly, however,
stasis reflects the general law of decay cited in Pericles'
third speech.
The general law of decay is one of two counter-
tendencies of nature at work in Thucydides' text. The other
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is a tendency toward combination. The tendency toward
combination, or unity, is associated with power, while the
tendency toward decay and decomposition is associated with
weakness. In linking disunity with the breakdown of
language, Thucydides
' account of the Corcyraean stasis
begins to make more explicit one of the most persistent, but
unspoken themes of the text: political power and stability
are linked to the use of language as a form of persuasion.
W. Robert Connor notes that the episode of the Corcyraean
stasis is narrated by Thucydides as a series of attempts at
persuasion.^3 James Boyd White further points out that the
meaning of the Greek term for persuasion, peitho, is deeply
imbued with political connotations of power and authority.
"To persuade is to compel obedience; to obey is to be
persuaded," he explains, thus emphasizing the link between
language and power. ^
Pericles' greatness in Thucydides' estimation lay in
his unparalleled ability to unify and lead the assembly by
means of his great powers of persuasion.
Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated,
he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other
hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once
restore them to confidence. In short, what was
nominally a democracy became on his hands, government by
1 1S
the first citizen. JJ
By means of persuasion Pericles was able to sustain and
dominate the common meanings attached to a public discourse
As long as Pericles was alive this common discourse
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sustained the unity of the Athenian assembly with the
singlemindedness which constituted the decisive gnome of
Athenian power. Following his death the common discourse
sustained by Pericles was appropriated for the more limited,
private ends of individuals seeking supremacy over the
assembly. This, and not the narrow escape of Mytilene, is
the foremost significance of the debate between Cleon and
Diodotus over the fate of that city. At Mytilene, for the
first time in Thucydides
' text, Athenian speakers are heard
to oppose one another, signifying the divisions which
followed Pericles' death. 136
Behind Pericles' rhetorical command lay the apparently
selfless, unifying vision of Athenian imperial greatness.
"With his successors it was different", Thucydides tells us.
"More on a level with one another, and each grasping at
supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of
state affairs to the whims of the mul ti tude .
"
XJ In a
parallel passage referring to the causes of the Corcyraean
stasis, Thucydides tells us that "The cause of all these
evils was the lust for power arising from greed and
ambition." 138 It is important to observe that Thucydides
does not here condemn the imperial quest for domination. He
condemns the lust for power of a more limited, selfish type.
It is the pursuit of personal supremacy which corrodes the
common interest and the common language, reducing society to
an arena in which "no man trusted his f ellow
.
" But the
"common interest" defined by Pericles and endorsed by
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Thucydides consists in the pursuit of Athenian domination to
its furthest limits. Thucydides condemns the individual
pursuit of supremacy not because he condemns Athenian
domination, but because the contest for personal supremacy
produces division which forestalls the collective action and
collective greatness achievable in war. There is not a hint
that Thucydides deplores the violence of war. Instead he
deplores the squandering of greatness lost to personal
contests for power.
It is tempting to conclude at this point that Pericles
is the conventional hero of Thucydides' History. In his
time Athenian greatness was at its height, Thucydides tells
us, but his successors, following private ambitions and
private interests, led Athenians into military "projects
whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage
of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain
disaster on the country in war." 14^ But the conclusion is
too facile. Thucydides gives us ample reason to believe
that Athens would have become great even without Pericles, 141
and that Athens would have eventually declined even with
Pericles. Thucydides praises Pericles because under him it
became greater than it otherwise might have, and, had he
lived, it might have become greater still before its
inevitable decline.
Thucydides is quite clear that it was stasis which
finally undid the heroic strength of Athens, and not the
superior force of its opponents. 142 There is a fall here but
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it is not a moral fall in the conventional sense. Athens
fell because it lost its common voice, its common will. As
the narration of the Corcyraean stasis foretells, the
contest for personal supremacy in pos t-Periclean Athens
imposed private meanings upon words, and the public language
so skillfully orchestrated by Pericles disintegrated into a
tool for personal rather than national advancement.
W. Robert Connor argues that under the pressures of war
language became an instrument of violence. 143 But Connor's
interpretation is implicitly based on the assumption that an
uncorrupted language had once been something other than
instrumental. From the beginning, however, Thucydides ' text
consistently portrays language used instrumentally by each
side to secure advantage for itself even prior to the war.
Apparently aware of the problem, and unwilling to defend the
purity of Pericles' language because of its support for war,
Connor later points to a solitary, uncritical quotation of
Homer by Thucydides. 144 According to Connor, the quotation
refers the reader "back to an age of fabled tranquility and
beauty, of poetry and order. We enter a festival of
families bound together in common observances, contests of
simple, physical joy. How complete a contrast to the
145
perverted festival we have just witnessed in Corcyra!"
Connor goes on to claim that the "episode provides the
contrast that lets us assess the events of Thucydides' day."
If Connor is correct, he has apparently identified the
single, brief passage in an otherwise forgotten portion of
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the text in which Thucydides has encoded the lost ideal
which animates his entire History. It seems more likely
that the logic of Connor's decline-and-f all paradigm demands
an Eden-like reference point or standard by which to judge
the steepness of the fall.
Like James Boyd White, Connor ascribes to language the
task of setting limits, and he views the Corcyraean
Revolution as a loss of limits previously to be found in
language. The Corcyraean story is told as a series of
attempts at persuasion, Connor observes, but the theme is
ironic, he contends, because "discussion, argument,
persuasion produce no conciliation only growing horror and
violence." 146 What, we are entitled to ask, is the basis of
this expectation that talk should produce conciliation?
Connor apparently, and without reflection, presumes the
existence of a Platonic universe in which language refers to
and reflects a harmonious natural order. The structure of
Thucydides 1 text disputes that presumption, however.
Thucydides' text shows us a vision of reality and a
conception of natural order which is anything but
harmonious. In Thucydides' world nature is deeply agonistic
and, without being chaotic, permanently at war with itself.
Language has no special status in this world, and it is in-
distinguishable from any other instrument to be employed to
advantage
.
In describing the Corcyraean Revolution, Connor
repeatedly refers to the "distortion," "abuse," or
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"pathology" of language, thus referring by his own language
to a standard of purity missing from the Corcyraean
portrait. If something like Platonic harmony or
"conciliation" is thought to supply the missing standard of
purity, it would also give meaning to Connor's reference to
limits which are violated in stasis and war. If harmony is
the standard, then violence constitutes a natural violation
of that standard. Armed with the Platonic ideal, Connor can
then read Thucydides' text as a condemnation of war. "War
becomes a teacher of violence," he claims, attributing the
thought to Thucydides. 147 The "moral implication" of the
Corcyraean episode, Connor concludes, is that the "drive for
dominance, self-aggrandizement, and ambition are all
manifestations of something in the very nature of man." iW
Connor's interpretation skirts the terminology of original
sin, but the similarity between Thucydides' account of the
Corcyraean stasis and his account of the plague at Athens
demonstrates to Connor that the "something" in human nature
is akin to a disease.
Much of the persuasivenes of Connor's position hinges
on a controversial translation of a critical phrase from
Thucydides. 149 Where Connor reads that war is a "teacher of
violence," Peter Pouncey reads that war is a "harsh (or
violent) teacher." 150 The former interpretation points to
the immorality of war; the latter leaves it open to ask what
is the lesson or truth imparted by war? We need not decide
at this point which translation is most correct. It is
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sufficient to observe that Connor's Platonic presuppositions
woven into the moral decline-and-f all framework draw the
interpretation in one direction to the exclusion of others.
Thucydides' account of the Corcyraean stasis suggests
another view of the relationship between language, truth and
power. Recall that in Thucydides' view, great political
power is collective in nature. It is the expression of a
united will or consensus behind a particular course of
action. In the case of the Athenian assembly this
singlemindednes
, or gnome, is produced by Pericles'
skillfull use of language. No Athenian leader after
Pericles is able to produce and sustain that single-
mindedness, even though Pericles' words echo through their
efforts.-^5 -1- The reason for their failure, Thucydides
indicates, is a deficiency of scale in their vision. The
vision of greatness which informed the language of post-
Periclean leaders was limited by standards of personal gain.
On the other hand, the vision of greatness which informed
Pericles' language was a vision of unlimited Athenian power
and domination.
In the Platonic view implicitly imported by Connor,
language approaches a transcendental status reflecting the
truth of a harmonious cosmos violated by violence and war.
In the heroic view of Thucydides, however, the cosmos is an
agon, an arena of strife and competition for ascendence and
advantage. In the heroic order, language is an instrument
capable of producing an artificial harmony through artful
84
persuasion, a form of subjugation through words, but
language itself does not reflect or refer back to an
original, harmonious truth. In the heroic configuration of
reality, the position of Platonic truth is occupied by war.
In place of Platonic truth, Pericles' language invokes a
vision of competitive greatness (arete) so vast that it
dwarfs the personal aspirations of ordinary mortals. The
heroic ideal which informs the public discourse of Pericles,
and which also sustains the celebrated Athenian single-
mindedness, is an ideal of greatness in war. Tragically,
however, Thucydides also shows us that in the world which he
portrays, war necessarily prepares the way for stasis. The
prescribed path to greatness contains within itself the
seeds of its own demise, and the way up is also found to be
the way down.
The Melian Dialogue
The opposition between war and stasis presents a
paradox to post-Platonic thought. To the Platonic way of
thinking, peace and war represent the opposites of unity and
disunity, harmony and dissonance. But in the heroic,
agonistic world of Thucydides" text, war represents the
unifying ideal, the force of integration, while stasis
represents the force of dissolution and disintegration.
Yet, remaining within the confines of the heroic conception
of nature reflected in the text, it would be misleading to
think of the counter- tendencies of war and stasis as
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entirely separate forces. They are opposites united
together as arcs on a vertical circle; they generate and
succeed one another much as seasons of the year.
Thucydides 1 observation that war leads to stasis is not
necessarily a condemnation of war, for war is also heralded
as the epitome of greatness. Instead, the observation may
be an acknowledgement that the general law of decay is a
governing principle of the cosmos along with the principle
of concentration. The heroic stance of Athens, which seeks
immortality through deeds so great, "whether for evil or for
good," that they will never perish from memory does not
pretend to negate that law. Rather the heroic choice
enlists that law to assure death or decay at the proper
moment--the acme of greatness-- thereby cheating not death
but time. Once again, the model is Homer's Achilles, who
chooses not death over life, as if that choice were among
the destinies offered, but rather the moment and manner of
death which secures immortality in memory.
The universal status of the general law of decay is
attested to by Thucydides when he tells us that "the
sufferings which revolution [stasis] entailed upon the
cities were many and terrible, such have occurred and always
will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the
same." 152 It is in this context that Thucydides says a few
lines later that "war . . . proves a rough master," making
it plausible that Thucydides' meaning is not that war is a




reference to the eternal recurrence of
stasis projects us both forward and backward in his own
text. Only a few lines earlier we had been informed that
the Corcyraean stasis was a preface to a similar convulsion
which engulfed not only Athens but the whole Hellenic world,
a convulsion which is dramatically portrayed in the final
chapters of Thucydides' work. In the other direction we are
reminded of Thucydides' statement early in the text that the
future of mankind would resemble the past and that this
truth constitutes a "possession for all time."
It is fitting that the end refers back to the
beginning, for the timeless truth which Thucydides finds
embedded in the course of the Peloponnesian War is a
circular path which joins together in an endless cycle the
opposites of war and stasis, integration and disintegration,
power and weakness. The initial Archaeology of Thucydides'
text leads us step by step from a description of the nomadic
instability and impermanence of "early times" in which there
was no "greatness," through the formation of successively
greater cities and associations, greater concentrations of
power, until finally power coalesced into two great rival
alliances: "At the head of the one stood Athens, at the
head of the other, Lacedaemon [Sparta], one the first naval,
153
the other the first military power in Hellas." The
history of the war itself then tracks the ascending power of
Athens to its unprecedented height of greatness, followed by
its inevitable decline into fragmentation and stasis. The
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two great forces of nature-association and dissolution,
power and weakness— are linked by the law of Necessity:
each is inevitable, and each contains within itself the
seeds of its own opposite which will grow to overcome it. 154
Viewed in this configuration, power contains within itself
its only limits, and those limits are not ethical or moral,
but tragic in a heroic sense.
Thucydides dramatically compresses the circular
movement of Homeric nature into his account of the notorious
dialogue preceding the Athenian massacre of the inhabitants
of Melos. The dialogue appears at the rhetorical and
structural center of the text, and it is here that
Thucydides distills and arranges all of the contending
elements of the text into their respective positions.
To recapitulate briefly from Thucydides' account, 155
Melos was a rather small island, a colony of Sparta, but one
which sought a "friendly neutrality" between the warring
parties of Athens and Sparta, and alliance with neither.
The Melian position became unbearable to Athens who
considered it an affront to Athenian power. Consequently,
Athens besieged Melos with overwhelming force, and delivered
an ultimatum: submit or be destroyed. Melos declined to
submit, and resisted briefly before being conquered by
Athens who then put to death all of the grown men, sold all
of the women and children for slaves, and colonized the
island for themselves.
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The negotiations which preceded this annihilation are
presented by Thucydides in the form of a stark dialogue in
which Athens restricts the subject of discussion to what it
calls matters of interest and expediency, and explicitly
excludes appeal to notions of justice and right, since
"right, as the world goes, is in question only between
equals in power, while the weak suffer what they must." 156
In its actions, Athens claims merely to be following what it
calls the "law of nature" in which both gods and men rule
whenever they can. "We found it [this law] existing before
us," Athens says, "and we shall leave it to exist forever
after us; all we do is make use of it" as would any others
in our position. 15^
The Athenian position certainly appears to be a claim
to unlimited power, and it is this apparent loss of limits
which places it at the heart of moral decline-and-f all
interpretations. At Melos, Athens imposed without
hesitation the same harsh punishment it had rescinded for
Mytilene twelve years earlier, making it plausible to infer
that Thucydides intended to portray a progressive moral
decline on the part of Athens. Furthermore, the final line
of Thucydides' account of the Melian episode is followed
abruptly by a line introducing the grandiose and disastrous
Athenian plan to conquer another island: Sicily. The
juxtaposition lends itself to a view that Thucydides sought
to dramatically link the hubris of Athens at Melos with the
nemesis of Athenian defeat in Sicily. 158 Viewed from within
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the heroic perspective, however, the Melian Dialogue
suggests an alternative view in which the dialogue portrays
not the moral inconstancy of Athens but rather the constant
trajectory of power according to the law of Necessity
governing the Homeric conception of nature.
The Melian Dialogue stands out as the only formal
dialogue within Thucydides
' text. Most other speeches tend
to be organized into balanced pairs, often widely separated,
and not addressed directly to each other but rather toward
an assembly or gathering of some sort. The dialogue format
of the Melian episode emphasizes its importance even as it
heightens the sense of confrontation.
Thucydides informs us at the outset that the Melians
prevented the Athenians from directly addressing "the
people," permitting them only to address "the few." 159 The
Athenians respond to this tactic saying that they know full
well it is intended to prevent the Athenians from
"deceiving" the people with seductive arguments. The
Athenians then propose a dialogue in which the Melians will
state their objections to the Athenian position, and the
Athenians will answer them. In this manner we learn at the
outset that the language of the dialogue will have a
different status and a different purpose from that of the
other speeches of the text. The Athenian proposal to submit
to a dialogue counters the accusation of untruthfulness,
thereby associating the dialogue format with the revelation
of truth.
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This is not a surprising move for Thucydides to make,
for it was an evolving view at the time that the order of
language bore a special relationship to the true order of
nature and the nature of justice (physis and dike). It was
a position later to be systematically explored by Plato, of
course, but at the time it was deeply lodged within the
production and performance of Greek tragedy as a public
event. Thucydides, however, casts the Melian dialogue in an
ironic light. To the extent that Greek tragedy was founded
upon and defended a view of justice and nature at odds with
the Homeric perspective, 160 Thucydides employs the Melian
Dialogue to contest rather than endorse the tragic view.
As the Athenians are quick to point out, the strongest
arguments of the Melians against their own annihilation or
capitulation depend upon hope of good fortune, faith in the
gods, and trust in the Spartans. Against these and other
considerations of expedience advanced by the Melians, the
Athenians counter with their interpretation of the "law of
nature" and the primacy of power in the relations of both
gods and men. The Melian Dialogue thus advances a view of
truth in which language is both an agent of and a reflection
of the general truth of power.
Does Thucydides mean then simply to side with the
Athenian view of power as domination, and the artificiality
of all limits? Few have ever believed Thucydides' work to
be so uncomplicated. The Athenian version of the truth of
power must be seen in its proper position on the wheel of
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the dialogue, which is a dialogue between positions of power
and weakness. It has often been observed that the Athenian
position articulated in the Melian Dialogue resembles that
of the Persians against Athens in the Persian War as
recorded by Herodotus. Furthermore, the Melian reply to the
Athenians is posed in almost identical terms as the Athenian
reply to the Persians when faced with a similar demand for
submission. 161 Athens did not submit to the Persians, nor do
the Melians submit to the Athenians. The Athenians were not
destroyed, of course, as were the Melians, but instead
successfully repelled a far superior force against all odds
at the decisive Battle of Salamis. But if the position of
Melos resembles Athens' past, it also resembles Athens'
future in its defeat in Sicily in a battle which would be in
many respects a mirror image of the Battle of Salamis.
There, in Sicily, in its hour of defeat and in one of the
most memorably moving portraits in all literature, Athens,
in the voice of Nicias, the Athenian commander, would echo




What are we to conclude from these resemblances, these
possible substitutions? Must we concur with the decline-and
-fall view that the Melian Dialogue, poised between Salamis
and Sicily, dramatically portrays the moral blindness and
hubris of Athens? Not necessarily. The Melian Dialogue can
also be viewed as a temporal diagram of the trajectory of
power. Along the circumference of the circle traced by the
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dialogue are all of the stages of physis: infancy,
strength, decline; morning, noon, and night. At the moment
of the dialogue Athens occupies the acme of power, much as
Persia had before it. The image of Melos with its
intimations of Sicily joins Athens' past and future, thus
closing the circle.
The circumference of the Melian Dialogue dramatically
recapitulates the trajectory of the Peloponnesian War, which
completes a circle from Athens' weak position against the
Persians to Athens weak position against the Sicilians. In
between is imperialistic Athens at its greatest and most
active height at Melos, where Athens resembles former Persia
and Melos resembles the Athenian army in Sicily. Each point
along the circumference of power is associated in the text
with a particular view of justice, dike. Midway in its
ascent to power, at the first congress at Sparta, Athens
would first articulate the law of nature that the weaker
should be subject to the stronger. But Athens' view then
was muted and qualified by an ambiguous deference to
moderation and restraint. The Athenian view was
complemented by a further claim that cries of "justice" are
raised only by the weak to further their own interests
against the stronger, only to be abandoned whenever force
might do as well. Opposite Athens position on the circle,
below the plane of equality, stood Sparta. Sparta's view of
justice was laconically voiced by Stenelaides who distrusts
words and urges a simple faith in the justice of the gods to
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rectify the imbalance. Later, at Melos, against the
implicit claim that language constitutes the mirror of a
justly balanced order of nature and a limit upon power,
language would be stripped of its persuasive strategies and
unmasked as a pure instrument and expression of domination.
Later still, however, in the evening hour of its defeat in
Sicily, Athens too would appeal to hope, justice, and the
favor of the gods, just as Melos and Sparta had done before
it
.
Does this trajectory convict Athens of hubris, and
vindicate the truth of dike as a self
-balancing moral force
in the cosmos? Not exactly. Not in the sense that it
accuses Athens of a moral flaw in its failure to sustain a
straighter, flatter trajectory. The changes which Athens
exhibits in character are not shifts of a moral nature.
Athens follows a path which exists before it and one which
will continue to exist long after it, according to the
timeless truth portrayed by Thucydides. The demand that
Athens should be morally consistent is a Platonic demand
which can operate meaningfully only in a world which has
been reconfigured to accommodate that demand. What does
remain truly constant, in Thucydides' cyclical view of
history, is not the current occupant of any particular
position on the circle, but only the circle itself. In that
view, the only limits to power are those which power
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From Oikos To Pol is
It is noteworthy that we learn from Thucydides next to
nothing of the internal political arrangements or structure
of Athenian democracy. Nor do we learn many details of the
actual decision-making processes which lay behind the
policies and conduct of the war Thucydides so brilliantly
chronicles. This seems odd since Pericles explicitly, and
Athenians generally, attributed their city's power and
greatness to its democratic rule. We have already
encountered of course Thucydides' own apparent disdain for
democracy and his claim that what passed for democracy in
Athens was in fact leadership by the "first citizen." 1 But
can the omission be attributed solely to Thucydides'
antipathy to democracy, or perhaps to the author's editorial
decision to confine his History to external events of the
war? The alternative possibility must be considered that
the Homeric conception of a cyclical natural order--with its
corollary views of language, truth, power and justice—which
serves Thucydides so well as a theoretical account of the
war, simply can not be extended to provide a comparable
account of the democratic polis as well.
Politically, the most significant development between
the Homeric age exemplified in the Iliad and the Periclean
103
age of fifth-century Athens was the emergence of the Greek
polis, or city-state. The Iliad portrays a world in which
political organization is minimal and might be described
without too much distortion as "tribal." Ties of loyalty
and obligation were defined by membership in extended
household or kinship groups, and by reciprocal bonds of
philia between members of different families. The term
philia is conventionally translated as "friendship" but
would probably be better rendered as "alliance." 2 To a
modern ear "friendship" connotes a relationship based more
on mutual affection than one based on favors earned and
owed. Yet the latter dimension takes considerable
precedence over the former in the early Greek relationship
of philia.
The notion of alliance is critical to an understanding
of social relations in the pre-political world of Homeric
society. As described by A. W. H. Adkins , "Homeric man
lived in a society of virtually autonomous small social
units called oikoi, noble households each under the
leadership of a local chieftain. . . . The oikos was at once
the largest effective social, political and economic unit,"
and only a tenuous, shifting structure of relationships
existed between oikoi. 4 Warfare was a prominent part of the
normal relations between oikoi, where these households
either fought one another or joined together to fight others
in a permanent quest for time, or honor. 5 The customary
expectation of reciprocal service and protection surrounding
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the relation of philia, or guest-friendship, supported a
primary network of alliances in these conflicts. It must be
emphasized that these relations were personal, not political
in a modern sense. Bonds of mutual obligation and
protection were formed between persons not communities,
although these personal bonds might in certain circumstances
be extended to other members of the family unit. While the
bonds of philia and similar ties may well have been the
forerunner of political and military alliances between more
recognizably political units, such abstract units did not
yet exist in a meaningful sense in the Homeric world. 6
The personal and apolitical nature of these earlier
alliances is well-illustrated by an episode in the Iliad.^
In the heat of battle the Greek warrior Diomedes encounters
the Trojan warrior Glaucus. In the course of one of those
extended genealogical accounts which identify heroes in
Homer, the two men discover that they are mutual philoi by
virtue of a compact of guest-friendship made by their
grandfathers. Consequently, even though they have never met
before, and despite the fact that they are enemies in war,
Glaucus the Trojan and Diomedes the Greek will not fight one
another out of respect for the bond of philia between them.
The same episode illustrates the apolitical, or pre-
political, character of the Trojan War. This was not a
conflict between nation-states but rather a personal
vendetta between the Greek brothers Agamemnon and Menelaus
on the one hand, and the Trojan Paris on the other, fought
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in order to avenge a violation of the code of guest-
friendship committed by Paris against Menelaus. The Greek
"army" is a loose assembly of great households under
independent chieftains bound together by personal bonds and
the perennial pursuit of honor, glory and booty. Agamemnon
is the leader ("commander" would be too strong a word) in
part by virtue of his close relationship to Menelaus and in
part because he is able to secure the assistance of the
largest forces. Nevertheless, as the Iliad makes clear,
Achilles or any other chieftain is free to leave and
withdraw his forces at any time, restrained only by concern
for one's own personal reputation and honor.
The identity of the Greek polis as a political
structure evolved slowly as relations between the chieftains
of these great households solidified and stabilized. 8 Two
consequences seem to follow. First of all, the original
polis would tend toward aristocracy, oligarchy, or the rule
of the few. Secondly, the central problem facing the
emerging community would be the problem of power. The polis
would naturally tend toward aristocracy because it
originated as an association of chieftains of great
households, and not initially as a merger of those
households into an overarching community. 9 These chieftains
were, collectively, the aristoi, the best men, by Homeric
standards. Their primary loyalty was always to their own
oikos and its philoi, and their primary aim was always to
secure and advance their own powerful status through
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competitive success, arete, and the acquisition of tribute
and honor, time. 10 Early Greek culture was, and remained,
fiercely competitive. Its heroic values were well-suited to
its agonistic texture, and they were deeply embedded in an
agonistic view of nature which justified those values and
that culture. 11
In its earliest stages then the Greek polis was a
precarious "assembly" of the powerful leaders of distinctly
autonomous groups. 12 In any such association the problem of
power must be paramount. For there to be an association at
all there must be some form of rule; and some form of rule
implies some form of submission. Yet to the heroic Greek
aristoi, submission could only be equated with defeat.
Competitive success, arete, the highest virtue of heroic
Greek culture, could only mean one thing: victory and
domination. The Homeric conception of natural order
contains no space for an affirmation of equal power.
Everything is either on its way up or on its way down in an
endless cycle of growth and decay, strength and weakness.
Equality is but a transient moment not to be sustained in
the eternal contest for ascendance. The early history of
the polis therefore is necessarily marked by intrigue, civil
strife, and intermittent tyranny against a background of
uneasy cooperation between heads of great households.
Whatever mystery attaches to the origin of the Greek
polis, it is grounded in deeply rooted and tenacious Greek
values of freedom, independence, and self-sufficiency.
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Within the Homeric universe, freedom, eleutheria, was a
"competitive combative concept, closely linked to arete, the
quality which enables one to have freedom oneself and
control over others." 13 The early Greek idea of freedom is
inseparably linked to the ideal of domination or rule over
others. To be free is to rule others; to submit to others
is to be unfree. No other options were thinkable. Equality
would be viewed as a mere standoff, not a goal to be
pursued
.
Nevertheless, the freedom sought and defended in early
Greece was never the freedom of the individual in the modern
conception. Just as no element of the natural universe
could escape its assigned place in a larger order of things
(dike), to a Greek mind every individual also necessarily
occupied a prescribed position within a larger social order.
Moreover, the social order was always embedded and reflected
in the natural order of the cosmos, as is evidenced by the
consistent appeal to dike as the most fundamental principle
of good order, both natural and social, which persisted
throughout Greek history. The early Greek conception of
order, either natural or social, did not yet imply equality,
but it did imply a certain reciprocity and an acknowledged
set of limits, however vague or contestable, upon both ruler
and ruled. To aspire to the disconnected and unlimited
freedom of the modern individual would have been considered
a form of madness to an ancient Greek. Such a terrifying
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and insecure freedom would also constitute the most severe
form of punishment in the Greek world: exile.
The Greek concept of freedom in the sense of self-
sufficiency always referred to a larger social unit than the
individual. Initially it may have applied to the family
unit of blood relations. Eventually it applied to the
oikos, the extended household, and its philoi. Finally it
applied to the polis itself and its constituents, but not
before the Homeric conception of natural order, dike, was
undermined and transformed by its own extension beyond its
original sphere.
Homeric dike is compatible with the hierarchical
relations of mutual dependence which define the Greek oikos.
And the same conception of dike might be stretched to fit
the more or less egalitarian alliances between small numbers
of aristoi for specific strategic purposes. But the lack of
ontological space for permanent equality severely tests the
possibility of a larger, more stable political order
premised upon equal power, even if that power-sharing is
confined, as it initially was, to a few aristocratic heads
of great households. It would be overly facile to imagine
democracy evolving "naturally" from such strategic alliances
among equally powerful aristoi. Before the idea of
democracy could emerge and be sustained as a legitimate,
justifiable political order, the very concept of "nature"
from which it is thought to evolve would need to be
radically transformed. It is this transformation, more than
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the origins of the polls itself, which is mysterious. For
democracy, as a sharing of power among the common people as
equals, could not evolve from the principle of dike, with
its limited space for equality, inscribed in the Homeric
conception of nature.
Although the actual conditions for a transition from
aristocratic rule to democratic rule were undoubtedly
complex and slow to evolve, the formal institutionalization
of democracy in Athens is conventionally dated to the
reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C. following the
Peisistratid tyranny. 14 Prior to Cleisthenes' reforms
Athenian history had been dominated by conflict and a
struggle for power between three or four great aristocratic
families and their philol.^ Cleisthenes, who was himself a
member of the great Alkmeonid family, as was Pericles after
him, reorganized the polis on a new, purely geographic basis
rather than the former clan basis. In place of the four
Ionian tribes which traditionally made up Attic society,
Cleisthenes set up a system of ten new tribes in such a way
that each tribe was now composed of demes, or districts,
from each of three regions of the city: those closest to
the center, those on the coast, and those in between. As a
consequence each tribe then embodied a cross-section of
populations, regional characteristics, and activities which
made up the city.
Cleisthenes is also credited with introducing the
practice of attaching the deme name to one's own name
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instead of the traditional attachment of the father's name.
Although this practice was slow to catch on, it did
eventually become standard, and its intent was apparently to
emphasize membership in the new civic organization over
traditional hereditary ties. The final innovation of
Cleisthenes was the introduction of ostracism, a procedure
where annually the assembly might send a single man into
exile for ten years without depriving him of either his
citizenship or his property. Apparently, however, this
particular provision went unused for another twenty years
until 487 B.C.
Admittedly, it is not immediately clear from this brief
account why Cleisthenes' reforms should be credited with the
institutionalization of democracy in Athens. But the
opacity of the account is apparently not due to its brevity
or incompleteness. Others have also puzzled over claims,
both ancient 1** and modern, that Cleisthenes was the creator
of democracy in Athens. 1^ What is not disputed is that the
reforms were intended to dilute or "mix up" traditional
aristocratic concentration and influence. More
controversial is the interpretation of Cleisthenes' own
strategy. Was it a complicated and shrewd attempt to
rearrange the city in such a way as to benefit the
Alkmeonids over the other aristocratic families, as W. G.
Forrest argues? 18 Or did Cleisthenes seek power for himself
only in order to institute his reforms and transcend the old
conflicts, as Ehrenberg argues? 19 On the first
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interpretation Cleisthenes was a clever politician who
outsmarted himself. Unable to achieve sufficient support
from the other families, he was forced to enlist the backing
of the demos, the common people, thereby initiating
democracy accidently. On the second interpretation
Cleisthenes was a selfless politician who sought to overturn
the traditional dominance of the aristocratic families,
including his own, for the greater good of the city.
Efforts to resolve the question have often sought to
ascertain the exact geographic boundaries of the demes, as
well as more precise knowledge of the patterns of influence
of the great families. This approach has thus far proven
futile because the historical record is simply insufficient
to determine the answers. Moreover the attempt is
misdirected. Of far greater import is the question of why
Cleisthenes' reforms, whatever their strategic status,
should have been widely, even enthusiastically received
among both demos and aristoi. That they were well-received
is attested by the relative internal stability of Athenian
democracy for almost two hundred years. 20 As M. I. Finley
observes, "Neither the sovereign Assembly with its unlimited
right of participation, nor the popular jury-courts nor the
selection of officials by lot nor ostracism could have
prevented either chaos on the one hand or tyranny on the
other, had there not been the self-control among enough of
the citizen-body to contain its own behavior within
bounds." 21 But what accounts for those bounds and what is
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the source of this "self-control" which Finley attributes to
the prior Greek sense of community? if, prior to
Cleisthenes' reforms, the Athenian polis, like all Greek
polei, was strained by tension between the aristoi and the
demos-, and if, as all observers agree that it did, that
tension persisted as a prominent strain in Athenian
politics, reference to a primary sense of community appears
to beg the question. For it is precisely the source and
cohesion of that sense of community which needs explaining.
Finley is right: Cleisthenes' reforms could not create that
sense of community if it did not already exist in some
fashion
.
Elsewhere Finley frames the issue differently. Why, he
wonders, did the reforms of Cleisthenes not provoke a
political debate over the theoretical question of
legitimacy? Instead, he says, the Greeks debated the nature
of justice. In the "absence of any need to grapple with the
problem of legitimacy,"^ Finley concludes that external
"conquest alone made possible political stability.'""
Finley *s conclusion fits with the Homeric/Thucydidean view
of natural order that an equality of powers is sustainable
only so long as that equality is a contingent strategy of
domination over others. And it vindicates the heroic view
that democracy and imperialism go hand in hand, each
supporting and, eventually, each undermining the other in an
endless cycle.
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But Finley's conclusion overlooks the possibility that
the continuing Greek debate over the nature of justice
(dike) may have functioned in fact as a debate over
political legitimacy, a debate in which the heroic legacy
and its political implications were contested. The social
order was traditionally thought to be embedded in the
natural order, and human law or custom (nomos) was thought
to be justified by the order of nature. In the ancient
Greek context we would then expect that a question as to the
propriety of the political order would ultimately be posed
as a question of dike itself.
Dike: From Eunomia to Isonomia
We should not be surprised to learn that the meaning of
dike tends to be elusive, not least because it tends to
shift over time. From its earliest beginnings as an
exclusive circle of ruling aristoi, the emerging structure
of the polis presented a paradoxical challenge to the older
Homeric conception of dike. In the older view "nature"
could be seen as an agonistic order of power in which the
eternal struggle for dominance brought about a regular
succession of victories and defeats for the various elements
(i.e., powers) of nature. This was not a conception of
lawless nature, however. The principle of dike, order,
referred to the regularities and the limits of the contest.
"Nature" embodied a series of concentric spheres, each a
separate arena of contest. Every element of nature was
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confined to its appropriate sphere and had its natural
opponent. To be unjust, to violate dike, was to leave one's
proper sphere and to challenge an inappropriate opponent.
The order of nature prescribed a relatively fixed hierarchy
of spheres within which competition would assure not only
that each sphere was ruled at any given moment by the best,
it would also assure an "orderly" transition whenever the
best inevitably weakened and became unfit to rule. Of
course "best" in this conception of order meant best at war
or competition. But under the harshly competitive
conditions of Homeric society, that was certainly an
important measure of "good" or "best." It was also
consistent with the hierarchical social structure of the
oikos in which one man ruled at the top.
In principle, the older conception of dike could be
extended to justify a hierarchical organization of polis
life. But with its limited space for equality, and with its
emphasis on continual strife rather than cooperation, the
same conception of dike was strained to provide a legitimate
basis for stable rule by a group of aristoi from different
oikoi, none of whom was prepared to concede superiority or
even equality to any other. The emerging polis thus
somewhat paradoxically demanded a conception of dike which
might justify both equality and inequality at the same time.
Equality at the top was needed in order to achieve stability
among the ruling aristoi, and to prevent disintegration into
tyranny or stasis. But, in order for the aristoi to
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preserve their ruling status, inequality between the aristoi
and the demos below needed to be justified as well. 24 What
was required
,
in short, was a justification of equal rule
over others who had little or no participation in that rule.
Under the pressure of these twin political imperatives
the political principle of isonomia— literally "equal law"
—
emerged to satisfy the first condition: equality among
rulers, a condition premised upon a fundamental inequality
between ruler and ruled. The second condition—hierarchical
inequality—was justified by the traditional principle of
eunomia, good order, anchored in the traditional conception
of dike as a hierarchical arrangement of spheres. J. Peter
Euben provides an admirably succinct characterization of
eunomia:
Eunomia rested on the acknowledgement of natural
hierarchies and inequalities. . . . Eunomia was the
recognition and observance of the boundaries that marked
and defined those places and ways. To ignore them, to
cross the boundaries and encroach on an area where one
didn't belong, was to violate nature, confound the law,
make for disorder and injustice, and commit an act of
impiety. ... In the world of men as in the world of
the gods, hierarchy and differentiation were the norm. 25
The problem which arose, however, was that isonomia and
eunomia each claimed to be universal principles of justice,
yet each was grounded in a vision of natural order
incompatible with the other, making it difficult to sustain
both isonomia and eunomia simultaneously. Isonomia could
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justify equality among the aristoi, and in principle, it
could justify equality among the demos, but it could not
justify inequality between the aristoi and the demos. The
traditional principle of eunomia, on the other hand, could
justify inequality between ruler and ruled, aristoi and
demos, but the same principle could not also serve to
justify equality among rulers. This is the dilemma of
legitimacy which furnished the theoretical breeding ground
for the emergence of democracy at Athens.
Against the traditional principle of eunomia it was
initially isonomia
,
equal law, not demokratia
, rule by the
people, which was used to justify the reforms of
Cleisthenes. Indeed there is considerable reason to believe
that at the time of Cleisthenes' reforms the term demokratia
did not yet exist. The term isonomia did designate a
principle of political equality, an ideal, which eventually
came to justify democracy, a form of government, but
originally the principle of isonomia did not necessarily
71imply a democratic polity.
"Isonomia" is a compound word of two parts: iso
(equal) and nomos (law) . The term thus lends itself most
readily to translation as "equality under the law" or
"equality through the law." The full meaning of the term is
adequately conveyed, however, only through an appreciation
of law as an expression or medium of power and rule. In
that sense isonomia means an equalitarian distribution of
power among participants, i.e., those who share power, in a
117
political community. Furthermore the sense of equality
expressed in the term isonomia does not imply a harmonious
equalizing, and therefore neutralizing, of power. The
equality found in isonomia refers to the sustained tension
involved when one power is pitted against another power in a
perpetually balanced opposition.
Although isonomia was always a political principle, we
know little of its actual use in the debates leading to
Cleisthenes' reforms. We learn of its meaning partially
from medical texts roughly contemporaneous with the reforms
of Cleisthenes. Alcmaeon, a physician, attributed the state
of health to the maintenance of a symmetrical balance
(isonomia) of power between opposing forces such as the hot
and the cold, the wet and the dry, or the bitter and the
sweet, etc. Ill health or disease he ascribed to a
"monarchy" in which one power achieved supremacy over its
opposite. 28 The unhealthy state, the unnatural state, is
thus one in which a single power is superior to all others.
The healthy state is one in which power is equally divided
among opposing forces. Health is therefore conceived as a
state of dynamic equilibrium in which power is always
limited by an equal and opposite power.
The use of political imagery to describe health and
disease in medicine is consistent with the practice of pre-
Socratic thinkers to explain natural phenomena in political
terms. We should not too hastily conclude, however, that
the use of political metaphor is "merely" rhetorical. The
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use of political metaphor to explain events in the physical
realm secures its effect precisely from the fact that both
nature and the political realm are seen as arenas of power
in conflict. Alcmaeon's conception of physical health as an
isonomia of powers, and his corresponding conception of
disease as a monarchy suggests that the problem of political
power and its limits formed a major axis of thought during
the period.
As noted earlier, isonomia furnished the principal
justification for Cleisthenes' reforms, and it continued to
justify further extensions of democratic practice over time.
Once having ascertained the meaning of isonomia as an
equilibrium of power between those elements participating in
the rule of a political community, it might seem as though
we have sufficiently accounted for the appeal of this
principle to both the aristoi and the demos of Athens in
508 B.C. But we have not. To modern thought which already
believes in the transcendence of democratic rule it might
appear that in any fair contest pitting equality and
inequality against one another, equality would "naturally"
win. But this view implicitly attributes to equality an
immanent, teleological or transcendent status it did not and
could not possess prior to the sixth century B.C. The
appeal of isonomia as a political ideal is grounded in a
conception of nature in which order exists and is maintained
because nature is an equilibrium of powers engaged in
perpetual but balanced opposition to one another. This
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conception of nature as an equilibrium of powers is most
strongly associated with the thought of the Ionian physicist
Anaximander of Miletus, ca. 575 B.C.
In a radical break with tradition Anaximander was
apparently the first systematic thinker to conceive of the
cosmos in geometrically spherical terms in contrast to the
more layered Homeric view. In Anaximander ' s view the earth
lay at rest at the center of the cosmos, equidistant from
all points of the surrounding sphere. 29 In the older view
the earth was located in a hierarchical structure midway
between the world above and the world below. In that
position the earth was thought to require a support or
foundation, an arche, on which to rest in order to retain
its stability. But in a bold view which eliminated
hierarchical considerations and dispensed with the need for
a foundational arche, Anaximander ' s cosmology attributed the
earth's stability to its location at the geometric center,
as though it were suspended by the equal radii governing the
spherical structure of the cosmos.
The term " arche" has various meanings. It can mean
"foundation," the firm ground upon which something rests.
Or, it can mean "origin" or "first principle" in the sense
of "that from which all else follows." Thirdly, it can mean
"rule" in the political sense preserved in the terminology
of "monarchy," rule of one, "oligarchy," rule of the few,
and "anarchy," no rule at all. The common thread which ties
these meanings together is the concept of power. That which
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supports everything else, that which is the source of
everything else, and that which rules or dominates
everything else are all superior powers. The spherical
geometry of Anaximander ' s cosmology eliminates the need for
a power superior to all others. To Anaximander the earth is
stabilized, held in place, simply by virtue of its position
in the center of the cosmos, equidistant from all other
points on the celestial circumference.
The order which governs Anaximander ' s cosmos is neither
static nor entirely harmonious. The elements which
constitute the members of the cosmos are conceived by
Anaximander as mutual opponents, pairs of opposites, each of
which encroaches upon and seeks to dominate the other.
Order is preserved, however, by the fundamental "law," dike,
of the cosmos which is isonomia, an equilibrium of powers.
The elements of the cosmos are balanced against one another
in such a way that if one of them is dominant for a time, it
is in its own turn then dominated by its opposition.
The language of Anaximander ' s text (actually only a
fragment) is permeated with political concepts and
terminology. The elements of the cosmos are construed both
as "powers" and "members" or "constituents" which "encroach"
upon on another. The elements are said to "pay reparation"
or "penalty" to one another for their "injustices" according
to the lawful "judgment" of time. With reference to the
earth's position, it remains in the center, it does not
fall, because it is not "dominated" by anything. This
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language strongly suggests that the school of thought for
which Anaximander was the spokesman represented an attempt
to deal theoretically with the political problem of power
which in turn was recognized as a problem of limits.
Unlike his predecessors, however, Anaximander saw no
need to account for order and stability in the cosmos in
terms of the rule of a superior power. From Anaximander ' s
perspective, the older, hierarchical view posed an
insurmountable problem of limits. For if one element of the
cosmos should possess sufficient power to dominate all the
rest, then that power would necessarily be unlimited and
would, of necessity, envelop and destroy all the rest. 30
Anaximander ' s solution to the problem lay in his geometric
conception of an equilibrium of powers. For Anaximander it
was equality, not supremacy, which furnished theoretical
limits to power and implied a guarantee of order in the
cosmos
.
Anaximander ' s cosmology retained many features of
traditional Greek thought. The universe was still infused
and animated by power. It was still an agon, a universal
contest of forces in conflict. And, most importantly, it
still conceived of power as self -limiting . In the older,
Homeric view the path of power followed a vertically
circular course in the manner of an upright wheel. In the
course of its trajectory from low to high and back to low
again, power naturally sought its greatest possible height.
But in so doing, power also necessarily generated within
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itself the seeds of its own opposition and destruction. It
generated an opponent which would inevitably grow to
overcome it, one which would itself then turn and repeat the
same eternal trajectory of hubris and self-destruction all
over again. It is a familiar pattern repeated throughout
Greek literature. Aeschylus recalls it in the Prometheus
Bound where Zeus is said to have overcome his father,
Kronos, only to fear his own overthrow by a future son in
turn. Thucydides invokes a variation in the rise and fall
of Athenian power. And distant echoes of the theme still
resonate in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics where
each form of polity is paired with its characteristically
degenerate form.
Although Anaximander ' s conception of the cosmos retains
the most prominent features of traditional cosmological
thought, those features are reconfigured to yield a
radically new conception of limits embedded in a new
conception of dike. In Anaximander ' s cosmology the upright
wheel of Homeric order is turned to rotate nearly
horizontally on its axis. In this configuration each point
on the circumference of the circle rises briefly, but not
too steeply or too far, above the others, only to decline
and occupy the diametrically opposite position soon after.
In this configuration all the points of the circle,
representing all the members of the cosmos, are seen in a
symmetrically reciprocal relationship one to another: each
one rules and is ruled in turn. Ascendance and decline are
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no longer equated with victory and defeat, dominance and
submission. Instead, ruling and obeying are compressed into
a new temporal order in which each position is seen to be
the reciprocal of its opposite in a single, simultaneous
relationship of isonomia.
Anaximander ' s reconfiguration of the cosmos into an
equilibrium of powers in rotation yields for the first time
an ontological footing for political equality. Dike no
longer refers to a succession of victories and defeats which
balance out only in a complete cycle of historical time. In
Anaximander ' s conception dike comes to refer to a regular
rotation of power in which all elements of the cosmos
participate on an equal basis, one in which ruling and being
ruled come to be seen as complementary positions within the
framework of a single, mutually shared relationship.
Without foundation in the cosmology of Anaximander it
is unlikely that the political slogan of isonomia could have
had more than limited appeal in a traditional, hierarchi-
cally ordered polity. To be sure, the ruling circles of the
aristocracy would have found in isonomia an attractive
solution to a problem of power-sharing among themselves.
But even so, isonomia would have lacked legitimacy in the
sense that it could not be rendered compatible with
traditional notions of dike and arete in the same way that
eunomia might be. And absent any grounding in a new
conception of dike such as Anaximander ' s , any link between
isonomia and demokratia, rule by the ordinary people, was
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certain to be encountered and resisted by the aristoi as a
threat to traditional, aristocratic conceptions of justice
and good order. Before it could lend legitimacy to equal
participation in power among traditional rulers, the
political principle of isonomia required a foundation upon a
new conception of dike such as Anaximander
' s universal
equilibrium of power. Even with the requisite legitimacy,
however, isonomia posed a new problem. It could justify
equality among participants in power, but it could not then
turn and restrict participation in ruling power to a select
few. Once the legitimacy of isonomia was established by the
need for stability among the traditional ruling circles, the
path to democracy was relatively assured.
Dike is by its very nature a universal conception.
Without a prior conception of justice to support unlimited
equality in power-sharing, the movement toward rule by the
demos, the people as a whole, would almost certainly have
led to stasis, civil strife, instead of stable democracy at
Athens. 31 The fact that isonomia as a political principle
apparently did find sufficient appeal in 508 B.C. to
overcome residual resistance by the Athenian aristoi
suggests that the new equalitarian conception of dike had
32
already partially displaced the older Homeric conception.
In this context Cleisthenes' reforms do not themselves
institute democracy so much as they signal a shift in the
conception of justice, dike, away from one configuration
toward another. The reforms of Cleisthenes then do not so
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much institute a new political order as much as they remove
elements of an old one already in the process of passing
away, thereby making room for an extension of democratic
reforms and practices. Among those practices were
unrestricted participation for citizens in the ruling
assembly, election to office by lot, and rotation in office
to assure maximum political equality and nearly universal
participation, all of which practices existed to a limited
degree prior to Cleisthenes' reforms. 33
Tragedy and Theory: The Oresteia
Despite the enormous intellectual, literary and
political legacy of ancient Greece, the inventors of
democracy never left us with, and apparently never
formulated a systematic theory of democracy. 3^ They did,
however bequeath us Greek tragic drama from which we might
extract something like a theoretical point of view, if by
"theoretical" we mean a cosmological view of nature which
serves to ground and justify democratic institutions and
practices. 35 Although it may seem curious to look for
political theory in the dramatic action of the theater, the
link is not so farfetched as it initially may appear.
Tragedy and democracy were both Athenian inventions which
developed, flourished, and eventually declined together.
The association is more than coincidental. Tragedy was both
a political and theoretical institution which played a vital
role in the democratic education of the demos.
31 In its own
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way tragedy was as much a political institution as the
Council or the Assembly. It was sponsored and financed by
the state in the same manner as the all-important Athenian
fleet. Admission was either free or subsidized and was open
to all citizens. Attendance was, if anything, even more
democratic than the Assembly since women apparently were
permitted to attend the theater while being barred from
participation in the Assembly. 38 Tragedy, moreover, was
commissioned for and performed on the annual holiday on
which the city of Athens celebrated its own democratic
structure: the City Dionysia. 39
More than mere entertainment, tragic theater was in its
physical setting, its performance and its vision, a
theoretical act. The geometry of the Greek theater
recreated the circular structure of the cosmos. Within that
design, including the seating arrangements of the audience,
all of the structural tensions of the city were re-
capitulated. It is useful to know that etymologically
"theater" and "theory" share a common root meaning to "see,
sight, gaze, look upon, behold, admire, and contemplate." 40
What is seen in the Greek theater is the nested, concentric
spheres of the cosmos in general, and the political sphere
of the polis in particular. In tragedy the city "puts
itself on the stage and plays itself." 41 What is finally
played out on the stage is a conflict between two visions of
dike, two conceptions of universal order. 42 One, the dike
of the Homeric world, portrays the heroic politics of an
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oi/cos-centered social order transposed to the context of the
emerging polls. The second version of dike derives from the
cosmology of Anaximander and is reflected in the political
principle of isonomia underlying the democratically ordered
polis. On one hand, heroic dike represents for the polis
the constellation of values and behavior which must be
opposed if the polis is to be sustained. Against heroic
dike tragedy portrays and affirms the dike associated with
isonomia. On the other hand, heroic dike cannot be entirely
rejected and obliterated. It too has its necessary moment
if the polis is to be defended and preserved. Sophocles'
Oedipus, for example, is a heroic figure. He is both
essential to, and destructive of the city's preservation.
The heroic principle for which Oedipus stands must be
permitted its time to rule, but it cannot be permitted to
rule uncontested. The perpetual contest between mutually
incompatible but mutually necessary opposites provides the
tragic principle of limitation essential to moderate and
stable political power, and it is this principle which is
portrayed and affirmed in Greek tragedy.
The tragedy which best illustrates the contest between
one dike and another is in many respects Aeschylus' trilogy,
the Oresteia. Produced in 458 B.C., shortly after the final
consolidation of democracy in Athens, the Oresteia is the
only trilogy of Aeschylus to survive completely intact.
With the exception of the Persians, an early play, the other
extant plays of Aeschylus each represent only a single part
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of a trilogy, an incompleteness which renders their
interpretation relatively more speculative.
The Oresteia consists of three separate but related
plays: the Agamemnon, the Libation Bearers, and the
Eumenides. By modern standards of dramatic action very
little actually happens in the Oresteia. The dramatic
tension occurs largely in the dialogue where contested
interpretations of the major events of the trilogy are given
voice by the chorus and other characters. In the play which
bears his name, Agamemnon, king of Argos and head of the
House of Atreus, returns home from the Trojan War only to be
murdered by his wife, Clytaemnestra . In the second play,
i
the Libation Bearers, Orestes, son of Agamemnon and
Clytaemnestra , returns home to avenge the murder of his
father by killing his mother. In the third play, the
Eumenides , the scene shifts to the city of Athens where
Orestes has been driven by his mother's Furies, or demons.
There the protector of the city, the goddess Athena,
empanels a jury of Athenian citizens to conduct a trial of
Orestes' guilt. That is the bare bones of the action which
occurs on stage.
Indirectly throughout the dialogue we learn of other
events and actions which frame those viewed by the audience.
We learn of Helen, sister of Clytaemnestra and wife of
Menelaus, Agamemnon's brother. The seduction of Helen by
Paris of Troy is recalled as the cause of the Trojan War in
which Agamemnon and Menelaus, sons of Atreus, organized the
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great Greek expedition to conquer Troy, retrieve Helen, and
right the wrong done to Menelaus and to Argos by Paris and
Helen. We learn too that in the course of sailing to Troy,
Agamemnon's fleet was becalmed, apparently through the anger
of a goddess. In order to appease the goddess and free the
fleet to sail, Agamemnon ritually sacrificed his daughter,
Iphigeneia. Later, on the return home following the
complete destruction of Troy, a violent storm struck the
Greek fleet, scattering and destroying it, leaving only
Agamemnon's ship to return safely to Argos.
Eventually we learn of the existence of a curse upon
the entire House of Atreus
. Some time in the past, Atreus,
father of Agamemnon and Menelaus, had quarrelled with his
own brother, Thyestes. Thyestes had seduced Atreus' wife
and sought to supplant him as the ruler of Argos. Defeated
and exiled for his attempts, Thyestes later returned with
his children to Argos as a suppliant to Atreus. Feigning
reconciliation, Atreus invited Thyestes to a feast at which
Atreus served to Thyestes his own roasted, slaughtered
children which Thyestes innocently ate. Upon learning the
nature of the meal he had just eaten, Thyestes cursed the
House of Atreus and fled with his only surviving child,
Aegisthus, who was later to become consort and co-
conspirator with Clytaemnestra in her murder of Agamemnon
and usurpation of the throne of Argos.
From even this brief synopsis it should be clear that
the separate threads which weave this story together are
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deeply knotted and entangled. What does it all mean?
Although there are many themes and symbols which recur
throughout this dense tragedy, it is widely agreed that the




According to what has now become a standard
interpretation of the text, the trilogy unfolds as a
progression from a "primitive" sense of justice, the lex
taliones in which the crime of murder is repaid in kind by
the by the family of the victim, to a higher, "truer" sense
of justice in which the family vendetta is replaced by the
impartial rule of law in the political state. 45 There is
clearly some merit to this interpretation. But in its most
superficial form it risks turning Aeschylus' tragedy into
mere political propaganda celebrating the central authority
of the state over more traditional forms of social
organization. At best it presents us with a vision of the
narrow confines and conflicts of the traditional family-
centered social structure transcended and reconciled within
the broader bonds of the political community.
There are at least two difficulties with the standard
progressivist interpretation. One is raised by Lazlo
Versenyi who notes that Aeschylus' introduction of trial by
jury as a "solution" to the problem of blood feud poses
dramatic problems of its own because the trilogy then
presents two sets of law diametrically opposed to each other
without addressing the legitimacy of one replacing the
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other. Versenyi appropriately raises the issue of
legitimacy without which Aeschylus' trilogy, and especially
the Eumenides, approaches political propaganda. His
criticism goes awry, however, because he can conceive of
"legitimacy" only in terms of philosophical rationality
which is absent from the Oresteia. To his credit, Versenyi
recognizes that the Eumenides fails to resolve the conflict
between competing conceptions of justice. But the Platonic
or Hegelian standard of rationality by which he measures the
text and finds it wanting forces him to conclude that
Aeschylean tragedy is primitive and "incoherent." 47
Conflict fails to yield to unity; therefore nothing has been
resolved and, apparently, nothing has truly been said. 48
The second difficulty, closely related to the first, is
that the progressivis t interpretation sees the establishment
of "true" justice as a matter of conflict resolution,
harmony, and reconciliation of opposites. * But, as Simon
Goldhill has painstakingly argued, to the extent that the
progressivist interpretation locates a reconciliation of
opposites and a final resolution to conflict in the
Eumenides , it must overlook or oversimplify significant
elements of the text. 50 According to Goldhill and similar
critics, "the problem of dike ... in this trilogy is not
solved but endlessly restated." 51 Conflict, not harmony,
continues to reign in the end.
The desire to find a politically ordered resolution to
the conflicts of the Oresteia in the establishment of
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"rational" legal institutions finds support in the text of
the Eumenides where the goddess Athena establishes the first
court to try cases of murder, a court which is ordained to
last for all time. But the longing for harmony which this
interpretation represents is forced to ignore other parts of
the text which do not readily fit the interpretation. For
example, what are we to make of the fact that the jury of
citizens is evenly split on the guilt of Orestes, 52 and that
it takes the act of a goddess to determine the outcome of
the trial? In what sense is this "resolution," and why
should opposing forces feel reconciled by Athena's
apparently arbitrary vote 53 which finds Orestes formally not
guilty but not wholly innocent either? What are we to make,
furthermore, of the Furies, those female demons who
represent the stubborn forces of darkness and the past in
this tragedy? Contrary to the progressivist interpretation
they are never truly harmonized into the higher order of the
state. They never fully emerge into the light. They remain
submerged underground from where they continue to exert
their terror. To be sure, they are not excluded, indeed
they cannot be banished from the political order, as Athena
assures them and us. They have power and cannot be
defeated. Nor is it entirely clear that their force can
always be fully "channeled" to work only on behalf of the
state, as the progressivist interpretation would have it.
All that can be said with confidence is that the political
order represented by Athena and Athens in this trilogy
133
depends for its own success upon forces which are opposed to
it. Nor is it even certain that the political domain
represents the realm of light against the realm of darkness
in this most murky tragedy. All the text permits us to say
is that the political realm is constituted by and depends
upon continuous tension between pairs of mutually exclusive
yet mutually dependent opposites such as light and darkness.
What kind of justice is this? It is the justice {dike)
of isonomia
,
the justice of Anaximander, not the justice of
Plato or Hegel. Aeschylus does not present us with a choice
between hierarchical order or conflict, as does Plato. Nor
does he present us with the evaporation of conflict in the
actualized political order as does Hegel. Instead Aeschylus
presents us with an image of universal tragic justice in
which sustained conflict between equal opponents is affirmed
as the guarantee against an oscillation between absolute
chaos {stasis) and absolute power (monarchy) represented by
the heroic configuration of justice.
The tragic justice of Aeschylus affirms equality but
does not therefore disavow conflict. Aeschylus, and Greek
tragedy in general, remains strongly within the ancient
Greek tradition in which the agon, the contest, represents
the supreme reality and the ultimate metaphor. Tragic
justice does not reject the contest but rather affirms the
equality of the opponents, thus assuring that the contest
will continue but that no victory and no defeat will ever b<
complete. Equality of power not supremacy; perpetual
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conflict not harmony provides the tragic guarantee of
political order. "No anarchy, no rule of a single master"
decrees Athena, echoing the Furies 54 and identifying a mean
established not through the elimination of conflict but
through its continuation.
Against the progressivist interpretation of the
Oresteia stands a more conservative reading in which ancient
Homeric justice is affirmed rather than rejected or
transcended. The most prominent articulation of this view
comes from H. Lloyd-Jones, 55 who explicitly rejects the
progressivist reading of the trilogy. "The cliche which we
have heard all our lives that the Eumenides depicts the
transition from the vendetta to the rule of law is utterly
misleading," he writes. 5** According to Lloyd- jones, the
essence of Homeric justice is the inexorable punishment of
wrongdoers. Those who violate the law of the universe are
punished by the gods. Those who violate the laws of the
state are punished by the state. The principle remains the
same. In the Homeric order the justice of the cosmos was
enforced by those mortals to whom Zeus made known his will
such as Agamemnon. In the Athenian state justice comes
through the law court established by Zeus' daughter, Athena.
For Lloyd-Jones, the court of Athena does not replace the
demonic Furies as agents of Zeus. Instead, he says, the
court is established to assist those venerable agents in
their fearful task. 57
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As with the progressivist interpretation which it
opposes, the conservative reading must find harmonies where
the text is dissonant or ambiguous. For example, the
conservative reading finds agreement between Athena and the
Furies while explaining away or ignoring the fact that
Athena casts her vote against them at Orestes' trial. 58
Moreover, the conservative reading presupposes a timeless,
unchanging conception of justice. What shifts over time is
merely the mechanisms or agents of enforcement, from
religious to political, and not the order of justice itself.
Continuity, however, is purchased only through
oversimplification. Lloyd-Jones concurs that "justice"
(dike) refers not only to the established order of the state
but also to the whole order of the universe. 59 But,
contrary to Lloyd-Jones, throughout the Oresteia and
throughout the history of Greek thought, "dike" always means
much more than merely the punishment of lawbreakers. Indeed
it is the profoundly dense ambiguity of the term "dike"
which furnishes the dramatic subject-matter of the Oresteia
,
an ambiguity which is suppressed by the conservative
interpretation. Lost in the search for continuity is the
possibility that the Oresteia portrays two complex versions
of dike, two incompatible versions of universal order, one
against the other. The first, located most prominently in
the Agamemnon, is associated with eunomia and the
traditional oi/cos-centered social organization of the Iliad.
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The second, most prominently portrayed in the Eumenides, is
associated with isonomia and political democracy. 60
The progressivist and conservative readings of the
Oresteia each tend to focus on one part of the trilogy at
the expense of others. The progressivist reading, for
example, tends to concentrate on the Eumenides at the
expense of the more heroic Agamemnon. From the
progressivist perspective, the mere establishment of a trial
court in the Eumenides suffices to overturn the more
"primitive" justice of the Agamemnon. From the conservative
point of view, the heroic justice of the Agamemnon seems to
be affirmed while the more "naive dramaturgy of the
Eumenides" is dismissed. 61 Each view oversimplifies the
notion, and the problem, of justice in the Oresteia while
largely overlooking the unique association of tragedy with
the origins of democracy. Along the way it has somehow been
forgotten that in sponsoring the production of tragic drama
the Athenian polis performed the political function of
educating, not propagandizing, the demos in a "theoretical"
view of the natural order which legitimized democracy. And
it did so, furthermore, by interrogating and reinterpreting
its own past in a remarkably sophisticated way. It is time
for another look at the Oresteia.
Heroic Agamemnon
It is no accident that the Trojan War provides the
frame of reference for the Agamemnon, first play of the
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Oresteia. The Trojan War was a heroic war and the Agamemnon
is heroic drama. 62 The Trojan War, it will be recalled, was
fought as a matter of justice against the Trojans for Paris'
abduction of Helen in violation of the Greek code of guest-
friendship. But it must also be recalled that Greek justice
(dike) was more than a legal or military affair. It was
also a matter of natural order. The traditional account of
the Trojan War with which every Greek was familiar through
the poetry of Homer's Iliad conveyed the cyclical pattern of
natural order and justice which constituted the dike
upholding heroic culture and its oi/cos-centered political
structure. The Agamemnon, with its treatment of the House
of Atreus, recapitulates that traditional order even as it
calls it into question.
Heroic dike follows a trajectory of rising and falling,
victory and defeat, success and failure reminiscent of the
arched path of celestial objects. In its circular course,
however, heroic dike conveys more than a mere repetitious
succession of victories and defeats. The principle of dike
operating in the heroic universe inscribes a pattern of
necessity in which the only path to victory also leads to
defeat, a pattern in which the necessary means to success
also set the stage for eventual failure. It is a recurrent
theme in Greek literature traced by Homer's Achilles in the
Trojan War, Thucydides ' Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and
Aeschylus' Agamemnon in the Oresteia, among others.
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Agamemnon was a hero of the Trojan War and it is
primarily through his character in the Oresteia that
Aeschylus traces the essential elements of heroic dike. 62
In the opening lines of the play a watchman speaks of the
"grand processionals of all the stars of night" resembling
dynasties of men waning as others arise. What we see in the
Agamemnon is the moment of Agamemnon's star falling just as
Clytaemnestra ' s rises, and the play explores the connection
between these two events. Indeed, they are finally seen to
be as intimately connected as spokes on a wheel so that they
constitute not two events but a single movement of rotation.
Agamemnon's actual presence upon the stage is brief.
He has fewer than ninety lines of dialogue in a play more
than 1670 lines long. His action is equally brief.
Agamemnon returns home from the war in his chariot. He is
persuaded by Clytaemnestra to alight without touching the
earth but to pass directly into the house upon precious
tapestries, where she kills him. Agamemnon's arrival in his
chariot, his failure to descend to earth, and his immediate
death all combine to remind us that Agamemnon's fate is
directly tied to his heroic status and the war.
Although Agamemnon's appearance upon the stage is
brief, his dramatic presence spans a much greater time, ten
years, in fact, the length of the Trojan War. If
Agamemnon's murder at the hands of Clytaemnestra marks the
end of the Trojan War, his own sacrificial slaughter of
their innocent daughter, Iphigeneia, marks its inauguration.
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That past event is recounted by the chorus early in the
play 64 so that it constitutes an introduction to the later
events presented upon the stage.
Ten years previously, the chorus recalls, Zeus had
dispatched the army of the Atreidae to sail against Troy in
order to avenge the abduction of Helen. But at Aulis,
before the fleet could reach Troy, the goddess Artemis held
back the winds, leaving the fleet powerless to sail upon its
ordained mission of justice. In order to appease the
goddess and free the fleet to sail, Agamemnon was required
to sacrifice his daughter, Iphigeneia. His only alternative
was to abandon the expedition, with all the shame attendant
upon that course.
It is perhaps too easy from a modern perspective to
condemn as immoral Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his
daughter in order to save the fleet and prosecute the war.
Viewed from within the framework of heroic culture, however,
the choice confronting Agamemnon constituted a genuine
dilemma. As king of Argos and head of the dominant house of
Atreus, it was Agamemnon's duty and responsibility to
protect his "house" (oikos) and its followers along with the
other houses of Argos from attack or violation. The
abduction of Helen constituted an attack upon one of the
most sacred customs of the Greek world, the custom of
"guest-friendship" by which strangers were protected from
harm outside their land, and who in turn refrained from
doing harm to their protectors. This was no mere courtesy,
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but rather a fundamental principle by which an insecure and
vulnerable world achieved a modicum of peace and
stability. 65 Violation of this customary law by Helen and
Paris tore at the very roots of whatever social order
existed in heroic culture. For Agamemnon to fail to defend
his "house" would not only be viewed as cowardice on his
part, a serious enough charge, but it would also threaten to
unravel the only system of justice known to his world.
It would be a mistake to view Agamemnon simply as a
character with a fatal flaw who could have and should have
chosen other than he did in order for good to win out in the
end. Agamemnon's dilemma was legitimate and resided in the
fact that in order to fulfill his role as protector of the
house (oikos) he had to sacrifice an intimate and cherished
member of that house. In order to avenge a crime he had to
commit another one. In order to protect justice he had to
commit an injustice.
In Aeschylus' drama Agamemnon chooses to resolve his
dilemma by sacrificing his daughter and going to war. We
misread the play, however, by concluding that Agamemnon
simply chooses war over family, implying perhaps that men
will always choose war and that women and children will
always pay the price. There is much to be said for that
angry view but it nevertheless oversimplifies the play.
Agamemnon had no guilt-free course open to him. Under the
circumstances, and apart from the larger conflicts of
justice of which the play treats, it is clear that if
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Agamemnon did not fulfill Artemis' condition and sacrifice
Iphigeneia, everyone, including Iphigeneia, would die. 66
That is not to say that, contrary to modern intuitions,
Agamemnon chose rightly. It depends upon what we mean by
"rightly." Within the play, choosing rightly means
"choosing according to justice (dike)." But in Agamemnon's
situation, each choice open to him is both just and unjust
at the same time. And we are led to infer that this
paradox, too, is according to dike.
But what kind of justice is this? It is ambiguous. It
may be heroic or it may be tragic. It is heroic if an act
of justice necessarily breeds an act of injustice which
ultimately brings the heroic actor to his death. 67 It is
tragic if the necessary conflict, the paradox in which an
act is simultaneously just and unjust, prevents the tragic
actor from moving too far in one direction and flying too
near the sun, so to speak.
Each conception of justice is associated with a
conception of limits. In heroic dike, the overreaching, the
high arch, is a necessary part of of the trajectory. The
correction, the inevitable fall, comes later in time as the
wheel of justice turns and the opponent bred by the original
action overtakes and fills the space previously occupied by
the the heroic actor. In tragic dike the limits occur not
over a period of time but more nearly simultaneously, as the
inherent injustice contained within a just act restrains the
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tragic actor, holding him to a flatter trajectory, and
preventing him from overreaching his bounds.
Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his daughter was
heroic, and the life of Agamemnon portrayed by Aeschylus
follows the heroic path. He arose to heroic heights in the
Trojan War and died at the pinnacle of his glory in Argos
.
Symbolically, he never set foot upon the earth following the
war, but returned home in his chariot only to enter his
house upon fine tapestries and meet his death.
Clytaemnes tra
,
too, is no less a heroic figure than
Agamemnon. She is his opposite on the wheel of heroic
justice. She rises as he falls. She justifies her act of
murder in part because it rights; that is, it balances over
time the injustice of Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia.
He has slain a family member, and so does she. He has slain
a woman, she kills a man. He has acted to protect the
"house" in the extended sense; she acts to defend it in the
more immediate sense of family.
Clytaemnes tra ' s act has justice on its side, to be
sure, but it is unjust as well. She has killed her husband,
a crime. She has killed the king, a greater crime. And she
has usurped the throne of Argos, perhaps the greatest crime
of all in the eyes of democratic Athens. Predictably,
Clytaemnestra ' s act does not end the heroic cycle; it merely
continues it. Her own unjust act of justice inevitably
leads to her own death at the hands of exiled Orestes, her
son. The figure of Clytaemnestra represents no alternative
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to Agamemnon's rule but rather its inversion. Her rule
represents the other side, the underside, of Agamemnon's
heroic trajectory. It is Clytaemnestra
' s rule (arche)
which, together with Agamemnon's, completes one cycle of
heroic dike. The cycle then appears to begin anew as
Orestes returns to kill his mother in retribution for the
murder of his father.
Like Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra before him, Orestes is
bound to commit an act which is both just and unjust at the
same time: the killing of his mother. It is a just act
because, as the only surviving son of Agamemnon, Orestes is
bound by the codes of the social order to avenge the death
CO
of his father. ° It is an unjust act because the same code
of social justice forbids the crime of matricide. Unlike
Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra, however, we shall see that
Orestes' character is tragicly balanced and not heroic, thus
lending his name to Aeschylus' trilogy. Agamemnon and
Clytaemnestra are each heroic figures because each
represents only one side of a complete circle. Each is the
other's opposite, and it is this one-sidedness which




When we first encounter Agamemnon at Aulis, he is torn
by the choice presented by Artemis: save his daughter and
lose the fleet, or save the fleet and lose his daughter.
"Which of these things goes now without disaster?" he
complains as he agonizes over his fate. But then he
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"endured" or "dared" 71 to become the sacrificer of his
daughter, and as he did so, the chorus tells us, his
character changed.
When necessity's yoke was put upon him
he changed, and from the heart the breath came bitter
and sacrilegious, utterly infidel
to warp a will now to be stopped at nothing.
The sickening in men's minds, tough,
reckless in fresh cruelty brings daring. He endured
then
to sacrifice his daughter
. . . ,
72
Under the yoke of necessity, Agamemnon passed from agonizing
indecision to singleminded resolution as he decided that
"such sacrifice of innocent blood ... is right." 73
The chorus associates the shift in Agamemnon's
character with a loss of limits— "a will now to be stopped
at nothing"—and a "sickening in men's minds" which "brings
daring." The "sickening" harks back to Alcmaeon, the
physician, for whom ill health represented a loss of balance
between equal and opposite forces. Good health he
attributed to a sustained but tense equilibrium {isonomia)
of opposing forces. 7^ In his anguish, then, torn by
indecision over his fateful dilemma, Agamemnon was painfully
but healthily balanced. The sickening of Agamemnon's mind
referred to in the text represents a departure from that
balance, that isonomia, followed by a loss of restraint
which led to reckless daring. It is Agamemnon's resolution,
his singleminded shedding of his agony, and not his decision
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to sacrifice Iphigeneia which is referred to by the chorus
as a sickness. To be sure, Agamemnon had to make a
decision. But he did not have to passionately agree that
the sacrifice of innocent blood was unambiguously "right."
He did not have to cease to suffer over the injustice
intertwined with the justness of his decision.
The one-sidedness
,
the imbalance which constitutes
Agamemnon's newfound resolution, is partially represented in
the text by the silencing of Iphigeneia. For Agamemnon not
only sacrifices his daughter, he ceases to hear her voice
—
"her supplications and her cries of father were nothing" 75—
and he gags her mouth in a move which the chorus
characterizes as drowning speech in strength. 6 At the
moment of sacrifice the chorus, too, is drowned by silence.
"What happened next I saw not, nor speak it," the chorus
77 • •
announces. What is this curtain of silence which drops
over the scene? It is the silence of the other voice, the
other side of Agamemnon's identity, which ceases to be heard
and therefore ceases to exercise its restraints. At the
moment when Agamemnon decided that the shedding of innocent
blood was unambiguously right, Agamemnon became unbalanced,
relieved of his agony. He ceased to be warrior-king and
father both, to become warrior only, unrestrained by the
claims of close family.
Later, when Agamemnon arrives upon the stage, still in
his chariot signifying his heroic heights, the same one-
sidedness rules his speech. He praises the gods whose agent
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he was in the destruction of Troy. He speaks in terms of a
unanimous vote in which the gods one-sidedly favored the
death of Troy and all her people. "Above the opposite vase
[i.e., the vase to hold opposing ballots] the hand hovered
and there was hope," he recounts, "but no vote fell." 78 in
this speech which implicitly equates justice with success, a
venerable Greek view, 79 Agamemnon speaks only of the
lopsided victory which the Argives achieved over the
Trojans. He gives no hint, he says not a word of the
enormous cost in lives and sacrifice paid for his and the
gods' heroic conquest. He speaks only of the pride and
glory of total victory.
A more balanced view is provided by the herald who
precedes Agamemnon's arrival upon the stage. The herald's
initial speech, filled with references to daylight and
sunshine, relays the immense scale of the Trojan defeat.
"All their plain has been laid waste. Gone are their
altars, the sacred places of the gods are gone . . . , " he
announces as he praises Agamemnon, ominously, as a "man
fortunate to be honored far above all men alive. " OKJ Soon,
however, under pressure from the chorus, the herald begins
to reveal a darker, more painful side to the Argive victory.
The heroic glory of battle was accompanied by immense
hardship, suffering, and loss of life for ordinary people.
"But why live such grief over again?" asks the herald in
true heroic fashion. "That time is gone for us, and gone
for those who died." The one-sidedness of the heroic path
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is captured in the herald's timeless query. "Why must a
live man count the numbers of the slain ..." he asks.
"For us survivors," he continues, "the pleasure wins, pain
casts no weight in the opposite scale." 81 The herald
extolls the glory which will accrue to Argos as a result of
the great victory over Troy. Immortal fame and honor will
live on in memory; the dead do not count in this tale.
Eventually, however, after further entreaty from the chorus,
the herald reluctantly reveals the true cost of victory in
human terms. Only one ship, Agamemnon's, has returned
safely from the war. All the others have been lost at sea.
This is the underside, the silent side, of the heroic quest
for justice.
Juxtaposition of the herald's speeches with that of
Agamemnon allows the audience to question the value, indeed
the very meaning of "success" and "victory" in a way not
possible for Agamemnon. There is no doubt that in
traditional terms the expedition against Troy was a
resounding success. But what kind of success, Aeschylus
seems to ask, is purchased at such enormous cost to both
victor and vanquished alike? In some of the most bitter,
biting lines of the play, the chorus recalls that not only
the houses of heroes suffered from the war and the
transgressions of "some strange woman. Every house in
Hellas suffered the loss of loved ones as the funeral urns,
packed smooth with "ashes that once were men," 83 returned
home from the war. A disproportion is introduced here in
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which the undying fame of heroes is purchased with the blood
of nameless, unheroic citizens.
Sickness, Suffering and Wisdom
It is tempting from a modern point of view to try to
understand Agamemnon's "sickness," his one-sidedness
, as a
sign of mental or moral deficiency in his character. And to
support such efforts we would have available to us the
familiar Greek notion of "hubris," or excess. To take that
path, however, would do little more than to affirm modern
categories of thought and to obscure, if not falsify, Greek
history. A whole range of behavior which eventually became
condemned as excessive was once commended as appropriate and
even necessary to the pursuit of justice. The shift
involved precisely those aristocratic characteristics once
associated with Homeric heroes, such as the competitive
pursuit of honor and glory in personal combat and the
accumulation of booty or wealth to signify and confirm their
greater status.
The eventual rejection of the extremes of traditional
aristocratic behavior in the democratic polis—behavior
which sought to exalt particular individuals and families
over the city itself— was historically associated with a
84
shift in the techniques and strategies of warfare.
Homeric heroes were hippeis, owners of horses and chariots
who fought individually in combat to secure and protect the
honor due themselves and their families. Later, in the
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seventh century, the hippeus came to be replaced by the
hoplite phalanx, heavily armed men fighting in an
unbreakable line, the shield of each man protecting the man
next to him.
With the shift in battle technology came a shift in
values. The warlike frenzy, lyssa, which once propelled the
individual hero into battle, permitting him to perform
extraordinary feats of courage, was now discouraged as
excessive and dangerous to the success of the coordinated
hoplite phalanx. Success would now depend upon each hoplite
soldier resisting the temptation of individual combat and
personal glory to hold his position in the line and not
break ranks. The virtues of self-restraint and respect for
equality began to take precedence over the competitive self-
glorification of heroic arete.
Agamemnon's "sickness," his singleminded resolution so
reminiscent of Periclean gnome, 85 must be seen in historical
context and not through modern moral or psychological
categories. To accuse Agamemnon of hubris, excessive
behavior, and let it go at that is to lose the ambiguity of
his character. To be sure, Agamemnon does go too far. We
learn from the herald that he has destroyed the Trojan
altars and the sacred places of their gods, actions which
Clytaemnestra had previously warned might anger the Greek
gods, endanger the expedition, and inaugurate a new round of
fresh wrongs demanding to be repaid.
86 Clearly, Agamemnon's
actions at Troy represent a loss of limits, an illicit
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crossing of boundaries. But those actions cannot be
isolated from his actions at Aulis, for it was at Aulis that
Agamemnon first affirmed that the sacrifice of innocent
blood is right {dike)
,
thereby acquiring a will "now to be
stopped at nothing." Left unresolved by the charge of
hubris, which seems to imply a flaw in moral judgment, is
the question of why Agamemnon lost a sense of limits in the
first place. The answer is found in the chorus' reference
to the "yoke of necessity" which first introduced the change
in Agamemnon's character. "When necessity's yoke was put
upon him, he changed," the chorus tells us in a view which
complicates our vision of hubris.' The chorus seems to be
saying that the shift in Agamemnon's character, the resolute
closing of his mind to restraining voices, had a fateful
quality of necessity, of inevitability, about it.
On one level the yoke of necessity applies to
Agamemnon's identity as a hero. His decision at Aulis to
sacrifice his daughter represented a decision to go to war
and enter battle. But for a hero to enter battle and fight
in a truly heroic manner it was necessary for him to become
unbalanced; that is, it was necessary for him to enter into
a state of relatively unrestrained frenzy (lyssa) which
would produce and sustain the stamina and courage necessary
oo
to heroic combat. 00
On another level, the "necessity" which applies to the
shift in Agamemnon's character at Aulis also posesses a mor<
universal quality associated with dike. Zeus has mandated
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the Trojan War as an affair of justice. But war requires
the presence of lyssa, the fierce determination which
overcomes fear and produces resolute courage. Lyssa is a
necessary ingredient of both victory and justice, but, on
the other hand, it is an imbalance which almost guarantees a
transgression of limits which will then demand fresh
retribution in the future. And so the cycle eternally
recurs. It appears, at least to Aeschylus, that Zeus'
justice in its heroic configuration necessarily generates
injustice which must eventually be repaid by a further act
of ambiguous justice, and so on, forever.
Aeschylus' Agamemnon faithfully recapitulates this
heroic cycle of justice even while it also calls it into
question. Recurring to Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia
as representative of the heroic configuration of dike, it is
notable that the episode is neatly framed in Aeschylus' text
by two references to "suffering" and "wisdom." "Zeus has
. . . laid it down that wisdom comes alone through
suffering," 89 says the chorus, introducing the tale of
Agamemnon's dilemma. Later, immediately following the death
of Iphigeneia, the chorus repeats that "Justice so moves
that those only learn who suffer." 90 These lines have often
been thought to contain the central "moral" of this tragedy
but their meaning is elusive. 91 "Suffering" is commonly
taken as a reference to the pain of punishment while
"wisdom" is often interpreted aa learning obedience to
political or religious authority. 92 But this interpretation
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is less than adequate for a number of reasons. Firstly,
everyone in the text to whom the lesson might apply already
quite justly believes that he or she is already obeying the
law in the proper sense. 93 Secondly, no one ever learns
anything in the Oresteia. They are for the most part simply
killed, as one scholar has observed. 94
The complexities of the Oresteia suggest that a more
complicated interpretation is in order. If the Oresteia
reflects a contest between two complex versions of dike, one
associated with heroic traditions and the other associated
with the new democracy and isonomia; and if Agamemnon's
sacrifice of Iphigeneia dramatically portrays the dike
upholding heroic traditions, then we are not unlikely to
find that the lines which frame that portrait point in the
opposite direction.
The Greek word for wisdom, sophrosyne , is historically
associated with the terms dike and kosmos, both of which
refer to universal order. The constellation of these
terms suggests that wisdom consists in comprehending the
order of the cosmos and acting according to its law, its
dike, and we may well ask whether the text portrays
Agamemnon as wise. The text is unambiguous that Agamemnon
follows a path laid down by Zeus in the pursuit of justice.
Indeed, Agamemnon's character dramatically embodies Zeus ' s
justice in its heroic configuration and we should therefore
expect him to be portrayed as wise, but that is not the
case. In his brief sojourn on stage Agamemnon is portrayed
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as a returning, conquering hero, but not a particularly
brilliant or insightful one. Indeed, in his exchange with
Clytaemnestra, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
Agamemnon is quite dull and even stupid. Most telling of
all, perhaps, it would seem that if Aeschylus had intended
Agamemnon's character to stand as a portrait of wisdom, the
text would have commended his decision to sacrifice
Iphigeneia as honorable. By heroic standards Agamemnon's
decision was appropriate and just. It should have been
regarded as difficult, perhaps, but wise. Instead, in a
reversal of expectations, the text describes it as shameful
and mad.^ Aeschylus' reversal effectively calls into
question traditional notions of wisdom and justice.
Agamemnon follows the dike of the heroic cosmos, yet he is
not wise. Therefore, either wisdom consists of something
other than justice, or the dike which Agamemnon follows is
not truly the justice of Zeus. Aeschylus suggests the
latter. He does not reject the equation of wisdom and
97justice. Nor does he suggest that Zeus is not just. 71 He
does suggest that Zeus* justice has been incorrectly
understood
.
Wisdom comes to those who suffer. Suffering leads to
wisdom. So states the chorus reflecting upon Agamemnon's
dilemma at Aulis. The usual interpretation suggests that
this is a sequential relationship: pain is followed by
wisdom, with the implication being that wisdom reduces or
avoids further pain. It may be, however, that Aeschylus
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holds that the actual relation is one of identity:
suffering and wisdom are in some sense united as one. 98
Wisdom consists not in the elimination of suffering but in
its retention. What can this mean? Aeschylean "suffering,"
I propose, refers to the constant tension of being pulled in
opposite directions simultaneously which is characteristic
of isonomia, the dike of Anaximander
' s universe and the
ontological justification of equality in the democratic
polis. Aeschylean "wisdom" consists in sustaining that
balanced tension, living with it, bearing up under it,
rather than diffusing or expelling it in some heroic act.
The identification of suffering and wisdom found in the
Oresteia challenges the traditional view of dike which
undermines democratic order in favor of a newer dike which
preserves it. Once again, Agamemnon's character serves to
illustrate the contrast. When Agamemnon first contemplates
the terrible choice confronting him at Aulis, he is torn in
agony. And "agony" is precisely the appropriate term here.
Agamemnon's identity embodies and reflects the universal
agon, or contest, which identifies the character of the pre-
Socratic Greek cosmos. Agamemnon's identity is at war with
itself. It is self -contradictory as it pulls in opposite
directions simultaneously. Agamemnon is, in modern terms,
both head of state and head of family." To be king he must
sacrifice his daughter in order to protect the state. To be
father he must sacrifice the fleet upon which the safety of
the state and, consequently, all families depend. Each
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course open to Agamemnon is mandated by who he is and each
is forbidden by who he is.
When Agamemnon chose to sacrifice his daughter he acted
courageously, resolutely, heroically. But he also acted
one-sidedly. He told himself that such sacrifice of
innocent blood was unambiguously right. Shedding his agony,
Agamemnon heard only the voices of fighters calling for the
execution of justice. The voice of his daughter softly
pleading against her own execution fell on deaf ears.
Agamemnon excised half of his identity and thereby shed his
suffering, but as he did so he lost his balance and his
self-restraint, signified by his failure to honor the sacred
sanctuaries of the gods in his pursuit of war.
If wisdom consists in acting justly, Agamemnon was wise
by heroic standards, according to which the necessary part
of one's multiple identity dominates at the necessary
time. 1^0 But Agamemnon was unwise by tragic standards
according to which opposing parts of the self act in unison
(but not in harmony) to restrain each other, a restraint
which ceases to operate when one side dominates and silences
the other. Agamemnon was unwise because he ceased to suffer
the agony of his identity. He ceased to be warrior-king and
father both to become warrior only, unrestrained by the
contradictions of his character. To be sure, Agamemnon had
to choose and he had to act. And perhaps it was even
necessary to choose as he did. Still he did not have to gag
his daughter's mouth and cease to hear or remember her
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cries. But Agamemnon shed his agony and forgot it. He
ceased to suffer and he was unwise.
Tragic Orestes, Tragic Wisdom
In contrast to Agamemnon, whose character represents
the heroic dike of the past, the character of Orestes
represents the tragic dike of the present in the Oresteia.
Numerous parallels can be drawn between the figures of
Agamemnon and Orestes, the most obvious of which is that
each kills an intimate family member. Agamemnon kills his
daughter and, in a mirror image of that action, Orestes
kills his mother (who of course has killed Agamemnon) . The
immediate effect of these reverse parallels is to suggest
that the wheel of heroic dike continues to turn and "right"
itself, so to speak. Until its last few lines, that initial
impression seems to be dramatically confirmed by the events
of the Libation Bearers, the second play of Aeschylus'
trilogy.
In the Libation Bearers, Orestes returns home to Argos
to avenge his father's murder and assume his rightful place
at the head of the ruling house of Atreus. The language of
the play is saturated with references to "right" (dike) and
things returning from darkness to light, all of which
suggest the eternal cycle of heroic justice based on the
temporal image of the movement of the sun. Orestes himself,
who is invoked as a hero and bringer of justice in the final
lines of the Agamemnon and in the early lines of the
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Libation Bearers, appears to his sister Electra from a place
of concealment into the light. 101 Soon afterwards the chorus
explicitly associates the "turning of justice" and acts of
retribution with the "age-old wisdom," a wisdom which will
be challenged in the final lines of this play and in the
events of the Eumenides.
The action of the play is simple. Under the guidance
of Apollo, Orestes has returned home to avenge his father's
murder by killing his mother, Clytaemnestra
. With Electra
and the chorus of serving-women, Orestes hatches a plot to
the enter the house and carry out the "innocent murder." 102
After the slaying, Orestes is aflicted by the horrible
Furies who drive him from the stage in fear and anguish.
Like Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra before him, Orestes is
required to perform an act which is both just and unjust at
the same time. And, like Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra,
i
i
Orestes initially approaches his task in the traditional,
heroic manner; that is, he approaches it one-sidedly,
resolutely. Indeed, Orestes is perhaps even more resolute
in his task initially than was Agamemnon. Prior to his
i
decision Agamemnon was portrayed as agonized by his dilemma.
Orestes, on the other hand, is confident from the outset in
the pure justice of his cause. He sees no dilemma. Apollo
has sent him on his mission of justice, Orestes claims,
armed with a litany of horrible punishments which Orestes
would incur at the hands of his father's Furies if he should
fail in his assignment. It is notable, however, that
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Apollo, the rational god, is also one-sided. He has
tellingly neglected to inform Orestes that he would also
incur similar punishments from his mother's Furies if he
should succeed in his assignment.
Within the play, then, Agamemnon travels from agony to
resolution while Orestes' path takes him from resolution to
agony. Once again the suggestion is present that Orestes
will complete the circle and finally right the imbalance
afflicting the accursed house of Atreus. Repeatedly
throughout the play the approaching action of Orestes is
invoked by the chorus and others as the event which will
once and for all "wipe out the stain of blood shed long
ago." 103 Only after the murder, in the final lines of the
play, do the chorus and Orestes recognize that locked within
the hope of eternal justice there is found only the promise
of eternal injustice. "Where is the end," cries the
chorus, 104 echoing Orestes' discovery that he has both
ins
succeeded and failed at the same time. •J
Like the hero that he must be, Orestes prepares for the
approaching contest with his mother by inducing a state of
lyssa to carry him through. For more than two hundred lines
Orestes, Electra, and the chorus alternately invoke the
traditional justice of Zeus with accelerating frenzy and
violence, at the end of which the chorus announces that "The
rest is action. . . . Your heart is set . . ., now you must
strike and prove your destiny." 106 Orestes' carefully
constructed resolve falters momentarily before he acts, as
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Clytaemnestra reminds him that they are mother and son. He
hesitates briefly but sheds his doubts, recovers his
imbalance and resolutely slays his mother. Immediately,
however, his doubts return to haunt him. He turns to the
audience as to a jury and defends himself. "it was in all
right [dike] that I achieved this death, my mother's," he
pleads. 107 He tries to frame his act as purely just. He has
been assured that it has the approval of Zeus, Apollo, and
the citizens of Argos
.
He even tries to characterize his
mother as some worthless "water snake, some viper" unworthy
of sympathy. 108 But he is unsuccessful and he slips into
agony. "I grieve for the thing done, the death," he cries.
"I have won but my victory is soiled [polluted] , and has no
pride [honor]." 109 At the fever pitch of Orestes' inner
doubt he is assailed and haunted by the Furies who
eventually drive him to Athens to escape his torment. Now
an outcast driven from his homeland and his household by the
Furies, he makes one last public appeal. "I killed my
mother not without some right," he submits. 110
The distance travelled from Orestes' first submission
to the audience- jury that his act was entirely right, to his
final plea that it was not without some right that he killed
his mother represents the difference between tragic error
and tragic wisdom. Tragic error coincides with heroic
wisdom and consists in acting and thinking one-sidedly, in
failing to hear and honor competing claims upon oneself
simultaneously. Tragic wisdom consists in recognizing that
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every act of justice contains within itself the seed of
injustice, and in somehow balancing these opposing claims
simultaneously. Tragic wisdom recognizes isonomia as the
law, the esssential dike of the universe.
Orestes' initial claim that the murder of his mother
was entirely just and right echoes Agamemnon's earlier claim
that the sacrifice of innocent blood was entirely right. At
that moment Agamemnon lost his balance and his wisdom
because he ceased to suffer, and honor, the contradictions
of his identity. In a reverse trajectory Orestes arrives at
wisdom when he recognizes that the justice of his act of
retribution is limited and partial because it is
simultaneously an act of injustice deriving from his
relationship to his mother, a previously submerged side of
his identity.
From the outset Orestes had approached his task soley
as his father's son. As Agamemnon's son, Orestes was
required by the customary code of justice to avenge his
father's murder and occupy his father's rightful place at
the head of the house. From this perspective, which Apollo
adopts, Orestes' murder of his mother is entirely
justified. 111 But Orestes is not only his father's son. He
is his mother's child as well, and from this perspective,
which is that of the Furies, the killing of his mother is
entirely unjust; it is purely criminal. Prior to the
murder, listening to Apollo, Orestes had discounted his
relation to his mother. Only moments before he strikes does
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Agamemnon's son begin to recognize himself as the son of
Clytaemnestra as well. Then, at the moment he acts, Orestes
recovers, and suffers, the contradictions of his identity,
and he begins to be wise. He comes to recognize that his
act is necessarily polluted, ambiguous. It is neither
purely just nor purely unjust. It is both simultaneously.
Shall we say then that tragic wisdom consists in
enduring the torment suffered by Orestes at the end of the
Libation Beearers? If action necessarily generates both
justice and injustice, must we conclude that the highest
wisdom consists in the paralysis of inaction? The answer is
provided by Athena in the Eumenides, the final play of the
trilogy. As has already been noted above, 112 the trial of
Orestes which takes place at Athens represents an
irreconcilable deadlock between opposing forces in which
nothing is finally resolved. According to the human jurors
the claims on both sides, represented by Apollo and the
Furies, are equal. This deadlock represents the tragic
balance, the isonomia of the universe. It is only the vote
of Athena which decides that Orestes shall be acquitted of
the charge of matricide, and she votes on quite arbitrary
grounds
.
Athena votes to acquit Orestes of his crime on the
grounds that she is "always for the male." 113 Before we
dismiss this vote as hopelessly sexist, 114 however, perhaps
we can view it in a wider light. The action of the
Eumenides lifts the themes of "wisdom" and "justice" from
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their locus within human characters and situates them in a
broader political order represented by Athena, goddess of
wisdom. The location is Athens and the political order is
democracy. Like Agamemnon and Orestes before her, Athena
confronts an impossible dilemma. She must decide for or
against Orestes* guilt on the charge of matricide.
Dramatically, the question turns upon whether Orestes
is his father's or his mother's son. The question sounds an
odd note to modern ears, and we are tempted to interject
that "he is both, of course," as though that would solve the
problem. But the ancient Greeks were not primitive thinkers
and before we leap to the conclusion that we are so much
wiser than they, we might consider that our response is
precisely the same as would be proffered by any Greek
audience. And therein lies Aeschylus' trap. For if Orestes
is both Agamemnon's and Clytaemnestra ' s son, then his action
was inextricably just and unjust at the same time. The
consequences for society are grave. For if Orestes had
failed to act against his mother, then, by a crime of
omission he would have condoned tyranny and undermined the
only principle of orderly political succession known to his
world. In carrying out his duty and murdering his mother,
however, Orestes' action violated the foundations of the
very order he sought to defend. Simply put, if Orestes was
indeed the bearer of a dual identity, then, as a matter of
justice, he was both bound and forbidden to to carry out the
same act of vengeance. Moreover, either course-action or
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inaction— leads fatally to the erosion of law and order and
the corrosion of political and social foundations. That is
Athena's dilemma: Should Orestes have acted or not acted?
Is he guilty or not guilty? Either verdict upholds a
legitimate version of justice while hoplessly shredding the
fabric of the social order.
Certainly it would be better for Athena if Orestes'
"actions" were separable, but as the failures of Apollo for
the defense and the Furies for the prosecution make clear,
they are not. Orestes has committed a single act which is
by different standards both just and unjust alike. And just
as Orestes has committed a single act, so Orestes is one man
(although he has a dual identity) and must be judged as
such: guilty or not guilty. Athena votes to absolve him of
his guilt but she does so on grounds which seem to have
little to do with the issues posed by the contest. She is
"always for the male," and it is just this apparently
arbitrary element which appalls many modern readers of the
play, not only for its apparent sexism but for its apparent
dramatic ineptitude. But the modern reader should perhaps
consider that, just as the ancient Greeks were not primitive
thinkers, Aeschylus was not a primitive dramatist. Surely
the arbitrary quality of Athena's decision was apparent to
Aeschylus and his audience and was not without its dramatic
intentions
.
The vote of Athena constitutes a political act in a
political context, and we can view it as representative of
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the often unavoidably arbitrary, and therefore unjust,
character of political decisions and political action.
Political decisions, by their very nature, determine which
set of fundamental arrangements will prevail over other
equally possible arrangements at any given time. No matter
how just, such decisions must inevitably disallow and
dishonor some legitimate claims.^
Faced with her dilemma Athena acts, she makes her
choice. But, unilke Agamemnon, she does not act one-
sidedly. She continues to hear and honor both sides at the
same time even though she must choose between them. Her
vote favors Orestes and the male, but to fully appreciate
the ambiguous meaning of her vote we must attend more
closely to the contested arena which Orestes' character
represents and embodies.
Orestes is not a modern identity, and there is more at
stake in the Oresteia than his personal "guilt" or
"innocence." Like Agamemnon's character, Orestes' character
represents a field of battle, an agon, where opposing forces
meet. There are numerous pairs of opponents at war upon the
terrain named "Orestes." On one side there is Apollo, on
the other, the Furies; male versus female; youth versus age;
change versus tradition; reason versus passion; and finally,
the political family versus the family of blood ties. In
voting for "the male," Athena has voted in favor of a whole
army against its related opponents. But at the same time
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she has not in heroic fashion elevated one side to victory
while crushing the other side in defeat.
Athena upholds the side upon which Apollo fought but
she rejects his argument against Clytaemnestra ' s maternity
of Orestes. Instead she couches her own decision in the
same words used by the female Furies, sustaining to some
degree the positions of both sides. On balance, Athena
sides with Apollo that on the issue before her Orestes is
more his father's son than his mother's. In doing so she
casts her vote for the political family over the family of
blood ties. In this she once again echoes Agamemnon at
i
Aulis. Unlike Agamemnon, however, she does not cease to
hear and honor the legitimate claims of the other side. Her
elevation of the Furies to a position of power and authority
within the political order recognizes that the unlimited
i
victory of either side over the other leads only to
unlimited bloodshed and disintegration.
It is well to remember that while Athena casts the
I
deciding vote, it is still only one of many. Her vote is
decisive only because the human jury was evenly split,
signifying the justice of isonomia. 116 Athena's vote merely
tips the balance slightly, and perhaps only temporarily, in
favor of one side over the other while ensuring that the
contest will continue. One might even construe her decision
in favor of the male, while conceding no power of her own,
to be a statement that both the female and male "forces," or
governing principles, are necessary to good order.
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Although Athena recognizes that justice speaks on both
sides through Apollo and the Furies, she also recognizes
that neither side can articulate a principle of limits for
itself. Each side claims that the victory of the other
guarantees a loss of limits and a disintegration of order,
but neither side can hear the truth in the other's words.
Only Athena recognizes that they are both right. She
recognizes, for example, that to the extent that Apollo
stands for rational order and the Furies stand for a
passionate commitment to traditional loyalties, each has a
legitimate time and a legitimate title to rule. But she
recognizes also that the rule of either alone without the
other leads to unending bloodshed. As incompatible as they
are, each needs the other as a limit to his or her own
excesses. Without fear or passion, the most violent acts
can be rationalized. But without the restraint of reason,
117passion authorizes continuous violence. It is Athena's
wisdom to recognize that although a decision must be made, a
verdict rendered, an action taken, neither side can afford
complete victory over the other. All sides must continue to
be heard and sustained in equal opposition. In the
Oresteia, Aeschylus educates and celebrates the democracy of
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The pattern is set by Achilles in the Iliad whose own
heroic frenzy is induced by the death of his beloved
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111 This is the import of Apollo's sophistic argument in
the Eumenides in defense of Orestes that the mother is not a
true parent of the child but merely a vessel which carries
the father's seed. {Eu. 657-66).
112 See p. 132
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CHAPTER 4
PLATO'S REPUBLIC: THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF TRAGEDY
Agony v. Identity
The dual vision and ambiguous language of Greek tragedy
reflects and represents on stage the principle of isonomia
(law of equals) which justified Athenian democracy. The
principle of isonomia is drawn from an image of nature which
yields conceptions of wisdom, justice, law, truth and
goodness which are at odds with the traditional meanings of
those terms within the Homeric conception of nature
portrayed by Thucydides in his History. A democratic
politics is therefore at its very origins a contest over the
meanings of words.
The natural order of the kosmos represented by isonomia
is one of a balance of opposing forces engaged in a
perpetual contest where no force is strong enough to defeat
any other. Nature is seen to be composed of pairs of forces
which are mutually incompatible yet mutually dependent and
inseparable at the same time. Opposites not only attract
and repel each other simultaneously, they mutually
constitute each other as units of power, or bipolar
identities
.
Isonomia is not a theory of power, strictly speaking.
It is a vision which implies a theory of limits to power.
That nature is an order of powers is taken for granted. The
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principle of isonomia is based on the premise that no power
or force contains within itself the principle of its own
limitation. Every force naturally seeks to dominate.
Limits are to be found only in the opposition of a different
but related force.
Isonomia characterizes itself as the law of nature
articulating the nature of justice. But this is a very
different sense of justice and a very different law of
nature from that articulated by Athens in Thucydides
'
History. In the heroic conception of justice found there
the forces of nature also seek to dominate, and they
succeed, but in so doing they generate their own opposition
which overcomes them in time. Time contains the limits
which balance out the forces of nature in their eternal
cycle of domination and submission, victory and defeat.
Tragedy constitutes a radical challenge to the heroic
tradition of Greek culture. The heroic tradition is not
overthrown or repudiated, however. It is reinterpreted and
seen to be only a partial view of nature, representing
incomplete wisdom. From the tragic perspective of time the
balance of the heroic cycle is seen to be an imbalance.
History appears as a cycle of domination and submission,
power and weakness, war and peace, victory and defeat only
because an imbalance has been introduced at some point.
Original nature is portrayed as isonomia, a balance of equal
forces each restraining the other, preventing the heroic
imbalance. Tragedy portrays the heroic cycle as a special
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case of order. What was once seen to be natural is now seen
to be a distortion of nature. The heroic balance in which
power and weakness naturally revolve over time is treated
tragically as a loss of a more original balance. 1
Tragedy introduces the notion of politics as a set of
dilemmas to be straddled rather than a war to be won. Every
political act threatens to set in motion the vertical
imbalance of the heroic cycle. The political art,
exemplified by Athena in the Eumenides, consists of
maintaining the balance even though it can never be
"perfect." Political decision-making always privileges one
side or the other, but that privilege can never be
permanent. It must be reciprocated if the perpetual
imbalance of the heroic cycle is not to rule.
Different conceptions of justice are reflected in
different forms of literature. The heroic conception of
justice lends itself to the historical form, particularly
the history of war, as Thucydides recognized. History
reveals the temporal "truth" of justice in its eternal cycle
of ascent and decline. The justice of isonomia, tragic
justice, lends itself more to the dramatic form. Tragic
drama compresses time to portray justice as a simultaneous
tension of opposites locked in a perpetual contest of equals
without final or full resolution.
Tragic drama affirms a democratic political order in
which opposites are honored as equals and no single force is
permitted to rule unopposed. The wisdom of isonomia, and
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the wisdom of democracy, consists in the recognition that
not only must opposition be tolerated out of fear of
reprisal, but one's own opposition must actually be honored
as good. For without opposition there are no limits, and
tragic wisdom tells us that we need limits even upon (or
within) ourselves. Without the limits found in opposition
every force ascends to crime and injustice. That is the
wisdom of tragic isonomia.
The Greek idea of wisdom had long been associated with
a knowledge of limits and self-restraint. 2 "Know thyself,"
the traditional formulation of wisdom inscribed over the
temple of Apollo at Delphi, originally meant to know one's
place in the social structure and not cross one's bounds.
To know thyself meant to restrain oneself and maintain one's
proper place in the social and natural order.
Tragedy continues that tradition but identifies that
order as contradictory in nature, placing oneself in an
arena of conflicting demands and loyalties. Wisdom consists
not in eliminating the dilemmas and resolving the
contradictions, for that would introduce an imbalance, but
in somehow honoring all contestants and dishonoring none,
thus retaining one's precarious balance.
Greek wisdom had always been associated with words
while "goodness" (arete) was more traditionally associated
with successful action, particularly in battle, although
"goodness" was always also the quality of a successful
person. 3 Thus the poets were wise because they articulated
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in inspired language the "truth" of the natural order.
Leaders and warriors were "good," on the other hand, if they
were successful. To be good was not necessarily to be wise.
In heroic hand-to-hand battle the quality of successful
arete could almost be said to be associated with a loss of
restraint, a loss of balance, in the form of lyssa, the
frenzied possession which overcame fear and inspired
courage. In time, however, as successful battle tactics
shifted from hand-to-hand combat to the hoplite phalanx
where success depended on maintaining one's place in line,
noble "goodness" became more associated with inaction and
self-restraint, almost the opposite of what it had once
meant, and closer to the notion of "wisdom."
As the location of "goodness" shifted from outward
action to the inward "action" of self-restraint, the arete
of action and the wisdom of words were drawn closer
together. Finally in democracy where warring words became
the medium of power and success, the domain of wisdom,
language, action, thought, and power overlapped the
political space of the assembly and the inner space of the
soul. It was this historical conjunction which permitted
Socrates and Plato to politically address language to the
arena of the soul rather than the arena of the assembly.
Plato's 4 relation to democracy is paradoxical. If we
are to take him at his word in the Republic, he considered
it the most nearly perfect form of political insanity
imaginable. 5 Nevertheless, Plato's Republic sets out to
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show us on what foundations a democracy would have to be
established if it were to succeed. It would require a new
basis of self-restraint, a new form of wisdom. First,
however, its tragic foundations would have to be destroyed.
Plato's target in the Republic is not democracy as
such. It is isonomia, the original foundation of democracy.
Isonomia is an illogical principle. Indeed it is the very
antithesis of logic. Isonomia portrays and affirms conflict
and self-contradiction as the true soul of nature.
Opposites such as justice and injustice, friends and
enemies, are portrayed as inseparably bound together as one.
Consistent with this illogical view, the language which
articulates the law of isonomia is deeply and irremediably
ambiguous
.
From a Platonic view, isonomia would seem to be a
dangerous foundation for politics because it seems to embody
the very principle of disorder itself: contradiction. To
Plato, contradiction is the metaphor of political
disintegration, stasis. Stasis means more than mere civil
strife. It represents the complete breakdown of order and
restraint such as would be found in a riot. It was a
frightening specter to all Greeks and a terrifying memory to
Athenians at the end of the Peloponnesian war.
In the Republic, Plato seeks to replace the law of
isonomia upholding Greek democracy with the law of identity
upholding logic and mathematics. The principle of identity
is the principle of non-contradiction. There are many ways
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of formulating the principle of identity. It essentially
states that opposites cannot be attributed to the same thing
in the same place at the same time. Aristotle defined it as
"the most secure arche [foundation] of all." 6 it remains
"the most secure arche" of modern rational life. 7
Plato was the first political philosopher to attempt to
place political order on rational, logical foundations, but
in order to do it he had to undermine and defeat the
principle of isonomia. That is why the Republic bans tragic
poetry from the ideal state. Tragic theater was the
institution which articulated the nature of isonomia and
dramatically represented it to the Athenian democracy. The
exclusion of the tragic poets from the ideal city of the
Republic is not a peripheral aesthetic concern to Plato. It
is the immediate target of his political project. 8
Language and law are closely related. The affinity is
expressed in the Greek term logos, which refers to the
universal law reflected in orderly thought and language.
The law is articulated in words, of course. But the
universal logos is expressed in the form of language itself.
Language must be properly formed and arranged if it is to
adequately reflect and express the highest logos of all.
That is the foundation of poetic wisdom. From Homer to the
tragic poets to Plato, the source of poetic wisdom has
always been found not only in the spoken or written words,
but in the form of speech, the inspired arrangement of the
words into an order which reflects the true order of nature.
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The law of isonomia is found in the paradoxical
ambiguity which haunts the language of the tragic poets.
The endless double meanings, double visions and oxymora
which give life to the tragic form are not warnings of the
chaos and perversion which threaten to envelop the political
order. 9 They affirm the vitality of the healthy political
order itself as a contest which preserves contradiction and
the coexistence of opposites in an uneasy balance. It is
the balance of "self-contradiction" which restrains the
political order from oscillating between the dangerous
imbalance of tyranny, where one element would rule all
others, and stasis, the absence of any rule at all. Tragedy
warns against logical coherence as a dangerous dream.
The language of Thucydides's History challenges the
tragic view of language as a mirror of a paradoxically
ambiguous nature implying the law of equals. Thucydides
portrays nature as a heroic contest in which language is no
more than another weapon in the struggle for domination and
inequality. Thucydides and the tragic poets agree that
nature is an agon, a contest of power between opposite
forces. They disagree on the geometry of that agon. Is it
a vertical cycle of ascent and decline, or is it a
precarious horizontal balance between rotating opposites?
The answer yields conflicting views of politics, justice,
law, wisdom, and goodness.
If tragedy contests the traditional heroic view
portrayed in Thucydides' History, Plato contests them both.
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Although tragedy contests the heroic view of equality, both
Thucydides and the tragic poets retain the central image of
the agon as the true metaphor of nature. Plato is much more
radical in his repudiation of this defining metaphor of the
entire Greek tradition. For Plato, the agon is also the
metaphor of stasis. Any politics founded on the image of
the agon at its core must ultimately produce stasis and
disorder
.
At the same time, however, Plato is much more
conservative than the tragedians on the notion of equality.
Plato rejects the balanced equality of isonomia in favor of
the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty retains the vertical
stance of the heroic cycle but freezes the rotation at the
point in time where reason is at its zenith. But tragedy
warns that even the sovereignty of reason represents a
dangerous imbalance inviting crime and retribution. Even
reason needs its opposition at times if it is not to ascend
to injustice. The sophistic reason of Apollo in the
Oresteia could justify any crime, and Athena recognized that
the fear and horror of the female Furies did not represent a
loss of reason or control but rather the enforcement of a
necessary restraint upon reason.
Sovereignty is the guardian against stasis in Plato's
thought. But what, the tragedians would ask, is to restrain
the sovereign? Plato's answer is that the true sovereign
will be self-limiting. Indeed this is to be the criterion
by which the true sovereign is known. Moreover Plato seems
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to believe that the principle of identity (the good), and
only the principle of identity, can fill that position.
The principle of identity, the Platonic good, is the
principle of "oneness," wholeness, and self-sufficiency.
Plato seems to believe that anything which is naturally
good, i.e., internally self
-consistent
, cannot change or
grow beyond a certain point before it divides into two.
Large, rich cities, for example, are in reality not one but
many cities at war with one another, and no match for a
smaller, more united city. As long as the principle of




Plato's paradoxical position with respect to the
tragedians and Thucydides is perhaps most evident on the
question of the status of language. Tragedy portrays the
natural ambiguity of language as a mirror of nature with
democratic implications for the nature of political life.
The view of language endorsed by tragedy and isonomia would
tend to affirm a rather robust and raucous assembly in which
all views were aired and honored. Political decisions would
tend to be understood as having elements of sacrifice to be
atoned for rather than acts of pure justice.
Thucydides portrays language as a weapon to be used in
the struggle for domination, and the political implications
are at odds with those of Greek tragedy and the democracy it
supported. Thucydides shows Pericles dominating the
Athenian assembly during his life with his considerable
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persuasive powers. Pericles' strength rested on his ability
to impose consistent public meanings on words and to
overcome the naturally indecisive and selfish language of
the assembly. Pericles was able to exercise this power by
consistently invoking the image of the greatness of Athens
over the greatness of any individual including himself. The
greatness of Athens and the prospect of immortality in
history was able to unite the Athenian assembly against the
image of death and dissolution.
If we can characterize Pericles' decisive gnome as the
elimination of ambiguity from the language of the assembly,
then Plato is closer to Thucydides in his view of language
than he is to Aeschylus or Sophocles. Plato would agree in
principle with the tragedians that language is a mirror of
nature, but he would disagree that the ambiguous language of
tragedy adequately reflected the truth of nature. For Plato
the ambiguous language of the poets represents a dangerous
distortion of language leading inevitably toward the
collapse of meanings into political stasis. The elimination
of ambiguity, and the poets who employ it, would avert
stasis and place politics on a more stable footing.
Unambiguous philosophical language would have to replace
poetic language, and philosophers would have to replace the
poets as the wise men of a stable political order.
Where Plato sees stasis, tragedy sees limits. Where
Plato sees stability, tragedy sees a dangerous imbalance and
a loss of limits. If ambiguity is lost and philosophy
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rules, tragedy asks, what is to restrain the philosophers?
Where is the principle of limits? From a Platonic
perspective it is an almost incoherent question of course.
The notion that philosophy might need limits seems quite
logically absurd. Philosophy would appear to be the very
embodiment of limits in its affirmation of the principle of
identity as the truth of nature and the fundamental
principle of political language. An unambiguous language
would reflect the highest good as the true form of nature.
Philosophical wisdom and restraint would be reflected in a
pure, unambiguous language just as traditional poetic wisdom
was reflected an incurably ambiguous language.
From the perspective of traditional arete and action
Thucydides would ask Plato what "good" is language in a
practical sense? Plato sees language as both wise and good
reflecting his position at the intersection of these two
separate strands of traditional thought and meaning. Where
Thucydides saw language as a weapon to be used in public
battle, Plato sees a surgical instrument to doctor the soul.
If a wise language reflects the principle of identity at the
heart of nature, then a good language will be a useful
device to bring the soul into a healthy state, a condition
of identity, at one with itself.
Plato seeks to replace the law of the agon in both its
heroic and tragic formulations with the law of identity
which yields yet a third view of politics and language which
will be traced out in the Republic. The principle of
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identity is based on the axiom that contradiction and
conflict are unnatural, unreal and untrue. A politics
founded on the basis of identity then will be free of
conflict and the pursuit of power, both of which are
contrary to nature. Ambiguity will be purged from political
language and philosophers will replace the poets as the
guardians of language and the figures of political wisdom.
It is well to remember, however, that when Plato
repudiated the agon as the central metaphor of politics, he
also eliminated the traditional source of limits to power.
As long as power was thought to be the natural and defining
characteristic of politics, political theory addressed
itself to the issue of limits. Even Pericles who seemed to
hold out to the Athenians the vision of an empire without
bounds never doubted that the natural forces of decay and
disintegration would overtake the Athenians in time. The
goal was not boundless power but eternal fame and glory. To
be talked about forever was a form of immortality in
language beyond death. Without the agon, a new source of
limits would have to be envisioned and articulated. Plato
apparently believed that the sovereignty of identity in the
form of "the good" would fill that role as well.
The Government of Desire
In democracy language is the medium of power. In the
Athenian assembly, the mysterious power of persuasion was
transformed into political power. It is appropriate then
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that Book One of the Republic initiates not only a
discussion of the contested meaning of "justice" derived
from a proper understanding of nature but also a discussion
of the status of language itself which will be carried on
throughout the text.
The opening lines of the text find Socrates detained by
a group of friends who wish him to stay and join their
festivities. Polemarchus presents the options to Socrates:
he will be overpowered by the physical force of numbers
unless he can convince them to let him go. 11 Socrates
suggests persuasion as an alternative to force but he yields
when his friends respond that the power of persuasion will
be powerless if they refuse to listen.
The brief encounter raises important but unanswered
questions. What is the difference between the force of
physical strength, represented by superior numbers, and the
force of persuasion? Which is the superior power in terms
of both arete and justice? Which is more legitimate, we
would ask, under what conditions and why? How are we to
evaluate the consent required by persuasion to secure its
effect. 12
The conversation moves to the home of Cephalus, father
of Polemarchus. Cephalus is a "good" man in the traditional
sense. He is pious in the sense that he observes the proper
religious rituals. He is wise in the sense that he is self-
restrained and moderate. He is well-off but not greedy. He
has less money than his grandfather but more than his
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father, and he has no desire to increase his wealth. He i,
honorable. He has sufficient money to pay his debts and
keep his word, a "noble," if simple, conception of justice.
He is not troubled by need or desire.
Socrates attempts to question Cephalus on his notion of
justice to see if it does not lead to contradiction, but
Cephalus declines the bait. He leaves the conversation to
attend to a religious duty but he bequeaths his part to his
son, Polemarchus.
Cephalus leads a good, but unexamined, life. He is
comfortable and secure and feels no need to question
traditional practices and beliefs. But Cephalus is elderly
and approaching death. He represents an age which is
already passing away. And the new age is not so self-
contained. It is no accident that the scene takes place in
the port district of Athens during the festival of a new
god. Athens has become a cosmopolitan city and the port is
the symbol of exotic pleasure and sensual desire. -^
Polemarchus takes over his father's position and
introduces the second, traditional formulation of justice:
helping friends and harming enemies. Socrates thoroughly
confuses Polemarchus demonstrating that he does not know
what he is saying. First he seems to discredit the
traditional view of justice as not useful. In a culture
which places a high value on success this is a powerful
argument. Socrates secondly shows that Polemarchus does not
know what it is that is due to friends and enemies, nor can
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he adequately distinguish real friends and enemies from
apparent ones, and finally he does not know what is helpful
or harmful.
The conversation with Polemarchus serves to show that
the traditional formulation of justice has become an
incoherent and meaningless cliche. But in the process
Socrates seems to have established that justice is a matter
of knowledge and desire. He has, moreover, injected the
tacit premise that justice and injustice, friends and
enemies, and even "helping" and "harming" are mutually
contradictory opposites which are never the same. The
ground for the eventual rejection of tragedy is thus laid
early in the opening lines of the Republic.
Thrasymachus enters to provide the third formulation of
justice. "Justice is the advantage of the stronger."
Thrasymachus also represents a powerful tradition. He
stands for the timeless belief that power is the good and
absolute power for oneself is the highest good. He also
stands for the Athenian view portrayed by Thucydides that
equality is merely a convention among the weak to restrain
the strong from harming the weak.
Socrates catches Thrasymachus in a web of apparent
contradictions. But Socrates concedes that his victory over
Thrasymachus is unsatisfactory. It was too easy,
unsystematic and incomplete. Furthermore Thrasymachus does
not consider himself defeated. He has been silenced but not
persuaded. It is an insecure victory and Socrates knows it.
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But Thrasymachus is incapable of carrying on the argument.
He is little more than an incoherent beast. Does Plato
suggest that those who occupy the position of Thrasymachus
will never be persuaded but only tamed and domesticated at
best?
In any case Plato has gained much from the reader. He
has seduced us into implicitly agreeing that the contested
terms of the argument are "knowledge" and "the good." And
he has secured our tacit agreement that the antithesis of
knowledge is contradiction. Those who contradict themselves
in argument are ignorant. And arguments which lead to
contradiction are false. By securing early and uncontested
submission to the principle of non-contradiction as the
standard of knowledge Plato has already secured the
foundation for his conclusion that tragedy must be banned
almost before the "real" dialogue begins. 14
Glaucon and Adeimantus take up the argument on behalf
of the silenced Thrasymachus. They claim that most people
secretly, but silently, agree with Thrasymachus. If they
could have their way, most people would want everything for
themselves. The convention of equality, they say, has been
adopted by the weak, who would end up with nothing, only to
curb the appetites of the naturally strong, who would end up
with everything. The convention is thought to be unnatural,
however, and anyone able to violate it without being caught
or punished would naturally do so.
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It is not necessarily a perverse argument. It is an
argument that could be made against democratic equality on
behalf of traditional arete and traditional forms of honor.
Honor was the form of praise which men either offered or
earned based on their standing or "goodness." Goods, in the
form of possessions and property, were merely outward signs
of the honor and status one had actually earned. Goods
could not confer status; they could only confirm it. From
this perspective, it is certainly possible to claim that
democratic equality upsets the natural order of things by
giving equal shares of honor to unequals. It might
certainly appear that democracy was an arrangement which
gave to the undeserving more than they deserved while giving
less to the more deserving.
The key to the argument as it is framed in the text is
the link between justice and "happiness." In traditional
aristocratic terms justice consisted of having the amount of
honor one deserved, and happiness consisted in being
satisfied with that amount. Goodness, arete, supplied a
natural limit to goods. To desire more than one's share was
unjust. Under commercial conditions, however, it became
possible to acquire an unlimited amount of goods with money.
Money represented a loss of limits. If democracy was
associated with the commercial classes, and the possession
of goods came to be associated with the acquisition of money
rather than traditional forms of success, then the
democratic pursuit of happiness could come to be associated
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with the unlimited acquisition of goods along with the power
such a pursuit would require. From this perspective
equality would seem to be a necessary social convention to
compensate for the loss of limits associated with the
severed link between "goodness" and goods.
Justice and happiness are linked and so it is not
farfetched that the quest for the meaning of "justice" in
the text is pursued in terms of the meaning of "happiness."
It can be agreed that everyone desires happiness and that
happiness in an interior condition. It is assumed that
justice is also an interior state (the text is concerned
with the "just man") but is it the same as happiness? The
participants in the conversation contrive an experiment to
find the answer. Socrates proposes that they look for
justice in the political state in order to better see it in
the soul. He further proposes that they construct their
experimental state in words rather than examine an actual
15
state, presumably to encounter justice in its purest form. 0
There is no immediate discussion of this proposal which
establishes that truth is to be found analytically in words
1 ft
and not empirically in deeds.
The origin of the polis is said by Socrates to be
determined by need. An association is necessary to fulfill
basic human needs because individuals are not self-
sufficient and cannot supply all of their own needs. The
first premise of the association, division of labor, is
logical and follows from the stipulated lack of self-
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sufficiency. Socrates' second premise, that each person is
"naturally fitted for a different job" and should perform
only one job, 17 can also be said to be logical but not
logically required. It is logical in the sense that it is
the axiom of identity in disguise which Plato is inserting
as the foundation of the polis. It is not surprising that
it will later turn up as the mark of a just soul.
The first city constructed in this manner is simple,
self-sufficient, and self-contained. Socrates describes it
as "true and healthy." 18 We would probably describe it as
"primitive." Glaucon calls it a "city for pigs" because of
its lack of more sophisticated pleasures and luxurious
comforts. 19 The designation is ironic because we would be
more inclined to describe the fat, bloated city which
follows as more pig-like in its indiscriminate feasting on
pleasure than the more primitive city.
Glaucon' s objections are accommodated and the
consequences are several. The city will need to greatly
expand in order to accommodate expanded desires. It will
need to encroach upon its neighbors' territory and it will
be the object of their envious desire. The city will need a
military to make war and defend itself. But more
importantly the city will need a government as a restraining
force. We would call it a police force. Plato calls them
"guardians .
"
The first city, the "true and healthy," city needs no
formal government and no police. It is self-governing and
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self-restrained, possessing the characteristics of wisdom
and freedom. Its primary characteristic is its transparent
visibility. It is small enough for everyone to see everyone
else. Everyone knows what they are supposed to do, they
know what everyone else is supposed to do, and they see that
they do it. It is a society in which everyone watches over
everyone else, everyone looks after everyone else, everyone
observes everyone else. Depending on your vantage point
this kind of society is either stifling or caring. But in
traditional Greek terms it would be free and wise; that is,
it would be self-governing, self -restrained and self-
sufficient .
It is the portrait of a classic shame culture. Its
freedom derives from its transparent visibility, its
simplicity, its limited size, and its well-defined and well-
differentiated roles. All this collapses with the expansion
of desire and the expansion of the city. The engorged city
is no longer visible to itself. People cannot see each
other. They become anonymous and do not know each other.
Instead of looking after one another they must guard against
one another. With a loss of visibility comes a loss of
shame. And with a loss of shame comes a loss of limits, a
loss of restraint. A loss of restraint signals a loss of
wisdom. It is no accident that the guardians of Glaucon's
enlarged, cosmopolitan city must be philosophers, lovers of
lost wisdom. The first "true and healthy" city of the
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Republic resembles Cephalus in that it too is a symbol of an
older age which is near death.
Invisibility and anonymity generate the need for a
police force, a government to watch over the city and guard
it from enemies inside and out. But who will watch over the
government; who will guard the protected against their
guardians? It is a classic paradox of government and
freedom. Plato answers that all must be governed by the one
law which governs nature, which he believes to be the law of
identity
.
Plato has framed the problem of government as one of
desire. The need for government only arose in the context
of unrestrained desire for physical pleasures and comforts.
If the guardians were to be governed by those same desires
then they would surely turn against those they were
instituted to protect just as a shepherd fattens his sheep
only to harvest and fleece them, as Thrasymachus earlier
pointed out. 20 The solution offered in the Republic is that
governors and governed must all be ruled by one desire, one
love, but the object of that love must be something of which
there is no conceivable shortage, "the good," which will
turn out to be logical identity. The true good which
everyone really loves, Plato will argue, is not a physical
thing at all but a metaphysical thing, something which is
unlimited yet is itself a limit. That "thing" is the good.
What we really seek above all, he will try to persuade us,
is a state of inner peace and harmony, without conflict or
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contradiction. This would be a state which conforms with
the true form of nature.
In order to maintain freedom while being ruled by
government, each person must rule one's self according to
the same law. When we are wise we seek to conform
ourselves, our souls and our state, with the law of
identity. Each person must seek to be only one person, not
many, and perform the one task which they are naturally
suited to do to contribute their part to the city. When
that happens the city will be one, at peace within itself.
Freedom and government are both maintained when each
obeys the same law. Language, law and justice are related
in Greek thought. The law which conforms to nature will be
a just law expressed in a form of language which reflects
that nature. This thought does not originate with Plato.
It is the traditional source of poetic wisdom. The poets,
however, in Plato's view speak a false language and portray
a false justice. Plato's complaint against poetic language
is that it is ambiguous and contradicts itself. It is
therefore dangerous on two levels. It corrupts the city,
leading it toward stasis. And it corrupts the soul, leading
it to confusion at best, lunacy and criminality at worst.
"Identity" is both a logical and psychological
principle. That is part of our Platonic legacy. If logical
identity represents the form of the highest good, the true
form of nature, then if the soul is to become good, it must
seek to replicate logical identity. The logos of nature and
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the logos of the soul must reflect each other as one. Then
and only then will the political sphere also be good in the
same image. The tool which accomplishes this political task
is philosophical language. If the city is to be orderly and
well-governed then the speech of its guardians must also be
orderly and well-governed.
Most importantly, however, if the city is to be free
and self-governing, then its citizens must learn to speak to
themselves in a language which maintains the true identity
of each. Language is a powerful political tool. Used
correctly it can bring health to the city and health to the
soul. As it turns out the primary function of the Platonic
guardians will be to guard language. And the primary
function of Plato's Republic is to teach the young, the
future rulers and citizens, how to talk to themselves
philosophically instead of poetically or incoherently as in
ordinary language.
The need for government generated by unleashed desire
initially seems to pose an insurmountable problem to
Socrates in the text. It seems that the rulers of such a
city would require contradictory natures. They must be both
ferocious and gentle at the same time. They must be harmful
to enemies and gentle to friends. 21 It seems contrary to
nature. "How can we keep men with natures like that from
being savage to each other and to the rest of the citizens?"
Socrates asks. "It seems impossible to reconcile
contraries, so it seems impossible to have a good
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guardian. "22 The difficulty expresses the unnatural
character of government in Plato's view. But then Socrates
remembers the existence of watchdogs who seem to naturally
unite the contrary qualities in one being and he concludes
that the possibility of government is not hopelessly
unnatural after all.
It is a curious exchange of dialogue made even more
strange by Socrates' sudden realization that watchdogs must
be natural philosophers because they instinctively know how
to distinguish between opposites. 23 In any case Socrates
has made several points here. Firstly, not all apparent
contradictions are real contradictions. At first it seemed
that the guardian's nature would have to be self-
contradictory and therefore contrary to nature. That turned
out not to be the case as proved by the existence of
watchdogs. Nevertheless, the premise has been reiterated
that real self-contradiction is contrary to nature. True
nature conforms to the law of identity.
Secondly, Socrates has suggested that friends and
enemies are true opposites. Friends are not enemies and
enemies are not friends. We should note again that this is
a rejection of the tragic view. We see in the Oresteia that
friends (family) can be enemies and enemies can be friends
at the same time. The law of identity does not hold. The
wisdom of the tragic identity is that it must honor
contradictory voices within itself, even when forced to
choose between them. Agamemnon could not identify himself
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solely as the head of his political family and sacrifice his
connection to his biological family without a loss of
limits. Orestes could not identify himself solely as his
father's son while sacrificing his mother without committing
crime. The wisdom of Athena consisted of balancing and
honoring those inseparable but contradictory claims
simultaneously
.
The same point is made perhaps more explicitly in
Sophocles' Antigone, where Creon insists upon the rigid
distinction between friends and enemies which destroys his
family and brings a plague upon the state. Creon resembles
Plato in his rigid separation of apparent opposites and his
philosophical resolution of conflict by the imposition of
hierarchy. Plato challenged the political wisdom of the
poets, but clearly the poets were also busy contesting the
political wisdom of the Socratics.
Finally, Socrates has made a statement about the nature
of knowledge and the nature of philosophers. The process of
knowledge is the process of distinguishing between
opposites. It is an expert skill demanded of rulers which
philosophers perform best. Natural philosophers are rare in
nature, however, suggesting that orderly government is
likely to be no less rare.
Having established the need for guardians the
discussion in the Republic turns to the form of their
education. Not surprisingly, given the power of words to
imprint themselves on the soul, stories play a significant
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role in the early education of the guardians. Socrates
first distinguishes between true and false stories because
guardians must be told only the truth or stories useful for
attaining the truth.
True stories do not contradict themselves or show the
gods or citizens at war with each other. 24 Socrates is
evidently not saying that such things never happen. 25 He is
saying that even if they do happen they are still untrue
because what is true is natural, and what is natural is an
absence of conflict and contradiction. Truth is not a
property of historical fact but of language correctly
composed to reflect the truth of nature.
Furthermore the gods must always be presented as good,
not evil, Socrates says. "We must . . . prevent our
citizens from saying or hearing, in prose or in verse, that
a god, being good, causes evil. That's pernicious, impious,
and a self-contradiction." 2^ Self-contradiction is taken to
be sufficient proof of falsity. "We must find some other
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cause for evil," he says portentously.
Once again the anti-tragic implication is that the
opposites of good and evil are mutually exclusive and cannot
be present in a single identity. The danger in this
position from the tragic point of view is that the quest for
a pure identity will continually cast out on to others the
impurities produced and found in the soul, just as Plato
28
will eventually locate the cause of evil in female nature,
and ban tragedy from the ideal city.
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Most dangerous of all from the tragic perspective is
the denial involved in the process which is symbolized by
Agamemnon's loss of memory and restraint after sacrificing
Iphigeneia in the Oresteia. The denial that opposites can
belong to a single identity disables us from recognizing
that our hates are produced by our loves. To love the good
is to love the one and hate the other which threatens to
pollute it. If identity is to be the highest standard, then
it appears that one cannot love without hating. This is the
tragic form of truth denied in Plato's Republic. The denial
is dangerous, tragedy teaches, because it cannot confront
the sacrifices it makes and the furies it creates as its own
productions and engage them as its own children.
Platonic truth is a property of language not fact which
opens up a possible disjunction between truth and history.
A true language will reflect nature and not necessarily
history. Language properly composed is a useful instrument
for doctoring and healing disordered souls. But disordered
souls also speak and make ignorant speeches reflecting the
state of their souls. In such cases their speeches are lies
but liars often make history. It is not always easy then to
distinguish lies from truth. Only the philosophers, the
guardians and doctors of language, can be trusted to make
the expert distinction, and only they can be permitted to
lie for good reason."
The most notable lie in the Republic is of course the
"noble lie" which says that the citizens are all one family
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born of the earth. 30 The effect of this lie if it were to
be believed would be to eliminate divided loyalties between
families, and to prevent competition for rule. The noble
lie unites the city into a single political unit by
eliminating distinct family units altogether. In this
situation there can be no conflict of loyalties between the
political family and the blood family such as agonized
Agamemnon in the Oresteia. There would be only one family
and it would be identical with the state.
The signal characteristic of a "dilemma" is that it
cannot be resolved by privileging one side over the other
because, in either case, the sacrifice would be too great.
The characteristic of a "contradiction" is that it can be
resolved by eliminating or elevating one of the conflicting
elements over the other. We would call it "prioritizing" in
the parlance of efficient organization.
The noble lie of the Republic transforms the tragic
dilemma of the Oresteia into a simple contradiction to be
resolved by eliminating one side. This was precisely the
form of one-sidedness which, in the case of Agamemnon's
sacrifice of Iphigeneia, the Oresteia portrayed as sickness
not wisdom. We may also recall that Socrates' "medicine" in
treating the family as unimportant or disruptive is the same
cure prescribed by Creon in Sophocles' Antigone, where Creon
tried to remedy the ills of Thebes by subsuming the family
beneath the state. There too the disease was stasis, but
206
Creon's cure succeeded only in bringing about a worse plague
which threatened to destroy the state he had hoped to save.
Having identified the true content of the stories to be
told in the ideal city, Socrates turns to their form. He
distinguishes between three basic styles of storytelling.
The first form is pure narration in which there is only one
voice to be heard, the voice of the author. There is no
deception or concealment here. The author's voice is easily
identified. It is authentic because it maintains a single,
uniform identity.
The second style is the opposite of the first and
consists of pure "imitation" with no narration. This is the
form of dialogue found in drama written for the theater. In
the imitative style the author impersonates many voices and
many characters without ever revealing his own . We might
say, along with Plato, that this style is unauthentic
because the author has no identifiable identity. He appears
always as many, never as one.
Socrates identifies use of the narrative style with
good men and use of the opposite style with the "opposite
nature." 32 The standard of judgment is the standard of
identity. Bad persons maintain no identity. Good persons
maintain one identity. On this basis the tragic poets are
judged to be worthless and are quietly but explicitly
outlawed from the city for the first time in the Republic.
33
The law which is violated by the tragic poets is the basic
law of identity which has governed the regime from the
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beginning: "...our men are not variable," says Socrates,
"each does only one thing.
"
34 This principle is crucial to
the idea of justice and the idea of the good at the core of
the Republic. It says that a good person is one person (not
many) whose soul naturally corresponds to one activity.
Justice prevails when these natures match.
In Book Four of the Republic Socrates declares the just
city founded, and by a rather deft (and logically
suspicious) process of elimination he discovers that the
principle of justice holding it together is none other than
the founding principle that "each one must pursue the one
pursuit to which his nature is most naturally suited." 35
Following this declaration, the discussion seeks to
determine whether the same configuration of justice found in
the city coincides with the configuration of justice found
in the soul of a just man, as was the original intention of
the dialogue.
At this point in the text the discussion suddenly turns
much more meticulously logical. The search begins with the
first formal articulation of the axiom of identity to appear
in the text. "The same thing will never suffer or do
opposite things in the same part at the same time toward the
same thing....
"
3° The principle is then elucidated and
37
repeated two more times in rapid succession for emphasis.
The formal statement of the principle inaugurates a
demonstration of rigorous logical analysis evidently
designed to reveal the method of Socratic knowledge. The
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method proceeds by identifying, analyzing and resolving
contradictions into their non-contradictory component parts.
If anything seems to contain its own opposite, if it appears
self-contradictory, then either the contradiction can be
shown to be merely apparent, not real, or the analysis has
not proceeded far enough to separate out the true,
fundamental identities. The argument "proves" that the
soul, like the city, does indeed have the same three
corresponding parts and that justice does indeed consist in
fitting them together in the only way possible to preserve
them as a single, harmonious unit. Reason must always
dominate, with the forceful part immediately below and the
emotional, acquisitive part always on the bottom under
control. Force is not required, however, since all sections
will naturally agree on the order because of their love of
harmony. ° Justice, Socrates concludes, "is really
concerned with internal activity--with the true self and its
business . " J:J
Plato is fond of medical metaphors and he now has
Socrates compare justice and injustice to health and
disease. "Producing health," he says, "means establishing
the parts of the body so that they dominate and are
dominated by each other according to nature, disease so that
they rule and are ruled contrary to nature." Justice and
injustice in the soul are then defined in identical terms. 40
Once again Plato has inserted a veiled but explicit
rejection of the tragic principle of isonomia in favor of
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the principle of sovereignty. in a medical context isonomia
portrays health as neither a harmony nor a hierarchy but
rather a contest in which the opponents are equally
balanced. 41 The Oresteia, which enacts this image of health
upon the political stage in the Eumenides, reiterates that a
loss of balance implies either anarchy, no rule, or
monarchy, the rule of one. What appears to Plato as an
unlimited good--the rule of reason—can only appear to
tragedy as a dangerous loss of balance. The sovereignty of
the good identity in which Plato finds the only possible
limits represents to tragedy the exact opposite: a
dangerous loss of any possible limits. It is not the rule
of reason which tragedy finds so dangerous, however, as
though the rule of passion might offer a superior
alternative. The danger lies in the principle of




The first four books of the Republic follow a
trajectory from low to high, body to mind, from the sensual
pleasures of the Pireaus to the intellectual pleasures of a
logical demonstration of justice. Retracing that trajectory
reveals that Socrates has also been more seductive than
strictly rational. 42 He has waited until the end of Book
Four to formally articulate the principle of logical
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identity which had been surreptitiously and repeatedly
inserted into the discussion at every possible opening.
Books Five through Seven repeat the same trajectory at
a higher level. The first four books represent the realm of
the body and its desires. Books Five through Seven
represent the intellectual realm of reason and its love as
the dialogue soars to the overarching height of truth,
dialectic and the idea of the good. The text ascends to
what would have been the realm of the gods and reveals the
thread of language which connects it to the world of
politics and the human soul below. Later, in Books Eight
through Ten, the text will descend once more to the realm of
worldly politics and the afterworld of death and
immortality. By that time, however, "knowing oneself,"
knowing one's place in the traditional sense of wisdom, will
have been overturned.
Book Five opens with Polemarchus interrupting the
discussion to raise the issue of sexual relations among the
guardians. The voices of all of the earlier participants
except Cephalus, but including Thrasymachus , are briefly
heard again signifying the new beginning. Socrates himself
warns that the subject of sexual relations forces the
discussion back to the beginning. It is not immediately
clear why this should be so, but the answer seems to be that
the historical conjunction of "sex" and "happiness" forces
the discussion to tackle the equation of "pleasure" and "the
good" and the love which joins them.
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Book Four had opened on the question of happiness and
ended on the same question, still unanswered. 43 The
conventional answer that happiness consists of the physical
pleasures obtainable through money, sex and power had not
yet been refuted, as Socrates reminded us. 44
Socrates now proceeds to gain assent to a program of
rationally controlled breeding and sexual activity in the
ideal city in which even the meaning of "parent" and "child"
become mathematically determined. The arrangement is
designed to minimize the disruptive influence of jealous and
possessive sexual eros upon the city.
The extreme of f ensiveness to us, the modern readers of
Plato's highly rationalized program of sex and breeding,
forces us to confront the author's intentions. Is it a
Swif tian-style "modest proposal" intended to shock the
reader (or listener) to the potential horror and absurdity
of the Platonic project? Surely it is here, if anywhere,
that such irony can be found. Might Plato be warning us
sub-textually that rationality is an extreme medicine
required to restore an extremely sick polis to health? 45 If
so, the Republic would appear to recapitulate the heroic
trajectory of Thucydides ' Athens and Aeschylus' Agamemnon,
suggesting that the medicine is potentially as poisonous as
the disease, and portending further that any future antidote
to the excesses of rationality would necessarily be as one-
sidedly dangerous as what had gone before, recalling the
endless cycle of revenge and retribution dramatized by
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Aeschylus in the first two plays of the Oresteia. Where
will it end, the tragic chorus would ask? If Plato joins
Aeschylus in calling such oscillation into question, the
Republic nevertheless has no political or theoretical
correspondence to the Eumenides within itself. The Oresteia
is tragic. The Agamemnon alone is not.
It is more likely that if Plato's eugenics is intended
ironically, it is intended not to call the project of the
Republic into question but rather the equation of happiness
with sexual pleasure. Immediately following the discussion
of sexual relations and the evils of civil strife within the
city, the question of happiness reappears once more.
Socrates contends that on the basis of the previous
discussion they have determined that the guardians will be
happier than any Olympic victor. 46 Indeed they will be the
happiest class in the city because they have the pleasure of
preserving the whole city, maintaining its identity. The
highest natures do not love the pleasures of sexual objects,
they love the pleasures derived from their relation to the
metaphysical object of the whole, the idea of the one.
Having decided that the ideal city as described is best
and most happy, the discussion turns to whether or not it is
possible for such a city to ever occur. 47 Socrates insists
that it can never occur until philosophers become kings or
kings become philosophers. Political power and philosophy
must be made to coincide. Socrates explains his conclusion
by explaining the nature of images and ideals.
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He reminds his listeners that they were seeking a model
on which they might model themselves. 48 But models, images,
are by their very nature ideal and not exactly reproducible
in physical form. He further reminds his listeners that the
conversation thus far has constructed an image, an idea, in
words. The ideal city is a construction of and in language,
not the physical world. But, Socrates insists, language
always contains more truth than action. 49
Language is the instrument which shapes the soul and
Socrates is teaching his students to talk to themselves
properly if they are to realize and maintain the ideal state
in their souls, which is where it must be realized first, if
ever. 50 Socrates can only seduce them with his language.
If they are to be free and self-governing they must be truly
persuaded and learn to speak the same language to themselves
in his absence.
Socrates has subtly turned the conversation to the
status of language and the unspoken power of persuasion. He
has been demonstrating the method of true knowledge and the
structure of reason itself. He showed that it was possible
to know something securely by following a methodical,
rational inquiry. He showed that the method of logical
reasoning is founded upon the axiom of identity, the
principle of non-contradiction. Now he self-consciously
points out that the knowledge of justice which had been
secured so far was produced by a logical argument which
flowed from an image, an idea, composed of words.
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By calling attention to the structure of the
conversation itself, Socrates has suddenly managed to cast
the entire conversation of the first four books into an
image, a mere shadow of the position where the conversation
now stands. In so doing he is able to cast the idea of
happiness and eros which governed the earlier conversation
into a mere shadow of the true happiness and the highest
love which will soon be illuminated. In the process the
role of imagery in the power of persuasion will also be
illuminated
.
The ideal city is a city composed of speech. If it is
to be well-ordered and well-governed it must be ruled by
those who are most expert at the composition of language.
It must be ruled by philosophers and not poets or sophists
like Thrasymachus . Language shapes the soul. The soul
shapes the state. Therefore he who best controls language
will best control the state. But whose language is best?
To ask this question is to ask to whom we should submit, by
whose language should we be persuaded in the contest among
the poets, sophists and philosophers? How is it possible to
decide among the language of the theater, the language of
the assembly, and the language of the soul-doctors?
The text suggests that the speech which shapes our
souls is also shaped by love. We are likely to be persuaded
by language shaped by the same love which directs our soul.
Persuasive speech therefore must contain an element of
seduction to entice the listener into desiring what is
215
offered. The love which guides philosophy is different from
(and superior to) 51 the love which guides the poetic speech
of the theater and the ordinary speech of the assembly and
the market. The rules of philosophical speech flow from an
image which inspires its devotion, the image of the good.
Philosophy loves the image of the good which is always
harmoniously one, identical to itself and forever
unchanging. 52 Its truth is reflected in an unambiguous,
logical language. Its wisdom consists of its steady desire
for the good. Its knowledge consists in its expertise in
using language to promote the good of the soul.
Poetic speech and ordinary speech, Plato believes, are
ruled by the image of war and the contest (agon). 53 Their
truth is reflected in the ambiguous language of the theater
or the disputatious speeches of the assembly and the market
place. Poetic speech loves to stir up the dangerous and
subversive emotions, while political speech seeks victory
either for its own sake or the honors it brings. The
character of ordinary speech is revealed in the selfish
babble of the market place as it pursues the power to
acquire endlessly more goods. They all lead to the same end
in Plato's view: war and stasis.
In the Republic Socrates must persuade his audience
that what they really love is not what they think they love.
They think they love the physical pleasures obtainable
through money, sex and power. But, he argues,
54 such
pleasures are unstable and their pursuit leads only to
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misery and the opposite of happiness. What they really
want, he must argue, is an internal state of harmony and
peace, being at one with oneself. This desire can never be
fulfilled by the endless pursuit of physical pleasures and
objects. That route leads only to war and stasis,
internally and externally, because it knows no end, no final
limit
.
Most people do not know what is truly good for them,
Socrates must argue, because they do not know the idea of
the good which everyone admittedly desires. That is why the
ideal state must be ruled by philosophers. Only
philosophers have knowledge of the good, the wisdom to
pursue it, and the skill to teach it.
While Socrates is extolling the virtues of the rule of
philosophy he is suddenly and forcefully interrupted by
Adeimantus who objects that Socrates really tricks his
listeners into seeming to contradict themselves because of
their lack of skill in the "game" of "question and
answer." 55 The participants, he complains, are left feeling
trapped with nowhere to move and nothing to say in this
"game where the pieces are words." But the game has
"nothing to do with the truth," he declares, because the
world of action, the visible world, the real world all
contradict Socrates' world of words. Socrates' argument has
shown conclusively, it seems, that only philosophers are fit
to rule. Yet, Adeimantus observes, if we actually look at
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the people who are called philosophers we find that they are
either "scoundrels" or useless.
Adeimantus confronts Socrates with a powerful
contradiction between the compelling conclusion of his
argument that philosophers should rule and the contrary
evidence of the senses. The objection raises fundamental
questions as to the power of persuasion and the meaning of
"truth." Adeimantus is essentially conceding the
intellectual validity of the argument on Socrates' own
terms. But why, he asks, should anyone be persuaded by
logical argument, especially when the evidence of one's own
eyes shows that the logical truth is falsified by the facts
of the visible world? Adeimantus is defending the knowledge
of the senses and the visible world (which after all seem to
produce real pleasures) against the seemingly insubstantial
truths of the intellectual world.
Socrates answers that he can only respond to
Adeimantus' objections with a metaphor, a poetic image, a
portrait in words. He supplies the image of a ship with a
mob of ignorant sailors who refuse to believe that sailing
and navigating require any special skills. The image, which
is reminiscent of Thucydides ' portrait of the Corcyraean
Revolution, portrays democracy as the equivalent of stasis.
It portrays the mob of sailors as believing that only
coercion and "sharp persuasion" are the skills necessary to
ruling. 56 The image is an allegory of language ungoverned
by the compass of truth.
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There is nothing deceptive or devious about Socrates'
resort to imagery in defense of logical truth. Indeed he
claims that it is required. And Plato clearly wishes to call
attention to this shift in the rhetorical strategy from
strict argumentation to metaphorical imagery. Otherwise he
would not have Adeimantus pointedly taunt Socrates with the
apparent inconsistency in his method. "I thought you never
used similes," Adeimantus teases him. 57 Plato is conceding,
even insisting, that the force of all persuasion including
the persuasion of logic proceeds from imagery and vision.
It is finally the correctness of the image, its truth, which
determines the truth of the argument and the power of
persuasion. In a contest between two forms of truth, the
logical and the empirical, for example, the correctness of
the vision informing the truth will determine the victor.
Socrates uses his image of the shipboard mob to
undermine his listeners' allegiance to the embodied world
and the limited vision of the goods associated with it. He
intends to show that appeals to the "real" world as a final
verification of truth are forced to presume a certain
necessity to the way things are. Theory must submit to
reality, the empiricists claim. But Socrates takes the
radical step of proposing that theory might be a test of
reality. Theory, and thus language, may be more true than
reality
.
Plato seeks to found political theory on logical
necessity, implying that things need not necessarily be the
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way they seem. If the world does not conform to the theory,
then the world may be false. In this upside-down world it
can be simultaneously true that a) philosophers are the most
fit to rule by nature, and b) most philosophers are either
useless or evil. But the apparent contradiction convicts
the world not the theory.
Several other images swiftly follow the image of the
shipboard mob in the text, 58 all designed to loosen ties to
the visible world and the loyalties, pleasures and loves it
commands. The images are intended to open up the
intellectual eye of the soul to its love for the highest
idea of the good, while dimming the eyes of the body
directed toward the physical world and its erotic pleasures.
The idea of the good is the idea which informs
knowledge and truth. The good makes knowledge and truth
possible. 5^ Socrates says he is unable to state the
outlines of the good without recourse to imagery. But he
can say what kinds of knowledge make use of the good. They
are the kinds of knowledge which the guardians must be good
at such as mathematics and geometry which are based on the
skill of judging the difference between one thing and
another
.
If the good is not the principle of identity itself,
then it is the source of the power to make distinctions and
judgments which rely on the law of identity to make them
possible. It is worth recalling that the image of the good
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supplied by Socrates in the text is the image of the sun
which is the source of power as well as light. 60
The power of judgment is called upon to resolve
contradictions
.
...if one is never seen without its contrary, so that it
always appears to be its contrary as well as itself,
then it demands judgment because it baffles the soul and
forces it to investigate. The soul stirs up its mind
and asks what one itself is. Thus the study of unity
would be one of the studies that lead the soul and turn
it to the contemplation of what is. 61
It is precisely this power of judgment which is subverted by
tragedy, Socrates claims, and it is the justification for
its expulsion. Tragedy appeals to a confused, irrational
part of the soul by failing to distinguish between opposites
such as justice and injustice or good and evil. Instead it
portrays opposites as inseparable in violation of the law of
identity
.
As he levels his charges against the imitative poetry
of tragedy, Socrates cites the law of identity once more.
"Didn't we declare it impossible for the same thing to hold
contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?"
he asks. 62 The formal accusation follows: tragedy portrays
persons "plunged into strife" within themselves "holding
contrary opinions about the same things at the same time,"
and contending and fighting within themselves in their
actions. 63 Finally the verdict,
221
The imitative poet instills an evil regime in each
individual soul, gratifying an irrational thing in it
that distinguishes neither larger nor smaller but thinks
the same thing now large and now small; he is a phantom-
maker ... who stands far from the truth. 64
and the sentence:
Thus in justice we may now bar him from the city, if it
is to have good laws, because by arousing, feeding and
strengthening that part he destroys the soul's rational
part ... and puts the rabble in charge. 65
The charge is not merely that tragedy appeals to the
emotions. It is more serious than that. Tragedy encourages
division and loss of identity in the soul in violation of
the foundational law of the city and the foundational law of
logic. Tragedy confounds the logic and the psychology of
identity. Significantly, Plato's most descriptively
passionate charge against tragedy is leveled at the shameful
portrait of good men in grief. 66 It is significant because
it is in grief at the loss of a loved one that we feel most
deeply torn in agony inside, as Socrates so profoundly
reminds us. But a truly good man, he says, will resist
inner sorrow, pain, grief and suffering, and certainly never
display anything but a calm, deliberate persona in public.
Reason dictates the expulsion of poetry, Socrates
insists. But in a rather disingenuous touch on Plato's part
he also has Socrates concede that "should imitative poetry
directed to pleasure be able to give reasons for her
existence in a well-regulated city, we would gladly take her
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back from exile 1,67 But of course tragedy cannot justify
itself rationally. To do so would negate its own identity
and destroy its balance. Tragedy is the very antithesis of
rationality. The ancient feud cited by Socrates between
philosophy and tragedy is real and irreconcilable. 68 They
are contradictory and, true to the form of rationality, the
philosopher- judge must resolve the contradiction by
eliminating one side with conviction.
Plato also permits Socrates to generously allow others,
not poets, to plead on tragedy's behalf but only in prose
form. Until they persuade us, however, "we'll chant this
argument [of the Republic] to ourselves whenever we hear her
as a charm to ward off her spell...." 69 Plato's emphasis
upon the form of language to be permitted at trials and
appeals is telling. First of all, the trial is a mirror
image of the trial and conviction of Socrates (in the
Apology) for refusing to speak in a manner pleasing to the
Athenians. Secondly, the suggestion that we should drown
out the voice of the opposition with our own speech to
ourselves recalls two injunctions. The first is the
Platonic injunction that the voice in which we talk to
ourselves is the way in which we govern ourselves to
maintain our freedom and our identity, which are one. The
second, opposing injunction comes from the image of
Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia, where Agamemnon
silenced the voice of his daughter, drowning her speech in
strength, in order to maintain his identity as a warrior.
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Lastly, the insistent control of language is reminiscent of
the "Melian Dialogue" in which the Athenians restricted the
Melians' plea for justice to a form which guaranteed their
extinction
.
Three images remain long after the trial and
condemnation of tragedy in the Republic: Melos, Agamemnon,
and Socrates. The same three images and the truths they
represent about power and wisdom continue to haunt, and




One can speculate here on the peculiar intensity of the
nomos-physis (law v. nature) debate at this time. If
isonomia represents the original law of nature then
democracy is more natural than empire, for example. On the
other hand, if isonomia represents an imposition of
restraint upon the natural pursuit of domination, then
democracy represents an artificial balance contrary to
nature
.
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I am grateful to Peter Euben for this observation.
Here as elsewhere in this chapter Euben's influence will be
unmistakable although we come to different conclusions.
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early dialogues."
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See Chapt. 2, p. 117, above.
Many of the early arguments of Socrates are suspicious
if not spurious, as even he seems to acknowledge near the
end of Book Four (438d)
.
43 Book Four opens with Adeimantus objecting that the
guardians will not be happy because they have no possessions
(419a)
.
It ends on the question of whether or not justice
"pays" (445a)
, as though to remind the reader that from the
beginning, even prior to the question of justice, was the
question, What is happiness?
44 Republic, 445a-b.
45 This appears to be Gadamer's position in Hans-George
Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets" chapt. 3 in Dialogue and
Dialectic : Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P.
Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale U. Press, 1980), 39 -
72). To some extent it may also be Peter Euben's position
in The Tragedy of Political Theory, chapt. 8, 235-77.
Gadamer appears to read his own responses to the text into
the author's intentions and weave them into a seamless
whole. However, the limits of Gadamer's hermeneutical
principle of interpretation are questionable. It is notable
that throughout his essay Gadamer continually refers to
Plato's "purification" of poetry and not its expulsion,





50 Socrates has already established in Book Four, 435e,
that the city receives its form from the souls of its
citizens
61 Republic, Book Nine, 581c-583a.
52 Republic, 485b.
53 Plato can conflate the poetry of Homer and the
tragedians because, in spite of their differences, they do
both retain the image of the agon as the central metaphor
governing their language.





The image of democracy as a huge, moody beast (493a-
494a) is followed by the divided line (509d-511e) and the



















This dissertation originated with a concern for the
nature of modern political power and its relation to truth
and language. As with Arendt, this concern was rooted in
the memory and the horror of the Nazi period in Germany. In
Hitler's Germany the power of the state was concentrated in
a drive to unify and dominate the western political world
under the Third Reich. The power of the state was further
mobilized to exterminate an entire people identified as a
people and not a state. What is the connection between
these drives of power and what are the implications for the
politics of the modern state in general and the modern
democratic state in particular? These questions have never
been exhausted. Furthermore, I fear that we have not yet
learned to frame them rightly.
It is too easy to launch an interrogation of history
from a medical or moral perspective which would identify
Nazi Germany as a diseased, perverted, or otherwise
pathological state. We might, for example, look to the
peculiar conditions of German history in order to fix the
onset of the disease and thereby prevent it or cure it in
ourselves. But this line of questioning presumes that a
diseased politics is a state of contamination or infestatio
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by a foreign invader. The cure consists of prophylactically
preventing the infection or excising it once it has entered
the body. The operative assumption is that we can identify
a pure state of health free of disease and then seek to
attain or maintain it. Excluded from this approach is the
thought that the very condition which we cherish as good
also generates the disease which we fight.
We might seek a more juridical account of the genesis
of Nazi Germany by characterizing it as a criminal state
ruled by thugs and murderers. Such an account would at
least have the merit of conceding that bad children often
come from good families, but then only through perversion or
subversion never as fruition.
It must not be forgotten that the Nazi era sprouted
from democratic soil. What if democracy and fascist
authoritarianism are produced from the same vine, and that
nurturing the one necessarily involves nourishing the other?
The question may seem absurd but it should not therefore be
forbidden. Its apparent absurdity stems from the Platonic
premise that good and evil are opposites and that like
produces like: good produces good; evil produces evil. It
remained for Machiavelli to suggest that evil might produce
good. Not until Nietzsche did the older, tragic thought
recur that good is also the father of evil.
The characterization of Nazi Germany as a transgressor
state quickly leads to the problem of limits. There would
seem to be no form of politics immune from perversion or
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subversion. "Politics" necessarily implies the formation
and use of power, and so the concept of limits applied to
politics seems to imply, as Arendt's work nicely
illustrates, the necessity of non-political limits upon
political power. Those limits have been sought in morality
and philosophy which, in the West, find roots in Plato.
Following this path leads eventually but certainly to an
inquiry upon the nature of "truth" (philosophy) and the
"good" (morality) and their relation to political power.
The dimension of language is deeply implicated in this
inquiry because of its intimate relations with philosophic
truth and morality ("in the beginning was the word") but
also because language is the very medium of political life
and political power in democracy, more so, perhaps, than in
any other political arrangement.
This dissertation has tried to take seriously the
Nietzschean thought that cherished ideals may contain within
them the seeds of evil. This endeavor entails a willingness
to consider the possibility that in some crude way the Nazi
regime in Germany represented neither a contamination nor a
perversion of the modern democratic state but rather a
harbinger of its future. The point is not to condemn
democracy nor to celebrate Nietzsche. The point is to open
an examination of democracy's foundations which is precluded
by the intellectual quarantine of an entire period of German
history as perversely or cancerously different. It may not
be sufficient to intone "democracy" as a talisman against
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fascism. It may be that something like German fascism,
albeit more refined, can and will happen here unless we are
prepared to confront all of the promises, the dangers as
well as the hopes, of our democratic ideals. Surely it is
neither perverse nor diabolical to confront the possibility
that tyranny may flow from democracy. Plato seemed to
consider it a certainty.
"Democracy" has many meanings. This dissertation has
looked at three contending theoretical views of democracy
represented in works of three Greek thinkers—Thucydides,
Aeschylus, and Plato
—
present at the height of Athenian
democracy. These three views of democracy yield three
interwoven but contentious views of language, truth, and
power embedded in competing interpretations of nature.
Juxtaposition of these theoretical strands of thought
reveals many knotted but common political threads among
them. Themes of justice, law, wisdom, freedom, war, peace,
death and immortality, for example, are but a few among the
many which might be singled out for further scrutiny.
Complete clarity is not to be expected, however. Pulling on
one thread may loosen some but tighten others connected to
it. I see this as a gain and not a loss, however.
The project embarked upon here has not sought to
"analyze" the tapestry of our politics by unthreading its
past into its separate and distinct colors. That sort of
autopsy offers its own rewards but it would, I fear, destroy
exactly what I have been seeking in the process of
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interpretation pursued here. Politics is best understood in
the texture and the weave of its whole fabric. We do not
better understand politics by unravelling the tapestry into
its separate yarns and threads, sorting them, perhaps,
according to their different weights, thicknesses and
colors. What I have sought to do instead is to unfold the
tapestry in which we ourselves are folded, and to pull on a
few tantalizing strings to see how they might be tied to
others .
*
In conclusion, I want to tug briefly but more firmly
upon the thread of "identity" left dangling from the
tapestry. In the three texts examined here, there can be
found three versions of identity associated with three
theoretical visions of democracy. In Thucydides ' History
the identity of Athens in the "person" of the assembly is
the focus of concern. In Aeschylus' Oresteia the torn
identity of Orestes occupies the stage. And in Plato's
Republic the identity of the good soul is the subject of the
dialogue. The material in these texts permits a
retrospective look at the nexus of language, truth and power
from the perspective of these identities. From there we can
we can speculate briefly on the same themes with respect to
modern democracy and its identity.
Thucydides' History concerns itself with the growth and
decline of Athenian power which is equated with greatness.
Within the heroic view of nature represented in that text,
power is composed of unity while weakness is attributed to
233
division. Political power is shown to be a composition
(poiesis) of forces acting in concert, not disparately.
There is nothing strange about this view. We have often
heard it said that "strength lies in unity" or "united we
stand, divided we fall." It is also a view shared by Plato
in the Republic. However, in contrast to the Republic, at
least on the surface, the History suggests that political
power requires an enemy, an opponent, in order to sustain
and perhaps to construct its own identity. To Thucydides
political power was inseparable from war.
In principle, unity equals strength. In actuality,
Athenian power derived from the decisions made by the often
fractious assembly. But as long as the assembly could
remain united behind a single policy, it was unequalled in
power. To the extent that the Athenian assembly was united,
to the extent that it spoke with one voice, we can say that
it acquired a single identity. Thucydides' task, and our
own, is to comprehend the accomplishment of that identity,
an accomplishment best understood through the speeches of
Pericles
.
Thucydides was no democrat. He considered the assembly
too whimsical to govern effectively. But as long as the
voice of the assembly was identical to the voice of
Pericles, democracy was the most powerful form of government
exciting the greatest possible loyalty and sacrifice. The
unity of the assembly and its identification with the voice
of Pericles was not naturally harmonious, however. It was a
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construction of power, specifically the power of persuasion
exercised by Pericles.
The persuasive power of Pericles had one notable
feature from which it drew its superior force. Pericles was
uniquely able to mute and render impotent any opposition to
his policies. He accomplished this feat primarily through
the "imagination of desire." As we saw in Chapter One,
Pericles continually enlisted support for his policies by
appealing to the one desire which could unite the men of
Athens: the desire for eternal glory. An immortal death
has always been the dream of heroes. And Pericles held out
to men the hope of participation in the undying fame of
Athens due to its greatness in war.
Sparta, the enemy, did not seriously threaten the
identity of Athens. Indeed it was partly through Sparta,
the enemy, that Athens consolidated its identity. There was
another force, however, which did threaten to decompose the
identity of Athens: the force of disintegration and decay
which eventually overtakes all things.
Identity and therefore power are coterminous in
Thucydides' History. But identity appears always to be a
precarious and dying achievement. It exists only so long as
it holds its opposite force at bay. This opposing force is
portrayed symbolically in the History in the form of the
plague (which ironically may have been caused by Pericles'
victorious policy of concentrating the Athenian population
within the walls of Athens) , and also by the Corcyraean
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revolution which represents the decay of language and
foretells the breakdown of persuasion which had sustained
the identity of the Athenian assembly.
The figure of Pericles represents the force of identity
in the text. He does not change. He remains constant. "I
am the same man and do not alter," he tells the assembly at
one point, "it is you who change." 3 Can we find another
figure within the text to personify the opposite force which
undermines identity thereby threatening heroic fame and
glory? This figure has no voice but it is a silent presence
representing the other side of identity in the funeral
oration of Pericles. Addressing the women in his audience
at the very end of his speech, Pericles admonishes them that
the "greatest [glory] will be hers who is least talked of
among the men whether for good or for bad."^ The female
force, and women's voices, represent the silenced "other" in
Thucydides ' History.
In heroic Greek literature the female force often
embodied unsteadiness and unfaithfulness. Women were
considered dangerously unreliable not because they were weak
but because they tended to change sides, they tended to
wander. The classic representative of this dangerously
ambiguous force in the heroic tradition is Helen, as
Aeschylus reminds us in the Agamemnon. Within the funeral
oration of Pericles, Thucydides has insinuated the contest
between truth and falsity that is at the heart of his
History, a contest between male and female forces.
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Pericles, the hero and the male, embodies truth. He is
singleminded and addresses the true desire of the assembly.
Women embody untruth, they bear a false identity, and they
must be barred from the field of language lest they corrupt
it.
Thucydides bears an ambiguous relation to Homer. He
positions himself against Homer and the poets, but at the
same time he strives to be a better "Homer" than Homer was.
Rather than condemning Homer, it seems that Thucydides seeks
to rival him.
Plato is to Thucydides as Thucydides is to Homer. The
Republic seems to condemn Homer along with the tragic poets,
but the similarities between Thucydides' and Plato's texts
suggest that Plato also seeks to rival Homer for the poetic
heights of truth. If so, then the Republic is heroic
literature and philosophy is heroic at its origins.
The similarities between Plato and Thucydides are
perhaps best revealed in a comparison of their own heroes,
Socrates and Pericles. Each seeks to shape the identity and
therefore the government of Athens through the force of
persuasion. Pericles of course addresses his persuasive
powers toward the assembly while Socrates, in the Republic,
directs his persuasion toward the structure of the
individual soul which he identifies as the source of the
Athenian form of government.-1
From Pericles to Socrates, "identity" has moved inward
but the ideal remains the same. To speak with, and accede
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to, a single authoritative voice yields superior strength
and goodness (arete). Plural, opposing voices signal a
decline into weakness and political stasis.
Socrates also recognizes, along with Pericles, that
persuasive force relies on an appeal to desire. Even the
persuasive power of reason and logic, Socrates demonstrates,
must ultimately rest upon powerfully seductive images for
its force. Socrates' task in the Republic is to shift the
image of desire away from the eternal glory earned in war
toward the inner peace found in the eternally elusive quest
for truth in the soul. The traditional Greek desire for
immortality in the face of death is consoled in the Republic
by the final Myth of Er which closes the text while
extending the prospect of reincarnation into another life
spent in the eternally rewarding quest for the truth of
identity
.
The Periclean path to identity requires an enemy to
fight. It also requires the exclusion of another dangerous
opponent, one who is also a friend, from the field of
language which is also the field of power. The double, and
therefore false, identity of women represents a threat to
the unwavering heroic male identity, and so they are
silenced by Pericles, neither to be heard from nor talked
about in public.
Are there parallels to be found in the Republic? On
the surface there are no enemies in The Republic, only
errant friends. This apparent harmony is consistent with
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the Platonic pursuit of identity as a universal ideal
reflecting the universal truth of nature. It can be argued,
however, that there is an enemy in the Republic occupying
the space of Melos in the History. In the Republic that
position is filled by tragic poetry. In the History Melos
was destroyed in part for its refusal to submit to the
language of justice and the law of nature articulated by the
Athenians. In the Republic tragedy, too, is invited to save
itself by pleading its case in the rational language
established by Socrates. Tragedy could not of course speak
in a different voice without annihilating its own identity,
and so the voice of tragedy was banished from the ideal
city, silenced by philosophy.
Is it significant that poetry is consistently
identified as a feminine voice ("she") in the Republic? The
crime for which tragic poetry is convicted and banished from
the city is the crime of ambiguity, a traditionally feminine
characteristic. Surely it is significant that it is a
woman, a harping wife, who corrupts the ideal regime of the
philosopher king, initiating its decline and fall into
tyranny. If so, then there is strong evidence for
believing that the ascendence of philosophy and the
conviction of reason is inseparable from the condemnation of
the "other." The charge is not merely that the ancient
Greeks were sexist, but that philosophy and the rule of
reason may in its very structure be one-sided and blind to
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the crimes and sacrifices it commits on the altar of
identity.
The Republic seeks to replace the ideal of a heroic
death in a great war with the idea of a permanent peace
beginning within and extending outward. But because it does
not successfully escape the heroic model it opposes, the
Republic, and by implication the unopposed rule of reason,
may actually set the stage for even more gloriously
devastating wars than either Homer or Thucydides ever
dreamed of
.
Aeschylus' Oresteia systematically undermines the
destructive assumptions and pretensions of the heroic,
imperialistic democracy portrayed by Thucydides. It does so
by affirming the fundamental ambiguity of language and
identity. It reveals in the Agamemnon the crimes and the
sacrifices which flow from the heroic ideal of singleminded
resolution. It substitutes in the Eumenides a vision of
democracy in which all voices are heard and none are
silenced. It is no accident that in Greek tragedy women's
voices are powerful and the female characters are often the
most richly complex. The result is not a harmonious chorus
but a noisy and fearsome clamor. The Oresteia affirms the
necessity of political judgments and convictions which are
not simultaneously condemnations of the other. It
identifies politics as a contest of claims to be
precariously balanced, and a set of dilemmas to be
dangerously straddled, rather than a set of conflicts to be
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"resolved." We learn from Greek tragedy that rationally
resolving conflict often means little more than unequal
sacrifice and crimes committed by the strong against the
weak in the name of "justice".
If Greek tragedy remains the best critic of the heroic
ideal, it can also stand as a warning that Plato did not
succeed in replacing the heroic foundations and aspirations
of ancient democracy but merely succeeded in concealing
n
them.' The warning is relevant today only if it can be
shown that the modern democratic state rests upon Platonic
foundations. The full challenge of that task cannot be
undertaken here but the most promising approach to its
exploration begins with Nietzsche.
The authoritarian implications of the Republic have not
been overlooked by other scholars. 8 Possession of the final
truth is antithetical to democracy. Still others, however,
point out that even Socrates never claimed to have seen the
light of the "good" or to be in possession of the truth.
Its positive identification appears to be eternally elusive.
Truth claims appear always open to further interpretation
and disputation. Therefore "there can be no permanent elite
who have the right to rule because they know [the truth]."
On this conventional, liberal reading democracy consists of
a collective pursuit of truth in which no single vantage
point can claim a monopoly. The eternally elusive character
of truth is thought to be a political safeguard against
tyranny while pulling us toward community.
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This position tends to overlook the fact that "truth"
and "good" are finally coterminous in the Republic, and that
the quest for truth is first of all a quest for internal
purity and goodness. While the elusiveness of truth is seen
on one hand to be a safeguard, few beside Nietzsche have
explored the consequences of never being able to be "good"
enough or pure enough. The pursuit of goodness translates
into the pursuit of a pure, internally harmonious identity.
The question then becomes, What are the consequences of
never being able to achieve that identity? The short answer
is that the impossibility of meeting that standard generates
feelings of inadequacy, helplessness, and self-hatred
(Nietzschean " ressentiment" ) which translate into a public
pool of damned up docility and rage. This reservoir of
docility and rage then generates the supply of political
power available for deployment by Nietzsche's "sick priests"
and politicians.^
Turning this Nietzschean lens toward the past and the
rise of German fascism reveals heroic strains. One might
conclude that targeting the Jews for elimination performed
the strategic function of concentrating the fear and hatred
of the other, which already diffusely existed, in order to
generate the political will and power for war. Turning the
Nietzschean lens toward the present, we might inquire about
our own foundations and our own trajectory. What sort of
democracy do we have and what will emerge from it? It is a
contest of course, but one in which we had better be able to
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1 Of course I have not merely "found" the tapestry
displayed here. I am in part its weaver and interpreter as
well as a figure in its tale. But it seems to me that
political theory is always in this position and that the
dream of detachment is itself one of the threads in the
Platonic yarn. What I have tried to do is to make such
threads more visible as threads which pull against others.
We cannot extricate ourselves from the tapestry in which we
occupy such a prominent position.
Poiesis implies composition in the sense of something
made or fashioned, and is not restricted to writing or
singing. The craftsman is as much a poet as the dramatist.
There is, therefore, an inescapable dimension of power to
poetry, and the texts examined here are, at a most profound
level, poems of power.
3 Thucydides, 2.61.
4 Thucydides, 2.45.
5 These addresses are not mutually exclusive, however, and
their comparison has the potential to illuminate the
mutually constitutive relationship between national and
individual identity which obtains today.
6 Plato, Republic, 549c-d.
7 This is not a claim about Plato's intentions.
8 See, e.g., I. F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (Boston:
Little , Brown, 1988) .
9 J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory, 263.
10 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, tr.
Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday, 1956).
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Efforts to ground legitimate limits of political power upon a foundation of truth
belong to a tradition dating back to Plato. In conjunction with the doctrine of "will to
power," Nietzsche's attack on truth has conventionally been interpreted as an affirmation
of unlimited power. I argue to the contrary that Nietzsche's work may be an attempt to
identify a loss of limits traceable to the logical concept of identity at the heart of Platonic
truth.
I identify two pre-Socratic theoretical orientations to the problem of power and its
limits expressed in Greek heroic and tragic literature. These orientations have opposing
political implications—one supporting Athenian imperialism, the other supporting Athenian
democracy—but they share an agonistic conception of power as naturally self-limiting. I
argue that the Platonic distinction between appearance and reality, and the concomitant
effort to found political stability upon the harmonious order of the individual soul, both
derive from the principle of non-contradiction which entails the rejection of the agonistic
tradition of prior Greek thought.
Notwithstanding its achievements, I contend that the Platonic restructuring of
political thought bequeaths a problem of limits without a satisfactory solution, one which
evolves into a political, philosophical, and psychological pursuit of ultimate authority. I
argue that Nietzsche's work identifies the unraveling of the problem and seeks to remedy it
by a (possibly rhetorical) return to a more agonistic orientation to power. I conclude that
while Nietzsche's remedy may itself be unsatisfactory, the position which he occupies may
supply needed balance to the tradition.

